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Introduction
In 1996 the Russian Federation joined the Council of Europe and signed the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). To many observers, perhaps wilfully ignoring the 
first Chechen War, Russia seemed to be on its way to become an esteemed member of 
the fast growing family of rules-based democracies. But only three years later the family 
fell in disarray.
On 11 June 1999 Operation Allied Force (a NATO intervention lacking United Nations 
Security Council mandate) came to an end. The Kosovo War, which had started more than 
a year earlier, was over. The day before, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had agreed 
to withdraw its troops from the Serbian Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Security 
Council had almost unanimously decided to rapidly deploy an international security and 
civilian presence in the province. (China was the only Security Council member that 
abstained from voting on resolution 1244.)
While NATO started to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, Russian Federation 
forces that were part of the international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia (SFOR) sud-
denly headed for Kosovo, through Serbian territory. Russian forces took Pristina Airport 
by surprise on 12 June. Moscow clearly feared NATO wanted to keep Russia out of the 
peacekeeping operation and had seemingly decided to force its cooperation on its Western 
allies.
NATO’s supreme commander in Europe, United States general Wesley Clark, ordered a 
blockade of the runway of Pristina Airport to ensure that no further Russian reinforce-
ments would enter Kosovo. Sir Michael Jackson, the British NATO commander on the 
ground, refused to execute the order. “I’m not going to risk World War III for you”, he would 
be quoted widely in later years. With the airspace over Kosovo being closed, the airport 
was not likely to be used for flying in Russian troops anyway.
With hindsight the Pristina Airport incident seems a prefiguration of how relations be-
tween the West, more specifically the United States and the European Union, and the 
Russian Federation would develop (or deteriorate) in the first two decades of the 21st 
century and how divergent Western responses to Russian actions sometimes would be.
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Introduction Introduction
“Problems in the modern world can be solved effectively only through serious and 
fair cooperation between leading states and their associations in the interests of 
common tasks. Such cooperation should take into account the multivariate nature of 
the modern world, its cultural and civilizational diversity, and reflect the interests of 
key components of the international community.”
The protection of human rights was a substantial part of the justification for the Western 
or Western-led military interventions in Kosovo, Iraq and Libya – an insufficient justifi-
cation from a Russian Federation’s point of view. These interventions therefore allegedly 
fuelled the idea in Moscow that it was high time to invigorate more traditional principles 
of international relations such as the sovereign equality of states, non-interference and 
the respect for territorial integrity and political independence of states. Not Russia, but 
the West was abusing the fundamental norms and principles of the international system. 
These interventions also fuelled the idea that human rights were just a Western pretext for 
expanding its sphere of influence, if not control. In Western responses, the Russian em-
phasis on traditional principles of sovereignty (and cultural and civilizational diversity) 
was often portrayed as just a smokescreen for the defence of narrow national interests. 
Western and Russian worldviews were once again colliding.
Turning away from international human rights protection 
After 1999 Russian resistance against alleged Western human rights interventionism 
also became manifest in other situations dealt with in United Nations fora, especially the 
Security Council. In 2007 the Russian Federation, together with China and South Africa, 
blocked Security Council action on Myanmar following military attacks against civilians in 
ethnic minority regions in the country. The Russian representative on the Council warned 
that it was unacceptable for the Council to discuss matters outside its purview. In 2008 
a Russian veto over coercive Security Council action on Zimbabwe was based on the view 
that electoral violence in Zimbabwe was no threat to international peace and security 
and therefore no matter for the Security Council. Again, China and South Africa shared 
Russia’s point of view. In 2009, during the final stages of the protracted armed con-
flict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
thousands of civilians were killed while both parties committed serious violations of 
international humanitarian law. Once again the Russian Federation, this time supported 
by China, Turkey and Japan, considered the internal armed conflict not to be a threat to 
international peace and security outside the Security Council’s mandate and blocked 
effective action.
19th Century politics in a 21st century world
In Georgia (in 2008), Eastern Ukraine (2014), Crimea (2014) and Syria (2015), the Rus-
sian Federation, seemingly concerned about expansion or growing influence of NATO and 
the EU, managed again and again to surprise Western actors with its interventions or 
(depending on one’s point of view) assistance in the internal affairs of other states.
To many analysts outside the Russian Federation it seemed as if the political leadership 
in Moscow was trying to re-establish a sphere of influence for itself, in which it would 
oppose interference by other major powers. 19th Century politics in a 21st century world, 
as then US Secretary of State John Kerry said in response to a Russian occupation of 
Crimea, which soon would be followed by a contested annexation. In an essay he pub-
lished in March 2016 Kerry’s Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov reminded him and others 
that during the reign of Catherine the Great “not a single cannon in Europe could be fired 
without [Russia’s] consent” and that is was Russia “that saved the system of interna-
tional relations which was based on the balance of forces and mutual respect for national 
interests” after the Napoleonic wars (Lavrov 2016). Writing on contemporary international 
relations Lavrov added: 
“I believe… it is essential for us to realize the continuity of Russian history, which 
cannot be edited to delete some of its periods, and the importance of combining all 
the positive trends developed by our people with their historical experience as the 
basis for moving vigorously forward and asserting our rightful role as one of the 
leading centers of the modern world, and as a source of values for development, 
security and stability.” 
At the same time he complained that Western powers were using the international order 
and its rules for their own gains and, more specifically, gains to the detriment of Russia. 
Like Lavrov, Russian media and commentators regularly reminded the world that Oper-
ation Allied Force was undertaken without preceding Security Council mandate, that the 
same held for Operation Iraqi Freedom (in 2003) and that the US and its allies abused 
Security Council resolution 1979 (2011) and the emerging international norm known as 
the Responsibility to Protect for an illegal regime change in Libya.
According to various scholars, the Russian perception that the West over-expanded its 
soft and hard power across the globe as well as in the Russian neighbourhood, for in-
stance by supporting the so-called colour revolutions, triggered a ‘conservative’ or ‘il-
liberal’ turn in Russia’s foreign policy. In his essay Sergei Lavrov (2016) chose a more 
positive terminology to describe Russia’s position:
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What next? 
Perhaps Operation Allied Force in 1999 was a wake-up call for the Kremlin. Perhaps Rus-
sian re-thinking of a Western-focused unipolar world only really started when the relative 
decline of the West became a prominent topic for politicians, diplomats and international 
relations scholars around 2008. In either case, the Russian Federation currently positions 
itself as a power that shapes the future world order and preferably in anti-Western al-
liances that value national sovereignty and promote respect for traditional values over 
the protection and promotion of individual human rights abroad, whether by force or by 
argument. 
What does the reinvigorated role of Russia in world politics mean for the protection of 
international human rights? In the essays that follow experts from academia, think tanks 
and NGOs further reflect on Russia’s role in world politics and the consequences for the 
international promotion and protection of human rights. 
A defining objective of Russia’s foreign policy is ‘sovereign democracy’. Rick Fawn traces 
the origin of this concept back to policy documents of 2006, situating Russia’s reinvig-
oration of traditional principles like national sovereignty in its growing unease with the 
country’s reduced great power status around the turn of the century. According to Fawn, 
Russian state authorities have been rather successful in consolidating their alternative 
views on democracy and human rights in Russia and the region. He nonetheless believes 
that human rights advocates should counter these state-led narratives, including by 
conducting and publishing impartial research into human rights violations (by Western 
and the Russian government alike) and through educational engagement of the younger 
generation.
In their essay on Russia’s role in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley and Matthew Schaaf 
affirm that Russia and China challenge international human rights norms and legal 
frameworks by offering new counter norms, based on security and political stability, the 
promotion of civilizational diversity and/or sovereign non-interference, and traditional 
community values. Russia and its allies also start building new regional organizations 
as alternatives to those of the West, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 
the Eurasian Economic Union. According to Cooley and Schaaf, human rights advocates 
better not turn a blind eye to those new regional legal frameworks, and rather engage with 
them as potential new advocacy forums to promote, or better, halt the erosion of human 
rights standards by balancing these counter norms. 
In 2011 this clash of worldviews would result in a Security Council deadlock over Syria. 
Five years later and after widespread violations of human rights and international hu-
manitarian law by many parties to the conflicts in Syria (allegedly including by Russian 
armed forces), Russia, together with Turkey but sidelining the US, the EU and the UN, 
would seek to broker a nationwide ceasefire between some of the major warring parties.
In late 2016 the Russian Federation announced to undo its signature of the Rome Statute 
for the International Criminal Court (ICC), an echo of president G.W. Bush’ undoing the 
US signature fifteen years earlier. Although it never ratified the Rome Statute, the Russian 
Federation was a signatory to it since 2000. Now it declared not to have the intention to 
ratify since the Court failed to meet the expectations to become a truly independent and 
effective international tribunal. Early in 2016 Russian authorities already complained 
about the ICC prosecutor’s investigation into alleged war crimes committed during the 
2008 five-days war between Georgia and the Russian Federation. At the moment of the 
Russian announcement of the withdrawal, an ICC preliminary war crimes investigation 
related to the armed conflict in Ukraine was underway. In a report on ongoing preliminary 
investigations, the ICC prosecutor wrote that the situation in Crimea amounts to a state 
of occupation, a qualification not shared by Russian Federation’s authorities.
Twenty years after signing the ECHR, international intervention in domestic human rights 
issues in Russia is also under pressure. Between 1998, when the ECHR entered into force 
for the Russian Federation, and 2015 more than 1,700 cases were brought against the 
Russian Federation before the European Court of Human Rights. The Court found viola-
tions of the ECHR in more than 1,600 of these cases.1 Since 2015 federal law provides for 
the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation to be able to declare decisions by the 
European Court of Human Rights, as well as those of other international tribunals, to be 
in contradiction with the Constitution and therefore not to be enforceable. This basically 
reverses the relationship between national and international law in the Russian legal 
order. It remains to be seen how serious the impact of this constitutional change will be 
in specific cases, or what its spillover effects will be, but the political symbolism can 
hardly be ignored.
1 Since its establishment in 1959 the Court delivered around 19,000 judgements, almost half of which  
concerned only five member states: Turkey, Italy, the Russian Federation, Romania and Poland.
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Introduction Introduction
tinctiveness from the West. Their power implies a further distancing from human rights, 
which are being associated with the West. Human rights advocates should therefore find 
new allies in the other two groups, so argues Smith.
Based on their analysis of changing governmental relations with civil society, Andrey 
Demidov and Elena Belokurova also reach the conclusion that international human 
rights organizations must start investing in dialogue and deliberation with unconven-
tional groups. Traditionally, they were focused on working together with independent NGOs 
involved in global society. But these are increasingly excluded from foreign policy-making 
and, under the so-called Foreign Agents Law of 2012, stigmatized and demonized as 
potential instigators of popular revolutions against Russia’s national interests. Gov-
ernment-sponsored NGOs (GONGOs), in contrast, are valued as instruments to increase 
Russia’s soft power in the region and do exert power on Russia’s external policies. Even 
though they may promote different understandings of human rights, they cannot be ig-
nored as political opportunities for international advocacy.
Alicja Curanović’ contribution helps the reader understand one of the driving forces be-
hind the ‘Russian’ human rights doctrine that is promoted in Russia and the region: the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Her analysis illustrates the evolving close relationship between 
the political establishment and the Moscow Patriarchate. While the official Church is 
rather unsusceptible to the views of human rights organizations, and it is uncertain how 
long the conservative turn in Russia’s foreign policy will last, Curanović does believe that 
some influence could be exerted through other Orthodox churches. 
The volume continues with two thematic essays. The first on Russia’s position on digital 
rights and Internet governance by Alexandra Kulikova. She describes how principles of 
state sovereignty, political independence and non-interference form the core of Russia’s 
position in global Internet and ICT-related policy debates, illustrated by its emphasis 
on state-led governance of the information space. According to Kulikova it is likely that 
national security and political stability agendas will continue to shape Russia’s internal 
and external policies on digital rights, with its sovereigntist line often trumping individual 
rights considerations.
The same principle of state sovereignty features strongly in the essay by Derek Averre 
and Lance Davies who analyse the Russian Federation’s concept of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). They argue that Russia neither opposes R2P per se nor fully excludes 
humanitarian considerations in its foreign policy, but that its approach “rests on the 
inviolability of national sovereignty as the fundamental basis of international order”. 
Human rights, particularly after the Ukraine/Crimea crisis, have also become entangled 
in political rivalries between the EU and Russia, that manifest themselves in the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership with post-Soviet states. In his essay, Alexander Sergunin argues 
that the two power blocks fundamentally differ in how they understand the meaning and 
role of human rights in the present-day world, with Russia insisting on a more contextual 
interpretation that takes particular cultural circumstances and traditions into account. 
With human rights having become an instrument for political pressure, Sergunin believes 
that international human rights organizations should not only criticize the countries’ 
governments but also emphasize common points with the EU and the positive role they 
can play in conflict resolution.
Bill Bowring’s essay is of a more optimistic tone than some of the other contributions. He 
agrees that Russia is increasingly critical about the involvement of European institutions 
such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, in particular the European Court of Human 
Rights, in Russia’s neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, Bowring holds the view that Russia 
has a long history of engagement with European human rights institutions that has left 
deep traces in civil society, law and education. The international human rights commu-
nity should further build on this history and “support in as many ways as possible the 
activities of the many courageous human rights defenders in Russia”.
A consistency throughout the different essays is the importance they allocate to state- 
controlled media as tools for the regime’s counter-narratives on democracy and human 
rights. Mikhail Suslov describes in more detail the formation of Kremlin-led commercial 
media outlets in his contribution to this volume. He discerns various foreign policy nar-
ratives that are being channelled through these TV and social media outlets, including 
about the rights situation of ethnic Russians living outside the borders. Despite their 
differences, ultimately they all represent Russia as civilizationally distinct from the West; 
a West that tries to promote its interests through ostensibly universal human rights which 
pose a threat to Russian national culture.
How influential are human-rights minded segments of Russia’s civil society? Two essays 
focus on the role in, and impact of, civil society on the construction of Russia’s external 
human rights policy. The first, by Hanna Smith, discerns three different groups that rep-
resent wider civil society views, each having different degrees of influence on Russia’s 
foreign policy. According to Smith, the ‘Westernizers’ – the group that Bowring seems 
to refer to – that favour partnership with the West based on common human rights un-
derstanding, is marginalized and discredited. The two most influential groups, with the 
so-called ‘Civilizationists’ winning terrain over the ‘Statists’, emphasize Russia’s dis-
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Introduction
Like several other authors, they argue that human rights advocacy groups would be wise 
to engage with Russia’s own views on R2P, sovereignty and human rights, leaning on the 
expertise of country and regional experts when devising strategies for states like Russia.
The concluding essay is written by Anna Neistat, Amnesty International’s Senior Direc-
tor for Research. Giving her own observations of Russia’s internal and external human 
rights policy and practice and reflecting on those of the other contributors to this volume, 
Neistat sketches the implications for Amnesty’s Russia strategy that, she argues, “needs 
to be developed as part of a more global, multinational, and multi-institutional human 
rights strategy”. While being realistic about the major, growing challenge that Russia 
poses for the human right movement, she discerns several opportunities and ways for 
human rights advocacy to be meaningful and effective, internally as well as externally, 
by minimizing the negative impact of Russia’s foreign policy stance abroad.
The views expressed in the contributions that follow are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect positions of Amnesty International, its Dutch section or the Strategic 
Studies Team. The editors wish to thank Sébastian Menninga, Nick van der Steenhoven 
and Jeroen Teitler for their editorial assistance. 
Rick Fawn 
Russian foreign policy and the promotion 
of alternative conceptions of democracy and 
human rights
Having gone in the early 1990s from being increasingly integrated into Western interna-
tional organizations and remaining, at least rhetorically, supportive of democracy and 
human rights, Russia is now a state that has systematically and creatively introduced 
into world affairs a reformulation of the meaning and practice of democracy and human 
rights. It has also created, with like-minded states, new institutions and mechanisms 
to lend credibility in its foreign policy to those alternative practices of democracy and 
human rights. Inter-governmental cooperation within the former Soviet Union, and often 
even in partnership with countries further afield, has aided the traction of these values, 
both domestically and internationally. These outcomes make the imperative for the pro-
moters of genuinely universal values of democracy and human rights far more challeng-
ing, yet equally more urgent.
Introduction 
The policies and practices of Vladimir Putin's Russia present a profound challenge to 
promoters of democracy and human rights, within that country and beyond. The regime 
has expended extraordinary amounts of talent, imagination and resources to insulate 
and make its society fearful of internal and especially external threats. In that project, 
a duplicitous West uses ‘human rights’ and ‘democracy’ as cunning ruses to advance 
mendacious interests. The practical ability of democracy and human rights advocacy 
within Russia and to engage internationally with like-minded supporters has become 
severely curtailed. Nevertheless, some capacity remains within Russian society, despite 
ever-increasing and coordinated obstacles for political pluralism. Foreign supporters of 
the Russian human rights movement continue to have every responsibility to disseminate 
alternative views that challenge the official account of how society can operate and of 
world events, and to support those who are under great threat for continuing to advocate 
political pluralism. The aspects of Russian foreign policy that promote these alternative 
conceptions must also be contested. 
The conclusion offers some suggestions. Before that, the earlier post-Cold War conver-
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gence of Russian and Western understanding is identified. Then the contribution estab-
lishes dimensions for understanding the place of Russia’s foreign policy in the wider 
world: that of the West, of Russia itself, and the role of the global War on Terror. Change 
and exacerbations of foreign policy relations are then analysed before turning to the 
future and some recommendations.
The short-lived convergence of Russian and Western political values
Even before the end of the Cold War prospects for democratization, the protection of 
human rights and the establishment of the rule of law in the USSR/Russia seemed en-
couraging. At the Paris Summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) in November 1990, all countries signed a Charter that stated that “the protection 
and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the strengthening of dem-
ocratic institutions continue to be a vital basis for our comprehensive security”.1 In 1991, 
and symbolically in Moscow, states of the northern hemisphere agreed that elections, and 
democracy in general, were no longer strictly domestic matters, but integral to securing 
international security and therefore a matter of shared international concern (OSCE 1991; 
see also Bill Bowring’s essay in this volume).
How unrecognisable the situation appears now. At the time, the Yeltsin period and, quite 
frankly, the concessions that the West provided him and the oversights that went along 
with it (not least Russian accession to the Council of Europe at the height of the first 
Chechen War), seemed a wonderful political honeymoon. True, much of the Western sup-
port was not so much based on Yeltsin’s own political efforts but on the fact that he rep-
resented the best chance in the middle of a toxic political spectrum. Hitler, we reminded 
ourselves, needed not one but three (democratic) elections to secure Nazi rule. As chess 
champion and political activist Garry Kasparov put it, “time and again the United States 
and Europe turned a blind eye to the crimes and misdemeanours” of late Soviet and 
Russian leaderships (Kasparov 2015: 6).
Part of the issue is an incompatible three-sided narrative: Western graciousness towards 
Russia; Russian perceptions of Western duplicity and mendacity; and an enduring sense 
of Russian encirclement by the West, which is exploited by the regime. The Russian gov-
ernment believed that it was fighting a just and necessary war against extremism in the 
North Caucasus. That powerful narrative was in circulation before the terror attacks of 
9/11 justified a severe disregard for civil liberties in the conduct of widespread, indis-
criminate anti-terror operations. Russian foreign policy therefore became one of justifying 
the fight against terrorism irrespective of political values.
1  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Charter of Paris for a New Europe (adopted  
on 21 November 1990). Available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/39516?download=true. 
The Western perspective of gracious accommodation
From a composite Western perspective – that is, taking the myriad of national policies 
together and particularly to summarize what major Western institutions did as a whole – 
Russia was very graciously integrated into a range of cooperation initiatives. 
Additionally, this was done, albeit unstated, on a basis that exceeded Russia’s economic 
standing. True, it remained the world’s largest state, with vast natural resources, and of 
course nuclear weapons, but its international standing was otherwise hugely diminished. 
The Russian economy in the 1990s was in a freefall and was no larger than that of the 
Netherlands. Even so, Russia was accorded membership of the G7, the forum that there-
with became the G8. Russia was accorded membership of the G8. In military and security 
terms, Russia gained important access to NATO. It was a member of Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and in addition it was granted a particular, even unique, standing with NATO in 
1997 with the NATO Founding Act, by which the special mechanism of the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council was created expressly for it.2 Arguably, Russia was given a free 
hand in conflicts and indeed in countries neighbouring it that had similarly been inside 
the Soviet Union. That legacy persists today with Russia’s on ground, and rather decisive, 
position in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and its decisive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, as well as its continued military presences in Moldova and Tajikistan.
The CSCE was transformed at the end of 1994 into the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), in which every participating state, including and perhaps 
especially Russia, not only had full membership but effectively a veto on anything that 
this consensus-based pan-European organization undertook. Until the 2004 enlargement 
of the EU, Russia had no issue with the European Union and instead enjoyed expanding 
relations. Not only continued participation in the CSCE/OSCE, but accession to the Council 
of Europe and the G8, and the granting of a seemingly special seat in NATO appeared to 
accommodate Russia’s status.
A different, dissatisfied perspective on the post-Cold War order
The Russian foreign policy perspective, however, was antithetical: not only were these 
provisions substandard and insufficient, but they also grew to be humiliating and then 
threatening. On the political-economic front Russia had, in fact, not yet been granted full 
membership of the G7 club. That only came in 2002, when (perhaps remarkably, in view 
2  The full name is: Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the  
Russian Federation, signed in Paris, France, on 27 May 1997. See NATO (1997) Founding act. Available at: 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm.
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of impeding developments in Russia) British Prime Minister Tony Blair pronounced “it’s 
a very big step forward and it’s a very strong message of support for President Putin and 
his reforms in Russia” (quoted in Popeski 2002).
That was a step up for Russia in its relations with the West. After all, PfP was offered to 
most post-communist countries and was hardly recognition of great power status. Nor 
did it give Russia any particular access to NATO. The 1997 Founding Act, while important 
in some regards, followed a parallel offer to Ukraine, entitled the Charter on a Distinctive 
Partnership.3 Russia’s status could, in Moscow’s view, hardly be comparable to Ukraine’s 
(and the only mention of Russia in that Charter referred, ironically in view of the 2014 
annexation of Crimea, to Moscow’s signature of the Budapest Memorandum, recognizing 
Ukraine’s post-Soviet borders). 
As much as NATO thought its inclusion of Russia afforded due recognition of its status, 
Moscow did not gain what it deemed commensurate with its power and its security needs: 
a veto on NATO actions. As the saying went, the then 16 members plus one Russia still did 
not equal 17. The inadequacy, from Moscow’s perspective, of the NATO-Russian relation-
ship intensified when the Alliance agreed in 1997 to expand eastwards: that strategically 
decisive piece of real estate to the Russian mind known as Poland, through which three 
devastating invasions of Russia had ploughed, would now enter NATO. Despite sitting at 
the proverbial table in NATO Headquarters, Moscow was powerless to stop it. Polish (and 
Czech and Hungarian) accession occurred in 1999, just as, even worse, NATO, which 
in Russia’s view had no right to exist after the Cold War, then launched a seemingly 
spuriously 78-day bombing campaign outside its border, and against tiny fellow Slavic, 
Orthodox Serbia. This aggression was justified as human rights protection, but NATO’s 
on-ground ally was the Kosovo Liberation Army, which had twice been on the US State 
Department’s list of terrorist organizations. So fearsome to the official Russian mind was 
this NATO attack that the Russian National Security Concept was revised the next year to 
call NATO a threat to world security (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
2000b). The otherwise benign EU, too, had become hostile by the late 2000s; Russian 
leaders called the European Neighbourhood Policy towards six post-Soviet states (exclud-
ing Russia) a zero-sum measure that forced countries to choose between it and the West.
The perceived threats to Russia did not stop there. The seemingly benevolent and in-
clusive OSCE seemed to work against Russia (and other post-Soviet states) by at least 
facilitating the revolution in neighbouring post-Soviet states. Even Putin, to 2004, played 
3 The full title of the agreement is: Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization and Ukraine. See NATO (1997) Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. Available at:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25457.htm.
fully to the terms of international election observation for the Russian Federation. No 
more. Stemming already from the overthrow of Edvard Shevardnadze in Georgia in 2003, 
OSCE election observation missions (of which more presently) which were supposed to 
be neutral if not under the control of all its participating States, were accused of aiding 
revolution.
But it was also at that time that Putin’s regime began to formulate alternative lan-
guage and mechanisms for creating a parallel universe for the domestic presentation of 
‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. By 2006 the official conception of Russian ‘sovereign 
democracy’ was in circulation, whereby political decisions were centralized in order to 
generate material wealth and societal fairness. Russia would indeed have democracy, 
but a distinctive and qualified form. In practice it meant that the regime had decided 
on a particular political values-system implemented through state-controlled media. 
Moscow’s understanding of human rights was inserted into foreign policy, so that for 
example, Russian diplomacy articulated the dangers to Slavophones in Estonia and Lat-
via and could thereby show not only Russians to be in danger but also the West to be 
hypocritical of its own values. Furthermore, outright duplicity and cunning of Western 
governments and institutions in only selectively protecting universal human rights could 
be vividly demonstrated (Fawn 2009; the wider Russian use of international law is treated 
authoritatively in Allison 2013).
Official Russian counter-distinctions to democracy and how it is achieved started before 
the promulgation of sovereign democracy, in face of the colour revolutions. The OSCE 
came under the greatest attack, the Russian government repeatedly calling it a generator 
of ‘double standards’. Moscow then promoted its own ‘international’ mechanisms for 
assessing democracy through the creation of international election observation missions. 
Although Western supporters of the OSCE’s ‘gold standard’ of election observation at-
tacked the methodology of these alternative instruments, their use and production of al-
ternative reports for domestic and regional consumption has continued. These measures 
are not mere rhetoric and theatre; they perniciously convince domestic populations of the 
conniving nature of Western governments and NGOs, as well as reinforcing perceptions of 
Russian vulnerability (the start of these practices is outlined in Fawn 2006).
These developments are particularly mendacious because of their relative success  
– especially in the increasing domestic absence of alternative information and models –  
at convincing much of Russia’s domestic population of these alternative scenarios. Add-
ed to that would be the coherent, and in many ways inventive, sense of cooperation 
among post-Soviet states to resist democratization efforts. A Moscow consensus on how 
to operate an authoritarian backlash to Westernizing democratic impulses has emerged 
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(see Lewis 2016; Hug 2016; earlier work includes Ambrosio 2009). One need not think, 
either, that resistance to a supposed Western conception of democracy and the creation 
of alternative mechanics for presenting democracy in post-Soviet states originate solely 
in Moscow. Azerbaijan, which formally remained outside of post-Soviet objections to OSCE 
election observation, has produced extensive alternative mechanisms for presenting an 
analysis of its electoral processes (Fawn 2015). The adoption in the post-Soviet coun-
tries of Russian laws that limit the capacity of the NGOs to operate is a leading example 
of authoritarian cooperation. Law-sharing for the repression of media and civil society 
is increasing among post-Soviet states. The validity of alternative norms in Russia is 
strengthened by the work of regional formations, which offer to the domestic population 
the reassurance that many other countries are doing the same. What to the wider outside 
world are repressive, illiberal practices, can therefore seem within Russian society as 
at least an acceptable regional norm. Structures from within the former Soviet Union, 
and more broadly too with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), allow Russian 
leaders to point to a wider consensus (for SCO, see esp. Cooley’s well-titled 2013 article 
and the essay of Cooley & Schaaf in this volume).
New laws are but a starting point. Activists are imprisoned on spurious grounds, some 
killed in circumstances that point to official culpability but with enough procedure and 
contingent information to give sufficient distance and doubt. All of this, even more per-
niciously, has occurred in a political-psychological environment reinforced and excused 
by the regional use of the rhetoric of the global ‘War on Terror’.
The global War on Terror
What became the global War on Terror after the 9/11 attacks on the United States ben-
efitted Russian official rhetoric. This was far from the symbolic – Putin gained positive 
media traction for being the first leader to reach out to US President George W. Bush. 
He advantageously reiterated that Russia had been the vanguard in defending against 
violent Islamic extremism, and aligned Russia’s anti-terrorist operations with what would 
become those of the West. For his part, Bush quickly acknowledged that ‘Al Qaeda folks’ 
were in the North Caucasus. 
Already in the mid-1990s the West had given a mostly free hand to Yeltsin to conduct 
the first Chechen War as his security organs saw fit. The benefit was that his regime 
was not (yet) adept at cracking down on civil society and media. Imagery and evidence 
of atrocities abounded. All the more, then, the culpability, already mentioned, of many 
Western governments of their permissive stance towards the Russian conduct of the war. 
And that, too, had deeply corrosive effects on Russian society, Gilligan (2013) provides 
a substantive account, including primary sources). What became the second Chechen 
War, like its first, was deeply entwined in the legitimation of a new Russian government, 
that of Vladimir Putin. Now, however, the learning curve of restricting media and NGO 
activism, international and domestic alike, was completed. The government ensured an 
overwhelming hand in how the war was reported and how society could respond (see for 
more on Russia’s framing and use of media, the essay by Mikhail Suslov in this volume). 
What changed? 
Two seemingly unrelated developments under Putin added to the existing Russian sense 
of Western betrayal: political contagion and energy opportunism.
Contagion came from regime change in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. What we know 
now as the colour revolutions, starting in 2003, traumatized the Kremlin. Georgia, some-
thing of a pro-Western upstart even under Edvard Shevardnadze (even he contemplated 
NATO membership and brought US troops to the country), saw the first removal of a 
Soviet-era leader. Georgia’s Rose Revolution was a combination of domestic initiative, 
Western democratization assistance, and at least the information basis for showing 
fraudulent elections, provided by the OSCE’s elections and democratization wing, the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (its abbreviation to ODIHR almost 
comically being pronounced ‘Oh Dear’).
Georgia, with under five million people and tucked away in a far corner of Europe, was 
deemed of little importance to Moscow (although its post-revolution political and foreign 
policy choices would come greatly to matter to an anxious Kremlin), Ukraine was of an 
altogether different magnitude. Ten times the population, integral to post-Soviet mili-
tary-industrial production, strategically situated between Russia and the (just-expand-
ed) EU, presented far greater challenges. Revolutionary overthrow followed in Ukraine in 
2004. Even the bastion of old Soviet ways, Central Asia, was not immune: 2005 regime 
change followed in Kyrgyzstan. The trio of revolutions catapulted Putin into counter-ac-
tion, including in Russian foreign policy. The colour revolutions coincided with a surge in 
world energy prices. Those gave the Putin government unparalleled geopolitical permis-
siveness as state revenues soared. 
But the regional challenges to Russian rule did not stop – a second, violent overthrow 
followed in 2013-14, when Ukrainians generated a second Orange Revolution, in the 
form of Maidan and then, achingly of different proportions for Moscow, as Euromaidan. 
President Viktor Yanukovych, ousted in 2004 but electorally resurrected later, was back 
in power with, one could say, a mandate from Moscow to manage Ukraine. Ukraine went 
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as a far as to attend the EU’s Vilnius Summit, where trade agreements were to be signed 
whose provisions would also bring those countries closer to EU norms. As veteran reporter 
for Eastern European report and Economist editor Edward Lucas summarized on BBC’s 
Radio 4, Yanukovych was “stupid, brutal and terrified of Putin”. When, by February 2014 
Yanukoych’s position was untenable, he fled to Russia, but was allowed only to the neigh-
bouring southern Russian city of Rostov. The Russian regime’s response has been to con-
tinue – with clever rhetoric and justifications – to restrict civil liberties generally and to 
suffocate civil society specifically. The diminution, the crippling, of the capacity of inde-
pendent civil society to operate is staggering. Additionally ominous is the Russian Justice 
Ministry’s tarring of the preeminent Russian public opinion research centre Levada as a 
‘foreign agent’ immediately in advance of the September 2016 Duma elections. Soviet-era 
dissident Lyudmila Alexeeva (2013) had already warned that it was “absolutely clear that 
Vladimir Putin’s goal … is to destroy all independent civic activity”. The regime benefits 
also from Russian civil society being divided from the population (McAuley 2015: 310).
And what of the future?
In terms of prediction and prescription: any contribution would be unrealistic if it is overly 
optimistic about democracy and human rights protection (let alone promotion). First, 
the person of Putin is simply representative of a wider set of people and of entrenched 
interests that are hard to conceive of disappearing. Karen Dawisha’s (2015: esp. 3, 8, 18)  
work exemplifies the view of those around Putin as a long-standing cohesive group. She 
terms this group a ‘cabal’, one rooted especially in the siloviki, those with careers in the 
military-security structures, but also extended to those who had secured control over the 
countries wealth in the 1990s and worked with Putin once he secured high office.
Political change, therefore, cannot simply come from removal of a leader or even a group 
of elites. Additionally, the relative success of their various control mechanisms, including 
centralization of decision-making and elimination of alternative sources of ideas and po-
litical organization, continue to diminish the prospects of alternative sources of political 
power, even of vision, to operate.
The Putin regime is astute at reading and acting upon past experience, including from 
its point of view the pernicious influence of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that introduced 
to the Cold War international dynamic what we know as the human dimension, and the 
post-Cold War institutions that grew out of it. Those offices – intentionally largely inde-
pendent of OSCE political control – such as the High Commission on National Minorities, 
the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and especially the ODIHR were perceived as 
not only lending voice but also practical support to illegitimate, even-regime threatening 
entities. The Russian regime, often in coordinated activity with like-minded post-Sovi-
et states, has worked energetically, creatively and proactively to limit the cooperation 
of outside democratizing, human rights-protecting forces and domestic Russian civil 
society organizations. Repeatedly in international forums Russian representatives have 
denounced the way in which OSCE democracy and human rights-promoting offices oper-
ate; those representatives also, for both domestic and international consumption, offer 
alternative accounts and understandings of those values (I have tried to detail this, 
including in the OSCE and the CoE where Russian and Western representatives clash on 
these issues, in Fawn 2013).
While Russian foreign policy exports its own interpretations and practically attacks, with 
vivid examples, the counter-productivity of Western ‘regime change’ in countries such 
as Iran, Afghanistan and more recently in Libya and to a modest degree in Syria, every 
effort must be taken to promote democracy and human rights back into Russian society. 
How? These include countering the alternative histories and explanations provided by the 
regime and allied media, and documenting the mistreatment of civil society. As much as 
the Russian regime has embraced social media for their purposes, alternative sources 
and access still, thankfully, continue. Educational engagement must also continue, in 
order to inform the youth, especially, of the alternatives to the Russian rhetoric. And also 
to inform them about Western blemishes, of course. Post-Crimea sanctions are targeted, 
rightly, at the Russian elite and its abiding interest in access to Western investment, 
travel and luxuries. These are not intended, at least, against the wider society and espe-
cially not against the Russian youth. Exposure to Western (or, really still universal) norms 
and practices, such as through education, remain essential. At the height of the Cold War 
exchanges provided a key means of not just developing relations but of forging concrete 
awareness of political alternatives (see Richmond 2003). This remains indispensable 
today.
Contingency is also a factor – as much as the regime claims that sanctions are strength-
ening Russian economic self-reliance, further downturns could foment unrest. Low energy 
prices are squeezing state capacity to placate parts of the population. The nationalistic 
chest-beating from the satisfaction of the annexation of Crimea may continue, but al-
ready seems tired. 
An element of geopolitical optimism still exists, too. Russia does not and should not want 
complete foreign policy isolation. Its relationship with China, although giving Russia as 
sense of ideological comradery, is more a marriage of convenience and one reinforced by 
strategic resistance to Western ideological impulses. Russia remains the junior partner 
and a supplier of raw materials, and even fears China’s overwhelming economic might. 
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True, a sports ban on Russian players for state-sanctioned doping might play into the 
hands of those Russians who like to present the country as being misunderstood and 
even harmed by a menacing outside world. But national glory also comes from inter-
national engagement. The Soviet bloc’s Intervision Song Contest (ISC), counterpoint to 
the Eurovision Song Contest, disappeared, along with many other Soviet propagandistic 
substitutions; its recent attempt at a revival has failed and Russian efforts have focused 
on winning the big prize of Eurovision. That is not meant trivially; Russia still seeks inter-
national, and especially Western, engagement. And this is a form of leverage. 
More specifically, it would be important to continue to use the OSCE and Council of Europe 
to question, raise awareness and secure information on Russian democratization-re-
sistance. As soft as these organizations may appear, their importance may increase in 
dealing with Russia if the EU’s status, and indeed internal coherence, is affected by 
Brexit. Irrespective of that, the EU has exhibited dissonance on maintaining sanctions 
on Russia after Crimea. As much as possible, genuine (not, or certainly not only, gov-
ernment-created) NGOs should continue to be included in OSCE and CoE activities and 
support. Such practice is not furthering the ‘more seminars’ argument often inflicted 
against these organizations, but an essential means of keeping channels open. That Rus-
sia has supported the OSCE Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (multiple issues concerning its 
on-ground effectiveness and operationality notwithstanding) is an example of the orga-
nization providing means attractive to a regime that has otherwise corroded its human 
dimension. Furthermore, through the Council of Europe membership, Russian citizens 
can and have raised legal challenges against the Russian government at the European 
Court of Human Rights (see Bowring in this collection; I have tried to offer accounts of 
how international organizations, governments and domestic and international NGOs can 
work together in face of authoritarian challenges in Fawn 2013). In its foreign policy, 
the Russian government seeks to legitimize actions in terms of international norms and 
laws, even if adapted, moderated and implemented in ways that outside activists do not 
recognize (see Allison 2013). Thus the recognitions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
the annexation of Crimea were readily ‘explained’. Such practices further demonstrate 
Russian vulnerability and Western opportunity: these all hardly changing facts-on-the-
ground, these justifications can be explained and exposed in international forums.
Indeed, continued Russian engagement with international organizations and norms will 
sound minimalistic, but they still provide for accountability of government agencies and 
the projection of alternative political values and orders, and even some support for be-
leaguered activists. Easily said, but democracy promoters inside and outside Russia 
need to continue to contest the official Russian unilingual account of democracy today. 
And in that they are fully deserving of Western support. In turn, every measure must be 
taken to promote positive accounts of that very broad, non-exclusivist Western concep-
tion of democracy and human rights, and to countermand the sophisticated yet deeply 
pernicious sets of Russian counter-narratives. The West makes mistakes. Its societies 
create and face divisive, polarizing issues. But its open and pluralistic ethos ensures that 
those mistakes and failures are evident. Everyone should know that, and everyone should 
have the opportunity to experience and participate fully in respectful pluralistic systems, 
regardless and because of their deficiencies. Our collective, brutal, history gives ample 
evidence of the costs otherwise. 
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Alexander Cooley and Matthew Schaaf 
The rise of authoritarian regionalism: 
Russia and China’s challenge to international 
human rights norms and law
New geopolitical dynamics across Eurasia pose a profound challenge to the international 
human rights protection regime. International institutions and organizations devised by 
Russia and China promote alternative legal frameworks that facilitate the erosion of hu-
man rights standards and protections established by international human rights law and 
ultimately strengthen the hand of authoritarian regimes as they target their perceived 
opponents. In response, governments, international organizations, and activists seeking 
to preserve and strengthen human rights protections must forcefully resist efforts to 
water down human rights commitments, keep rights front and centre in their multilateral 
and bilateral engagements, and support activists on the ground.
Introduction 
Since 2001, international interest in Central Asia has intensified as Russia, China, the 
United States and the European Union have all pursued new regional strategies and 
adopted a broad range of instruments of soft power and influence. Over roughly the 
same period, the state of political rights and civil liberties in Central Asia has markedly 
deteriorated, as authoritarians have consolidated their rule and constricted the space for 
human rights advocacy. The onset of the ‘colour revolutions’ in the mid-2000s, the Arab 
Spring of 2011 and the Ukraine crisis of 2014 have all greatly alarmed the Central Asian 
regimes, leading to new crackdowns and attempts to control civil society, restrict media 
freedoms, and squelch street protests. 
As a result, the external support of human rights in Central Asia has become inextricably 
intertwined with regional geopolitical agendas in two main ways. First, Russia and China 
have strongly backed and frequently copied the Central Asian regimes and their new 
repressive measures, accusing the West of attempting to destabilize the region by pro-
moting its values agenda and unwanted interference into the region’s domestic affairs. 
Second, within both the United States and the European Union the question of how much 
emphasis to afford to human rights in regional policy has generated intense internal de-
bates; for example, the sanctions imposed on the Uzbek government following its bloody 
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crackdown on protestors in Andijan in May 2005 precipitated a divisive debate in both 
Washington and Brussels about how much leverage the West actually exerts over hardline 
regimes in the region (Cooley 2008).
Over the same period, a more consequential change in the regional environment, mostly 
unacknowledged by policymakers, has also taken place: from providing opportunities for 
the dissemination of human rights norms, standards and practices, the international 
political and normative environment has increasingly become hostile to the human rights 
endeavour. Over the last fifteen years Russia and China have expanded their political, 
economic and legal reach across the region and pioneered new instruments of influence 
and legal frameworks. Russia has promoted organizations like the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, most 
recently, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which it considers to be the foundation 
for a future more comprehensive EU-style Eurasian integration. China, too, has rapidly 
expanded its engagement on both security and economic issues with the Central Asian 
states. It has channelled many of its initiatives through the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization (SCO) – comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan – which has proclaimed itself as a ‘new style’ regional organization that seeks 
to promote regional understanding and trust, especially in the areas of security and 
countering terrorism. In the past, sceptical commentators have criticized the actual sub-
stantive accomplishments of these organizations, regarding them as ‘virtual’ regional 
organizations or ‘cheap talk’ shops. 
However, while these organizations have often failed to function as effective prob-
lem-solving bodies or regional integration mechanisms, they have been more successful 
as political vehicles. They have grounded the backlash against Western human rights 
promotion in new legal and normative frameworks and provided mechanisms for partic-
ipating states to enhance and streamline their cooperation, especially when it comes to 
collaboration among security agencies. At the same time Western credibility as a promot-
er of liberal values is at an all-time low, given the damage to US moral authority inflicted 
by its violations of human rights norms in prosecuting the global War on Terror and the 
EU’s internal struggles in dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis, the rise of illiberal gov-
ernments in Poland and Hungary, and the UK referendum for Brexit. 
In this essay, we overview some of the features of this new environment supported by 
Moscow and Beijing, highlighting their implications for advocates and policymakers. 
New regional laws and treaties
First, Russia and China have promoted new regional organizations and treaties that have 
been key in seeking to establish new legal frameworks that have facilitated the erosion of 
human rights standards and protections. Consider the SCO and its 2009 Anti-Terror Treaty 
and its Regional Anti-terrorism Structure, along with the CIS Minsk Convention (1994).1 
The SCO’s Counterterrorism Convention of 2009 created a new, regional legal fabric for 
combatting the so-called three evils of ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’. In prac-
tice, the treaty creates a web of new extraterritorial rules and obligations that, in the 
name of pursuing these security objectives, empower domestic security services and 
erode human rights safeguards. Most important, the treaty obliges member countries to 
reciprocally recognize designated groups as ‘terrorist’, regardless of their own national 
laws, due process or reference to standards of proof (Article 10), while further obliging 
member states to act on requests for extraditions within 30 days regardless of national 
extradition procedures (Article 14). Another provision (Article 18) explicitly allows mem-
bers to dispatch its agents and personnel on to the territory of another member to conduct 
an investigation. 
The SCO also has established the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure (RATS), located in 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, a cooperation and data-sharing forum for the security services of 
SCO member states. International human rights watchdogs have been especially con-
cerned at how RATS designates individuals and organizations as “terrorists, separatists 
or extremists”, noting that there is no transparent procedure for a group to contest its 
designation or be delisted (HRIC 2011/ International Federation for Human Rights 2012). 
The list itself seems to have grown at an alarming rate – from 15 organizations and 
individuals in 2006 to 69 organizations and over 2500 individuals in 2016.2 Of special 
concern to human rights observers is that the RATS blacklist has fostered a regional log-
rolling dynamic, where each member country places its own domestic political opponents 
or ‘extremist’ organization on the expectation that its designations will be reciprocated. In 
2009, then UN special rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human Rights Martin Scheinin 
expressed “serious concerns” about these SCO data-sharing and blacklisting practices by 
observing that they were “not subject to any meaningful form of oversight and there are 
no human rights safeguards attached to data and information sharing” (Scheinin 2009). 
1 This section draws on Cooley, A. & M. Schaaf (2017 forthcoming) ‘Grounding the Backlash: Regional Security  
Treaties, Counter norms and Human Rights in Eurasia’ in: S. Hopgood, L. Vinjamuri & J. Snyder (eds) Human 
Rights Futures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2 Rymbaev, S. (2016) ‘SCO terrorism fighters are creating a database of suicide bombers’, Region.kg,  
13 September. Available at: http://region.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=artile&id=2059:2016-09- 
13-20-20-53&catid=28:bezopasnost&Itemid=35.
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He also noted that, “cooperation between secret services [in the SCO] is exercised without 
any oversight” and information-sharing is not subject to disclosure.
A similar extraterritorial framework for legal cooperation is the Minsk Convention (formal-
ly the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family, and Criminal 
Cases) of the CIS, another grouping of Eurasian states. The Minsk Convention governing 
legal cooperation among CIS members and the legal status and rights of citizens of CIS 
countries when within the CIS bloc, provides for similar forms of legal cooperation among 
members as does the SCO’s Counterterrorism Convention. Ratified by Armenia, Belarus,  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Ukraine in 1994, the Minsk Convention also provides for extra-territorial implementation 
of member states’ laws and court rulings, and expedited extradition without the due pro-
cess provided by courts charged with upholding domestic and international anti-torture 
and civil protections. 
Taken together, these regional frameworks have strengthened security and regime power 
by offering mechanisms to target political opponents and human rights advocates resid-
ing abroad and have offered a mechanism for regional security services to increase and 
justify their cooperation. They have justified the detention and transfer of Central Asians 
living in Russia back to the region by Russian security forces and from one Central Asian 
country to another. Although not substituting or abrogating human rights treaty commit-
ments in any legal sense, these regimes have eroded and muddled the procedures and 
legal frameworks surrounding important human rights safeguards by providing an at 
least plausible normative basis for subverting regular extradition procedures and political 
asylum hearings. For example, as described below, they have also served as a convenient 
justification for violating basic protections of international human rights law such as the 
non-refoulement principle, under which the return of a person to a country where s/he 
may be at risk of torture is prohibited. 
Against liberalism: the rise of counter norms 
The expansion of Russian and Chinese-led regional organizations in Central Asia has also 
promoted the rise of a range of regional norms that seek to counter liberal democracy 
and the promotion of universal rights. First, and most significantly, is the counter norm 
of security and political stability. Following the attacks of 9/11 and the launch of the 
US-led global War on Terror, counterterrorism has been widely invoked to justify a new 
consolidation of executive power. Professor of Sociology and International Affairs  Kim 
Lane Scheppele (2007) has termed this a transnational anti-constitutional movement, in 
contrast to the rights-based frameworks that were built up in the 1990s; this movement 
has featured an increase in surveillance and the use of arbitrary detention, the estab-
lishment of parallel legal processes for accused terrorists, the expansion of extrajudicial 
measures such as state-led renditions, and the deepening of security cooperation among 
internal security services without accompanying transnational monitoring or checks. 
In Eurasia in particular, the onset of the so-called colour revolutions of the mid-2000s, 
in which regimes relatively friendly to the Kremlin were swept out of power following 
apparent electoral fraud and subsequent mass popular protest, has further equated the 
promotion of democracy with regime change and insecurity. The Russian government has 
adopted increasing restrictions on civil society groups – including the ‘foreign agents’ 
law, the ‘patriotic stop list’ passed by the Russian parliament’s upper chamber, and 
the 2015 law on ‘undesirable’ organizations that banned certain groups, including the 
National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Societies Foundations, completely, and 
criminalized any association by Russian citizens with them. Both the Kazakh and Kyrgyz 
parliament considered so-called copycat laws, based on Russian legislation (see below 
for more on the Kyrgyz legislation). Finally, the rise of ISIS, and reports of its active 
recruiting of Central Asians from the region and third countries such as Russia and 
Turkey, has further prompted governments to justify internal crackdowns in the name of 
countering terrorism and extremism. In short, the space for pluralism and the activities 
of civil society is clearly shrinking under the security imperative. 
A second counter norm, one that is often pushed by China, is that of ‘civilizational diver-
sity’ and/or sovereign non-interference. Embodied in the founding documents and public 
statements of the SCO, civilizational diversity, also referred to as the ‘Shanghai Spirit’, 
meant to celebrate and respect the right of each state and civilization to formulate its 
own cultural and political values without judgment or external interference. This doctrine 
stands in contrast to the political and human rights criteria which must generally be 
accepted to participate in Western international organizations and which proscribe the 
domestic freedom of action of regimes, and embody certain political values such as the 
universality of human rights.
A third counter norm, pushed more vigorously by the Russian Federation, is that of the 
‘traditional values’ agenda (see also the essays of Alicja Curanović and Bill Bowring in 
this volume). This has increasingly been offered as a critique of Western emphasis on 
individual rights and its alleged moral decay, and emphasizes the primacy of official 
religious institutions such as the Orthodox church, national identity and culture, and the 
promotion of the traditional family and rejection of other family forms, especially those 
created by LGBT people (Lukin 2014). Some foreign policy commentators have advocated 
that this traditional values agenda has also become the normative framework behind the 
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expansion of the Eurasian Union, while others have sought to fuse the counter norm with 
the resurgent ‘Eurasianism’. 
In 2016, the Kyrgyz parliament preliminarily approved a copycat ‘anti-gay propaganda 
law’, modelled on Russian legislation though going beyond Russia’s law by providing 
possible jail time for violators. Reports indicate that violence against the LGBT com-
munity has increased by 300 per cent in the two years since the legislation was first 
introduced. Russia has also sought to lead the promotion of ‘traditional values’ interna-
tionally, working pragmatically with states in the Islamic world, the global conservative 
religious right, and others to advance their shared values (Hooper 2016). For example, 
Moscow collaborated with Islamic states to pass a resolution on the "traditional values 
of mankind” at the UNHRC in September 2012, which was heavily criticized by the EU and 
LGBT rights organizations, and by opposing the creation of a UN expert to research and 
report on violence and discrimination against LGBT people. 
None of these norms, individually, can be said to be the universal alternative to liberalism. 
However, taken together, the counter norms of security, civilizational diversity and tradi-
tional values offer a menu of options for Eurasian governments to justify and legitimize 
their political crackdown and violations of rights. 
Redefining existing institutions and spaces
Another characteristic of the geopolitical shift in Central Asia involves Russia and Chi-
na targeting the institutional practices, norms and procedures of existing international 
organizations. During the 1990s, scholars and policymakers assumed that international 
organizations operating in the region would help to strengthen and disseminate human 
rights norms. However, we now see that even regional organizations that were predicated 
on a values platform are now changing their character. 
The most important case here is that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) which, upon its founding, had a ‘human dimension’ component that 
was committed to upholding the rights and freedoms embodied in the Helsinki Final Act. 
However, during the 2000s Russia and the Central Asian states increasingly criticized the 
OSCE for aligning the geopolitical agendas of the West and as sources of criticism for 
their domestic practices, and resisted OSCE and its participating states’ efforts to uphold 
the ‘human dimension’ commitments on human rights, pluralism, and elections (see 
for more on Russia and its relations with the OSCE Bill Bowring’s essay in this volume). 
One of Moscow’s main targets has been the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic In-
stitutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Among its many activities, the ODIHR has been 
responsible for sending comprehensive election monitoring missions. But since the ODIHR 
established a pattern of issuing critical reports, Russia, backed by the Central Asian 
states, has led a campaign to change the practices of the ODIHR, including introduc-
ing proposals that would reduce the number of election observers, allowing the head of 
mission to be appointed by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (not the ODIHR Office) and 
reaching its final assessment of a national election in consultation with the host country 
government. If adopted, these reforms would gut the practice of election monitoring as 
we know it. Not coincidentally, over the last decade, both Russia and China have also 
pushed the practice of sending alternative election monitors, both under CIS and SCO 
auspices, to issue far more supportive evaluations of flawed elections than the ODIHR. 
Emulating the form, but not the substance of more established monitoring operations, 
these so-called ‘zombie monitors’ provide governments with more supportive interna-
tional assessments to balance out any criticism they receive from Western organizations. 
In a similar fashion to election monitoring, China and Russia are leading the way in coun-
tering the critical assessments of human rights monitors and civil society organizations 
by establishing new Government-Sponsored Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs). 
GONGOs challenge the human rights regime not only substantively – by defending and 
justifying the abysmal human rights records of their governments – but also procedurally. 
Through their participation in regional conferences, international forums and meetings, 
GONGOs expend valuable agenda time and organizational resources that would otherwise 
be channelled into networking transnational civil society organizations that share com-
mitments to upholding the international rights-based regime (see also the essay by Andrey 
Demidov and Elena Belokurova on the impact of GONGOs and civil society on Russian 
foreign policy). 
Case study: the fate of Central Asian dissidents in Ukraine
The case of Ukraine, a country which has vacillated between European and Eurasian out-
looks and between democratic liberalism and authoritarianism, reveals how cooperation 
under SCO and CIS treaties can severely undermine internationally guaranteed human 
rights protections such as those provided by OSCE and UN agreements.
For example, in 2006, Ukraine was widely condemned for returning ten Uzbek political 
activists seeking asylum after fleeing Uzbekistan following the crackdown in Andijan. 
All ten of the asylum seekers were convicted on trumped-up charges and sentenced to 
imprisonment between 3 and 16 years upon their forcible return in what the OSCE Chair-
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man-in-Office at the time called “a serious violation of the principle of non-refoulement 
and of international commitments undertaken by Ukraine”.3
Through 2010, extraditions in Ukraine were governed exclusively by the Minsk Conven-
tion and bilateral agreements.4 These agreements are clearly inconsistent with Ukraine’s 
commitment to not return individuals to countries where their torture is likely (non- 
refoulement) and oblige Ukraine and other signatories to accept the court rulings and 
other judgments of other signatories, essentially forcing Ukraine to accept judgments is-
sued, for example, in Uzbekistan with only a limited ability to reject extradition requests.5
In 2012, Ukraine again extradited recognized refugees, an Uzbek and a Russian, who 
were clearly at risk of torture upon return in what the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees called a “deliberate violation of provisions of both national and international law” 
(UNHCR 2012). Indeed, Ukraine still is not a safe place for those fleeing persecution in 
Russia and Central Asia, regularly returning or refusing asylum to activists who fled its 
greatest foe, Russia (Coynash 2016).
Yet Ukraine could also serve as an example of a country that rejects cooperation with 
authoritarian governments persecuting civic activists. Changes to Ukraine’s asylum law 
have stalled in the parliament, though if passed they would provide some additional 
protection for activists who are being persecuted in connection with their support for 
Ukraine and criticism of Russia’s actions against Ukraine (Frolov & Arkhipova 2016). 
More generally, Ukraine has demonstrated a new willingness to reject the authoritarian 
approaches of its past following the 2014 revolution by engaging the public directly in 
governance and by decentralizing authority, renewing its commitments to international 
human rights protections, and creating a more tolerant and pluralistic society. Other 
changes in Ukraine such as the dramatic strengthening and renewed prominence of its 
civil society, to the growing desire among Ukrainians to reject the worldview and values 
associated with Russia, the so-called Russian World (Russkiy Mir ), and the populariza-
tion of human rights and dignity have in many ways moved Ukrainian society and forced 
the government’s hand away from authoritarian approaches. These developments offer 
some hope that the new norms and procedures advanced by the regional bodies of the 
EEU and the SCO are not moving the region in one direction and can be resisted.
3 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (2006) OSCE Chairman expresses consternation  
at Ukraine's decision to return Uzbek asylum seekers, February 17. Available at: http://www.osce.org/
cio/47117.
4 No Borders Project (2012) Refugees in Ukraine – without a right to protection. Available at: http://noborders.
org.ua/ru/files/2012/01/Refugees-in-Ukraine_short-overview.pdf.
5 Commonwealth of Independent States, Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family,  
and Criminal Cases.
Conclusion and future scenarios
In sum, the recent developments in Central Asia suggest that Russian and Chinese-led 
efforts have changed the regional and international environment from one that prompted 
the protection of rights and the dissemination of liberal norms, to one where the pro-
motion of rights itself has become entangled in geopolitical rivalries with the West and 
where new regional legal frameworks and counter norms offer justifications for regimes 
to erode human rights safeguards. The drawdown of NATO forces in Afghanistan has con-
tributed to US and European disengagement from the region, while Russia’s resurgence 
and China’s much-publicized Belt and Road Initiative signal that Moscow and Beijing’s 
interest in influencing governments along with political and social developments across 
Eurasia will not only endure, but is set to increase.6 
In this context, it is important for human rights defenders and advocates, as well as 
supportive governments to confront some of these new regional sites of contestation and 
external actors. 
First, advocates should push Western governments to comprehensively engage with re-
gional bodies of the EEU and the SCO, and on a bilateral basis with individual govern-
ments on both their norms, values, and operations, as well as on their potential capacity 
to solve regional problems or deliver public goods. In other words, rather than ignore 
the issue of values and rights, they should be part of a more comprehensive Western 
engagement strategy with these counterpart organizations and their member govern-
ments, pushing them to be more transparent about their policies and approaches while 
discouraging their diffusion of authoritarian norms. The alternative is that the United 
States and the EU (and its members) risk further marginalizing their concerns about 
respect for human rights in EEU and SCO members by limiting their discussions to official 
regional ‘human rights dialogues or working groups’, as opposed to more comprehensive 
discussions and engagement mechanisms. 
Second, governments, as well as executive bodies, representatives, and independent 
mechanisms and experts of organizations such as the OSCE and UN, should actively re-
sist efforts to water down their human rights commitments and enforcement mechanisms 
and advance so-called traditional values, ensuring that challenges to democratic and 
human rights norms in international forums such as the OSCE Permanent Council and 
the UN Human Rights and NGO Committees, where civil society participation is frequently 
opposed by authoritarian governments, are resisted and contested.
6 For more on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, see the Economist (2016) Our bulldozers, our rules, 2 July.  
Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/china/21701505-chinas-foreign-policy-could-reshape-good-
part-world-economy-our-bulldozers-our-rules. 
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Alexander Sergunin
Changing Russia-EU relations 
and their impact on EU’s human rights policy 
in the eastern neighbourhood
Given the current tensions between Brussels and Moscow it is difficult to expect that the 
EU and Russia will soon stop harsh polemics on human rights and turn to cooperation on 
the promotion of human rights in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood. However, the author 
believes that international human rights organizations could encourage Russia and EU 
to defend and promote human rights in the region by not only criticising the Russian and 
EaP countries’ governments but also offering their expertise and mediation/good services 
in conflict situations.
A general overview of the EU-Russia relations in the sphere of human rights
The EU-Russia dialogue on issues of democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and the rule of law is an essential element of EU-Russia relations. Brussels and 
Moscow agreed at the St. Petersburg 2003 summit to create a Common Space on Free-
dom, Security and Justice. A road map agreed in 2005 sets out the objectives and areas 
for cooperation in this sphere. Biannual meetings of the EU Troika (EU Presidency together 
with incoming Presidency, Council and Commission) with the Russian counterparts at 
ministerial level monitor the overall implementation of this Common Space. 
Moreover, the Common Space on Research, Education and Culture aims to strengthening 
and enhancing the European identity on the basis of common values, including freedom 
of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect for human rights, including 
the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and promotion of cultural and linguistic 
diversity as the basis of a vital civil society in Europe without dividing lines.
In 2005, regular, six-monthly EU-Russia human rights consultations were established. 
They have provided a substantial dialogue on human rights issues in Russia and the 
EU and on EU-Russian cooperation on human rights issues in international fora. The EU 
also maintains a regular dialogue with both Russian and international NGOs on human 
rights issues. 
Third, local activists should continue their advocacy and struggle for human rights and 
democracy, and governments and other donors should continue to support them regard-
less of ‘foreign agent’ laws, bans on ‘gay propaganda’, and other provisions that clear-
ly violate human rights guaranteed by a variety of international agreements. This may 
require them to develop creative ways for this collaboration and support to continue, 
especially given efforts to restrict international collaboration through passage of ‘foreign 
agent’ laws, creating black lists of foreign organizations, the likening of international 
reporting on human rights to treason, and restrictions on foreign funding of civil society 
groups.
Finally, governments, scholars, advocates, and journalists should expand their work to 
understand how regional bodies of the EEU and the SCO function, to provide clear analy-
sis of the real impact on the implementation of counter norms advanced by and through 
these bodies, and to resist the erosion of key institutions, forums, and agreements nec-
essary to upholding and maintaining international human rights protections.
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The EU’s agenda in these consultations includes issues such as the human rights situa-
tion in Chechnya and the rest of the North Caucasus, including torture and ill-treatment; 
freedom of expression and assembly, including freedom of the media; the situation of 
civil society in Russia, notably in light of the laws on NGOs and extremist activities; the 
functioning of the judiciary, including independence issues; the observation of human 
rights standards by law enforcement officials; racism and xenophobia; and legislation 
relating to elections.1 For its part, Moscow raises matters of concern to it on developments 
within the EU, including the abuse of adopted Russian children, Russian ethnic minority 
rights in the Baltic States, as well as human rights situation in some Eastern Partnership 
(EaP) countries (especially Ukraine)(Yakovenko 2014; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation 2012).
Brussels tries to support the development of democracy, the protection of human rights 
and the development of a healthy civil society in Russia first and foremost through the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). In the EIDHR framework 
the EU works with Russian and international NGOs and with partners like, the Council 
of Europe and UN bodies in fields such as: penal reform; improving the capacity of law-
yers and law enforcement officials to apply the European Convention on Human Rights; 
combating human rights violations in the North Caucasus; human rights of conscripts 
in the armed forces; promoting children’s rights; and promoting the rights of indigenous 
peoples.2
EU officials are involved in the observation of human rights-related trials and maintain 
a network of contacts with Russian human rights defenders. The EU also feels that it is 
appropriate to make public statements concerning the human rights situation in Russia, 
usually at times when matters of specific concern arise, sometimes with reference to the 
situation of individual human rights activists. The EU (European Commission and EU 
Delegation in Moscow) and those EU member states which have diplomatic missions in 
Russia confer regularly on human rights issues to discuss how the EU as a whole could 
promote respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law in Russia.
For its part, Moscow tries to support its compatriots and promote Russian understanding 
of democracy and human rights as well as its culture and values in the EU and EaP 
countries through its soft power instruments (Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015). In 2007, 
the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) foundation was established by a presidential decree 
1 European Union External Action. EU relations with Russia. Available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/about/ 
index_en.htm.
2 Delegation of the European Union to Russia. Human Rights and Civil Society. Available at: http://eeas.europa.
eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/human_rights/index_en.htm.
(although with NGO status). The Foundation’s main function is to promote the Russian 
language, culture and education system abroad. For example, the Russkiy Mir nominates 
the best teachers and students of the Russian language and culture for the position of 
‘Professor of the Russkiy Mir ’ and ‘Student of the Russkiy Mir ’. It also has fellowship 
and internship programmes for foreign scholars and students to be hosted in Russia. 
The foundation organizes various conferences, competitions and olympiads on a regular 
basis (see for more on this the essays by Mikhail Suslov and by Andrey Demidov & Elena 
Belokurova in this volume). 
In 2008, the Rossotrudnichestvo, Federal Agency for the CIS (Compatriots Abroad and 
International Humanitarian Cooperation) was established with nearly the same mission 
as Russkiy Mir but with governmental status under the Foreign Ministry. Today the agency 
has representative offices in almost all European countries, the United States, Canada 
and major Asian, African and Latin American states. 
In addition to these two main institutions, a number of (often state-affiliated) NGOs, 
such as the Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy, the Andrei Pervozvanny Fund, the 
International Foundation for Working with Diasporas Abroad ‘Rossiyane’, the International 
Council of Russian Compatriots, the Library ‘Russian-language Literature Abroad’ and 
the International Association of Twin Cities partake in soft power activities.
The Russian higher education system has gradually built up its soft power potential. 
It is becoming internationalized via the introduction of the Bologna Process and has 
increased the state quota for foreign students to be trained in Russian universities. The 
frameworks for academic exchanges are diversifying. The state-funded ‘slots’ for study 
in Russian universities are distributed through Russian embassies, with 70-100 ‘slots’ 
for each country annually. 
It should be noted, however, that the EU-Russia dialogue on democracy and human rights 
has been slowed down over the recent years (even prior to the Ukrainian crisis) and at 
times nearly stopped. Brussels believes that since Vladimir Putin’s second presidency 
(2004-2008) a clear trend toward authoritarianism can be identified and the human 
rights situation is deteriorating. Moscow disagrees with this observation saying that what 
the EU calls authoritarianism is in fact ‘strengthening of power vertical’, ‘consolidation of 
the Russian society’ and ‘sovereign democracy’.3 The current – relatively stable – state of 
affairs in politics and society is represented by the Russian political class as an antipode 
of the anarchy, chaos and fragmentation of the 1990s. Moscow acknowledges the fact 
3 This term once popular among the Russian political elites (in the 2000s) is no longer in use.
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that the situation with human rights and rule of the law in the country is still far from 
ideal. For example, in March 2016 President Putin has mentioned that there were 3.2 
million human rights violations in Russia in 2015.4 However, the Kremlin underlines that 
in a transitional society and political system things cannot be changed overnight; further 
democratic reforms are desirable and possible but they should not lead to destabilisation 
and disintegration of Russia (especially in the current critical situation).
The EU and Russia differ in their basic understanding of human rights’ and democracy’s 
meaning and roles in the present-day world (Deriglazova 2013). The EU views all human 
rights as universal, indivisible and interdependent. It actively promotes and defends them 
both within its borders and when engaging in relations with non-EU countries. The EU 
furthermore believes that democracy is the only political system which can fully realize 
all human rights.
Moscow in principle agrees with this political philosophy but objects to the absolutist, 
categorical, abstract and non-contextual interpretation of these principles. Particular-
ly, Russian political, academic and religious elites underline that the European (and 
more generally Western) concepts of democracy and human rights are based on specific 
religious (Catholic and Protestant) and cultural (European and American) values and 
traditions which are not universal and for this reason are not fully accepted/shared by 
other nations, religions and civilizations.5 According to this school, the EU (the West) 
has neither legal nor moral rights to impose its understanding of democracy and human 
rights on other nations, including Russia. Russia is different from Europe in terms of its 
ethnic and religious composition, history, culture, values and traditions. According to the 
Russian mainstream political thinking, Russia should develop a model of democracy of 
its own, a model which should be based on Russian values and traditions, not the alien 
ones (Torkunov 2006). Russian politicians and academics draw the attention of their 
European opponents to the nation’s negative historical experiences: almost all socio-eco-
nomic and political ‘experiments’ done on the basis of Western models and principles 
either completely failed (including – most recently – the Marxist/communist project6) or 
had very negative consequences for the country (like the chaotic, ill-advised reforms of 
the Yeltsin era).
4 BBC (2016) Putin Reports Large-Scale Violations of Rights and Freedoms of the Russians, 23 March.  
Available at: http://www.bbc.com/russian/news/2016/03/160323_putin_human_rights_violations. 
5 For example, see Blagovest-info (2006) Conciliar hearing Human Rights and dignity of the individual,  
1 March. Available at: http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=4&id=4803.
6 The present-day Russian mainstream believes that Marxism was an alien (Western) ideology that has  
mutated on the Russian soil and degenerated into the Soviet totalitarianism.
As mainstream Russian political thinkers maintain, the ‘time factor’ is important as well. 
It took several hundred years for the European nations to develop their democracy model 
and human rights concept. In this historical context, it is unclear why the EU expects that 
in the post-Communist countries, democracy is built in just a couple of decades? Rus-
sian analysts point out that even not all EU newcomers were able to fulfil all democratic 
criteria set out by Brussels. There are numerous human rights violations in the Baltic 
States concerning the Russian ethnic minorities, Roma people rights in some Central 
and South-East EU countries, freedom of conscience (e.g., the Hungarian Constitution), 
freedom of press (Hungary, Poland), bans on some professions for certain categories of 
citizens (Poland and the Baltic States), etc. 
According to Russian political thinkers, the EU exaggerates its unity regarding common 
values and democratic principles. In addition to the examples above, they point out the 
rise of nationalism, xenophobia, religious extremism, the failure of multiculturalism and 
tolerance concepts in many EU member-states (especially in the context of the ongoing 
migration crisis and repeated terrorist attacks). In fact, Brussels is unable to speak with 
one voice on behalf of Europe; there are many different voices and they are not in tune 
with each other. In this context, Russian analysts suggest, the EU standing in the field of 
democracy and human rights looks quite like window-dressing and too ambitious rather 
than solid and reality-based.
In contrast with the 1990s, Moscow does not want to accept a teacher-pupil type of rela-
tionship in its dialogue with the EU. Equally, it rejects the idea of setting benchmarks for 
Russia’s progress in the human rights area which is being suggested by some EU poli-
ticians and international human rights NGOs. While in the spheres of economy, environ-
ment, research and education Russia tacitly acknowledges the EU as a normative power, 
in areas of democracy, human rights, culture and values Moscow does not recognise the 
EU’s normative authority. 
On the contrary, the Russian political class and many common Russian citizens believe 
that some of the so-called ‘European values’ are not only incompatible with Russian 
values but also undermine traditional moral, religious and family principles. They refuse 
to be tolerant to some provocative/extreme forms of the LGBT community’s activities and 
propaganda, Pussy Riot’s ‘punk-mess’ in the Christ the Saviour Cathedral or more re-
cently to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad and Russia’s plane 
downed by ISIS terrorists in Egypt. This does not mean, they continue, that society’s reac-
tion to these phenomena should be violent but they should not be allowed or encouraged.
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The dynamics of the EU-Russia relations
It was common place to ascertain that the progress in the EU-Russia relations was sort 
of “a success story” of the post-Cold War radical transformations in Europe. Despite 
the fact that the whole process was not exactly very smooth, the EU-Russia dialogue in 
various fields has been developing quite dynamically over the 1990s and 2000s. There 
was an obvious progress in many spheres of the EU-Russia bilateral relations. These in-
cluded the Partnership for Modernization (PfM), energy, transportation, information tech-
nologies, telecommunications, environment protection, visa facilitation regime, reform 
of the Russian legal system, dialogue on the human rights problématique, education, 
research and culture. The EU has become Russia's largest trade partner and source of 
investment, while Moscow is one of the main energy suppliers to Europe. The two actors 
tried to coordinate both their global and regional strategies to make the world and their 
neighbourhood a safer place.
The situation has radically changed with the start of the Ukrainian crisis in early 2014. 
In response to Russia’s reintegration of Crimea and support for the pro-Russian rebels 
in Donbass Brussels has introduced economic and political sanctions against Moscow. 
The Kremlin has reacted with counter-sanctions against the EU countries. These dramatic 
developments have seriously undermined the EU-Russian dialogue in many areas, includ-
ing human rights. It seems now this sphere is perceived by both sides as a platform not 
for cooperation but for the psychological/ideological warfare in which nearly all methods 
are allowed.
The regular bilateral human rights consultations did not take place in the aftermath of 
the Ukrainian crisis. To compensate for the lack of direct talks with Russia on human 
rights, since September 2014 the EU started the practice of delivering demarches on 
issues of concern and handing over lists of individual cases. Contacts were stepped up, 
in Moscow and in Brussels, with Russian civil society organizations.
The EU Delegation in Russia and the EU member states continued their practice of trial 
monitoring and of visits to human rights NGOs across the country. The EU continued to 
give financial support to Russian civil society and the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum, in 
particular through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (€3 million) 
and the Civil Society and Local Authorities Programme (€1 million). An EU roadmap for 
engagement with civil society was adopted by EU Heads of Mission (European Commis-
sion 2014).
For its part, Moscow has intensified its propaganda campaign which aimed to, on the 
one hand, portraying Europe as a bearer of false/immoral/corrupted values and norms 
and, on the other, accusing the EU of interfering with Russia’s domestic affairs under the 
flag of human rights protection (the vocabulary of the Cold War era). The Russian NGOs 
funded by the EU programmes or other international sponsors were increasingly targeted 
and forced to register as ‘foreign agents’ or even be closed (See more on Russia’s use of 
media as propaganda tool, Suslov’s essay in this volume).
Whether the resumption of a normal EU-Russia dialogue on human rights is possible in 
the foreseeable future or not remains to be seen. This, of course, depends on the gen-
eral atmosphere of the EU-Russia relations and, particularly, on whether the bilateral 
sanctions will be lifted or not. It is interesting to know, however, that recent international 
crises, such as the Georgian-Russian military clash of 2008 and the ongoing Ukrainian 
crisis entailed not only the interruption of the EU-Russia direct dialogue on human 
rights but also the broadening of a geographic scope of the ideological ‘battlefield’. Now 
EU-Russia confrontation in this sphere covers the EU’s whole eastern neighbourhood. 
Let’s focus on this dimension of the EU-Russia debate on human rights in order to check 
which obstacles and opportunities exist in this sphere.
Russia’s cold shoulder to the EU’s Eastern Partnership
In the 1990s and early 2000s Moscow was absolutely positive about EU’s regional and 
sub-regional initiatives and encouraged Russian border regions to participate in various 
trans- and cross-border collaborative projects. For example, since 2000 Moscow took an 
active part in the EU’s Northern Dimension Initiative that involved Russian north-western 
regions in a quite intensive sub-regional cooperation with neighbouring countries.
However, when in 2002-2003 Poland (being still an EU candidate country) launched the 
Eastern Dimension initiative7 that was aimed primarily at engaging Belarus, Ukraine and 
Moldova and – only in the second place – the Russian exclave region of Kaliningrad in 
this project, Moscow’s attitude to Brussels’ regionalist projects in the near neighbourhood 
became more suspicious. Some of the Russian strategists tended to believe that such 
initiatives had a secret goal to undermine Russia’s geopolitical positions in its traditional 
sphere of influence.
That was the reason why the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy of 2004 got ‘a cold 
shoulder’ from Moscow and why the latter refused to join the initiative claiming special 
7 This initiative was never implemented but served as an inspiration for the EaP project.
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status in its relations with Brussels. The same attitudes explain why Russia was quite 
suspicious about other EU regional/sub-regional projects such as the Black Sea Synergy 
(April 2007), Central Asian Strategy for New Partnership (June 2007), Arctic Strategy 
(November 2008) and Baltic Sea Strategy (June 2009).
Although the EaP, which was launched in May 2009, has not come as a surprise for Rus-
sia it was perceived by Moscow as another (‘soft’) security challenge in the post-Soviet 
space. Along with other sensitive issues in the EU-Russia relations, the EaP has become 
one more source of numerous misunderstandings between Brussels and Moscow. These 
misunderstandings revealed the fact that the two international players have fundamental 
differences as regards their visions of the future of the EaP countries and policy methods 
to be implemented in the region.
Moscow took notice of the fact that the issues of democracy and human rights were an 
important priority for the EaP. One of the four programme’s thematic platforms was spe-
cifically devoted to democracy, good governance and stability. It was also planned from 
the very beginning that the EaP implementation is to be facilitated by an active partici-
pation of the non-governmental sector. This led to the creation of the Eastern Partnership 
Civil Society Forum, which brings together civil society representatives from countries 
participating in the EaP, including those of the EU. The first forum meeting was held in 
November 2009 in Brussels. Since then the forum’s meetings are being held on a regular 
basis. To support NGOs financially a Civil Society Facility was established.
The Russian concerns about the EaP can be explained by a number of factors. First of all, 
from the very beginning Russian politicians and experts believed that the EaP’s ‘hidden 
agenda’ aims at undermining Russia’s geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe and the 
South Caucasus (Tarasov 2009). In this sense, the EaP was seen by Moscow as the EU’s 
attempt to withdraw six post-Soviet states from Russia’s sphere of influence and estab-
lish a sort of protectorate on them. Moreover, the EaP might potentially undermine Mos-
cow’s own integrationist projects (Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Customs 
Union, Eurasian Economic Union, Belarus-Russia Union State, et cetera) (Zhiltsov 2009).
Second, many Russian experts believed that the EU’s main interest in the case of the 
EaP is building alternative gas and oil pipelines bypassing Russia (such as Nabucco or 
White Stream). Georgia and Ukraine were considered important transit countries while 
Azerbaijan can serve both as a source of and transit point for energy supplies. Russian 
specialists, however, doubted that these plans were realistic and believed that any new 
energy transport schemes without Russia’s participation were doomed to failure.
Third of all, again, from the very beginning there were numerous doubts in the Russian 
policy making and expert community about the feasibility of democratic reforms by the 
EaP participants: some of the partner countries (e.g. Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko, 
Azerbaijan under Il’ham Aliyev, Ukraine – first under Viktor Yanukovich and later under 
Petro Poroshenko – and Georgia under Mikhail Saakashvili) were/are led by authoritarian 
or kleptocratic regimes that were/are reluctant to implement any serious democratic re-
forms and just imitated such reforms.
The Russian diplomats and mass media accuse both the EU and international human 
rights organizations of double standard human rights policies in the case of the EaP 
countries. The pro-Russian regimes in Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine (under Yanukovich) 
are portrayed in the EU official documents and international human rights NGOs’ reports 
as slow in reforms or even undemocratic, authoritarian and corrupted ones (Freedom 
House 2013; European Commission 2014: 113, 116-117). 
At the same time, pro-Western regimes in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (under Poros-
henko) are characterized as making progress in democratic reforms, good governance 
and human rights protection (European Commission 2014: 118-125). For example on 17 
December 2014 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the occasion of the 
ratification by the European Parliament of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement. The 
resolution highlights Georgia’s significant progress in reforms and in strengthening rela-
tions with the EU. The resolution recognizes the efforts by the Georgian authorities in the 
area of democratic reforms, including measures to tackle the reform of the judiciary, and 
the need to investigate properly and fully all allegations of violations of human rights; the 
resolution stresses, however, that all prosecutions should be transparent, proportionate 
and free from political motivation, and should adhere strictly to due process (European 
Commission 2014: 119).
Despite the vast evidence of torture and killings of regime opponents, prosecution of 
political opposition, murdering journalists, and the closure of opposition TV channels, 
radio stations, newspapers and journals, et cetera in Georgia (under Saakashvili) and 
in Ukraine (under the current regime) the EU continues to ignore or stay silent on, these 
facts. It is remarkable that the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the 
World in 2014 has only mentioned in passim the Odessa tragedy of 2 May 2014 when 48 
innocent people were burned down or beaten to death and more than 200 were injured by 
the Ukrainian nationalists, while human rights violations by the Yanukovich regime and 
the alleged persecution and intimidation of the Crimean Tatars by the Russian authorities 
were described at length. 
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Only recently international NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, acknowledged the fact that the Ukrainian security services are practicing kid-
napping, abuse and torture in their fight against the rebels in Donbass (Kramer 2016). In 
contrast with the EU official documents, international NGOs note numerous human rights 
violations related to prisoners of conscience, freedom of expression and media, torture 
and other ill-treatment practices, LGBT rights, et cetera as well as the lack of effective 
measures to curb corruption and reform the law enforcement system in the present-day 
Ukraine (Amnesty International 2016: 378-380; HRW 2016a: 567-602 and 2016b; Free-
dom House 2016). 
For its part the EU condemns Moscow for violation of the rights of Tatar activists in Crimea 
as well as for its support of the rebels in Donbass, of undemocratic regimes in Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus, and of the separatist republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia,  
Nagorny Karabakh and Transnistria.
What should be done?
Given the current situation it is difficult to expect that the EU and Russia will soon stop 
these harsh polemics and turn to cooperation on the promotion of human rights in the 
EU’s eastern neighbourhood. Having in mind that the EaP is only an element (and not 
the most important one) of the EU-Russian relations, first, the major barriers to bilateral 
cooperation should be removed. Among these barriers, the bilateral sanctions, the lack of 
mutual trust, the lack of a proper legal basis for the bilateral relations (no new strategic 
partnership agreement to date), and the lack of substantial progress in implementing 
the EU-Russia Common Spaces concept should be mentioned. Without doing this, the 
EU-Russia cooperation on human rights (including in the EaP region) will be sluggish 
or limited.
But – looking at the bright side – even in the current situation some opportunities for 
human rights community (including HR organizations) to promote a more intense coop-
eration between the EU and Russia are available:
I. First and foremost HR community could help the EU, Russia and EaP partner countries to 
shift their mental paradigms and start their dialogue with finding common points that 
unite rather than divide them. 
II. Particularly, HR advocates could explain Brussels and Moscow that they should avoid 
seeing the human rights area as a battlefield and instrument for putting pressure on each 
other and come back to the vision of this sphere as a platform for cooperation rather than 
confrontation.
III. Moreover, both sides should be more transparent and self-critical with regard to their 
domestic human rights situations to demonstrate their good will and open-minded ap-
proach to the subject.
IV. International HR organizations should push the EU and Russia to be more balanced in 
their coverage of the human rights situation in the EaP countries. Facts – either positive 
or negative – should not be ignored. Individual cases should be first double-checked 
before they are publicized to avoid mistakes or misinterpretation.
V. HR community should take into account that while Russia remains hostile to the eco-
nomic/trade aspects of the EaP seeing association agreements and creation of free trade 
areas between some EaP countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and the EU as det-
rimental to its interests, it does not exclude some limited dialogue on human rights 
problématique both with the EU and EaP countries. The three stakeholders (with the help 
of reputed international human rights NGOs) should think about specific venues and 
platforms for cooperative initiatives.
VI. For example, most of the EaP multilateral platforms, including those on democracy, 
good governance and stability as well as on the promotion of contacts between people, 
and flagship initiatives (e.g., the border management programme and good environmen-
tal governance) could be linked to similar EU-Russian programmes (via joint training, 
seminars, exchanges, research projects, et cetera). The EU could use for this purpose its 
instruments, such as EIDHR, Horizon-2020 and Erasmus Mundus.
VII. HR advocates could encourage the EU and Russia to change focus from national to 
sub-national level: Brussels and Moscow can encourage the border regions and munic-
ipalities of the EaP partner countries and Russia to cooperate. The experiences of the 
Euroregions and city-twinning in Europe which are based on network-type/horizontal links 
could be helpful.
VIII. International human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, Freedom House, 
and Human Rights Watch, could be helpful in encouraging Russia and the EU to de-
fend and promote human rights in the region. They can do that by not only criticizing 
the Russian and EaP countries’ governments but also by offering their expertise and 
mediation/‘good’ services in conflict situations. These could be: sharing with the above 
governments and local NGOs data on human rights violations; explaining to them the 
methodology and indicators used for observing the human rights situation (possibly even 
developing joint methodology and indicator systems); organizing trainings, workshops 
and seminars for governmental officials and NGO activists (not only from the political 
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Bill Bowring 1
Does Russia have a human rights future 
in the Council of Europe and OSCE?
This essay argues that despite the Russian regime’s clampdown on civil society and 
apparent desire to defy the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights, there 
are grounds for optimism. During nearly twenty years of engagement with the Court, a 
new generation of activists has emerged, which is also conscious of the turbulent history 
of reform in Russia. For them, as for their counterparts in the West, the fight for human 
rights is unrelenting.
Introduction
It is now considered by many commentators and perhaps by the general public that 
Russia has abandoned the human rights orientation which began in the last years of 
the USSR with Mikhail Gorbachev and perestroika, and which crystallized under Boris 
Yeltsin with accession to the Council of Europe in 1996 and ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights in 1998. In this essay I seek to show that the reality is more 
complicated. In order to properly examine the issues which are the subject matter of this 
essay, it is necessary to have in mind, at least in overview, the historical processes which 
have led to the creation, in 1991, of the present-day Russian Federation.
Historical and social complexity
Although the Russian Federation is much smaller than the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics (USSR), which collapsed in 1991, it is still the largest state by territory on the 
planet, with 85 federal subjects including 21 ethnic republics, and an extraordinary eth-
nic, linguistic and religious diversity. The largest minority, the Tatars, 5.5 million strong, 
speak a Turkic language, and other minorities, at least 150 of them, speak not only Turkic 
languages but languages related to Finnish and Hungarian, Finno-Ugric languages, Inuit, 
Mongolian, and others. A law of 1997 specifies that Russia has four traditional religions, 
Orthodox Christianity (imported from Byzantium), Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism. There 
1 New developments concerning Russia and the ECtHR are discussed in Bowring, B. (2017 forthcoming)  
‘Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: Case Law, Compliance and Socialization Effects’  
in: L. Mälksoo & W. Benedek (eds) Russia and the European Court of Human Rights: the Strasbourg Effect, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
opposition but for all parties involved or potentially involved/interested); networking be-
tween local/national and international NGOs; mediating conflicts between local NGOs and 
the government and between NGOs themselves; reviving existing multilateral institutions, 
such as the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and EU-Russia civil society forum 
with the aim to make them more active in defending and promoting human rights in the 
region.
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are more than 2 million Muslims in Moscow, which has a population of 12.5 million. The 
Russian state has organized Muslims since the 18th century (Crews 2006). The Kremlin re-
gime, which justifies Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea by reference to the “right of the 
‘people of Crimea’ to self-determination”, is alarmed by the possibility of a further break-
up of the Federation or at the very least of separatist tendencies. This ‘paranoia’ is an 
important factor in the current repression of foreign-funded NGOs, to which I turn below.
Rights in Russia
Some Russian ideologues seek to present Russia as a civilization distinct from the in-
dividualistic West, based on collective and Christian values. Indeed, Russia’s territory 
straddles two continents, both Europe and Asia. But since the 16th century Russia has 
had close ties with Western Europe in terms of reform. 
During the time of Catherine II, Semeon Desnitsky, the founder of law as an academic 
discipline in Russia, studied for his Doctorate in Civil Law at Glasgow University from 
1761 to 1767. He wrote the first legal textbooks in Russian drawing from the lectures of 
Adam Smith on constitutional law, which he attended, and proposed law reform including 
a constitutional monarchy, jury trial and the abolition of serfdom (Bowring 2013a). 
Following Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II abolished serfdom in 
1861, and, in his Great Legal Reforms of 1864, fulfilled Desnitsky’s mission by instituting 
trial by jury in the Empire, new Justices of the Peace (based on the English model), a 
much reduced role for the procuracy, an independent judiciary, and the first Russian Bar, 
a profession of independent qualified advocates (Bowring 2013b). The Bar continued its 
independence, under great pressure, in the USSR. The other reforms, abolished following 
1917, have been restored to a greater or lesser extent since 1991. I have argued elsewhere 
that the incorporation of the ECHR into Russian law is not a ‘legal transplantation’, but a 
restoration of 19th century reforms. This is one of the reasons for my guarded optimism.
The CSCE/OSCE and its role in the collapse of the USSR
Dov Lynch (2009:5), in 2009 Senior Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, summarized 
the origins of the OSCE thus, attributing a key role to Russia:
“The first glimmer of what would later become the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) was evoked in the Soviet call in 1954 for an all-Euro-
pean conference. […] This proposal led eventually to the negotiations on the 1975 
Helsinki Final Act where Soviet diplomacy played a leading role. Fifteen years later, 
‘new thinking’ in Soviet foreign policy helped create the context for agreement on the 
1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. […] [T]he Charter set a framework of shared 
values and common purpose across a wider Europe that lasted well into the 1990s.” 
Russia is still a member and full participant in the 57 member state OSCE and its in-
stitutions, for example the Office on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 
based in Warsaw, and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), based in 
The Hague. I have worked in Russia for both these institutions since 1991, including mis-
sions in Russia with the HCNM in 2000 and 2010, when the High Commissioner studied 
the situation of the Ukrainian minority in Russia (second largest after the Tatars) and the 
Russian minority in Ukraine. 
The USSR wanted recognition for the GDR (East Germany) and settlement of post-WW II 
borders; the West wanted recognition of a wide range of human and minority rights, to 
which the USSR agreed. Failure to implement these commitments provided legitimacy 
for the human rights dissidents led by Andrei Sakharov, and, in my view, hastened the 
process of the rotting away of ‘Marxist-Leninist’ ideology, laying the basis for its final 
abandonment by Mikhail Gorbachev from 1986, and its replacement by the concepts of 
the ‘rule of law state’, the ‘Common European Home’, and the supremacy of human rights 
(Bowring 1995).
Nevertheless, post-Soviet Russia has expressed increasingly forceful criticisms of the 
OSCE, in particular justified criticism that OSCE monitoring is focused almost exclusively 
on eastern rather than western member states. At the 2007 Munich Conference on Secu-
rity Policy, Vladimir Putin stated:
“They [the West] are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed 
to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. […] Deci-
sion-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organi-
zations are tailored for this task. These organizations are formally independent but 
they are purposefully financed and therefore under control (Kolesnikov 2007).” 
Nevertheless, OSCE monitors remain actively engaged in closely monitoring events in the 
conflict between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces in the Donbas, 
Eastern Ukraine, and have even been criticized by Ukrainian nationalists for being too 
friendly with the rebels.
Russia’s engagement in OSCE processes and mechanisms remains at a high level, and 
in my view it is unlikely that Russia will leave the OSCE any time soon. For example, 
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during the German OSCE chairmanship in 2016, a leading Russian pro-regime public 
figure, Vladislav Grib, was appointed in June 2016 on Russia’s nomination as Personal 
Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and 
Discrimination, also Focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and 
Members of Other Religions.2 
The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in May 1949, long before the CSCE/OSCE. But 
whereas the CSCE was the product of ‘détente’ between East and West, the CoE was a 
Cold War institution, in the words of leading Western scholars, an ideological counterpart 
to NATO (Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2006: 609).
Its eight founding states were all Western European states. Its ‘three pillars’ were and are 
the rule of law, multi-party democracy, and the protection of individual human rights. The 
USSR and its allies, on the contrary, gave constitutional priority to social and economic 
rights, especially the rights to work, to pensions and social security, to health and to 
education. To an extent, they delivered on the constitutional promises. The twin pillars of 
Soviet international law doctrine were state sovereignty and non-interference in internal 
affairs.
So the Western allies wanted to show their real commitment to individual rights and civil 
liberties, and did so by adopting the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, mod-
elled on the 18th century French and American declarations of rights), and creating the 
first human rights court in the world, with the power to interfere in the internal affairs of 
its members and to deliver binding, obligatory judgements: the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg (the Strasbourg Court). 
With the exception of the Central Asian states and Belarus, all the states of the Warsaw 
Pact, all the components of the former Yugoslavia, and all the Union Republics of the 
USSR have now joined the CoE, and have ratified the ECHR, accepting the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court. The CoE now comprises 47 member states and over 
850 million people, from Iceland to the Bering Straits.
2 This is typical OSCE wording, see OSCE. Prof. Dr. Vadislav Grib. Available at: http://www.osce.org/
node/223936. 
Russia’s accession in 1996 was highly controversial both in Russia, where it meant a 
significant loss of sovereignty and an acceptance of outside interference, and in the West, 
given that the First Chechen War (1994-1996) was raging within Russia (Bowring 1997; 
Bowring 2013c). Russian arguments in favour of joining included the desire to make use 
of CoE mechanisms to protect the rights of the 25 million ethnic Russians who found 
themselves outside Russia after the collapse of the USSR, especially those in the Baltic 
states and Ukraine. I myself have represented ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking 
applicants in cases against Latvia and Estonia. In my view it has been of the greatest 
importance that ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in EU member states seek redress 
in Brussels and Strasbourg rather than Moscow.
Russia has also ratified the CoE’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM), the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), and many 
other CoE treaties. Russia is pretty good at formal compliance with treaty obligations, as 
was the USSR, which ratified most of the pre-1991 UN human rights instruments, and 
even ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, with the right to complain to the 
UN Human Rights Committee shortly before its collapse in 1991. Indeed, Russia has an 
impressive record of engagement with the FCNM and CPT. 
According to Russia’s 1993 Constitution (Article 15(4)), adopted after Boris Yeltsin’s 
forcible suppression of the former Supreme Soviet (Parliament), international law takes 
precedence over Russian domestic law. This principle has been explained and emphasized 
by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in two authoritative Resolutions, in 20033 
on international law, and in 2013 specifically on the ECHR.4 Russia now has its third 
judge at Strasbourg, Dmitry Dedov; his predecessor, Anatoly Kovler, was, in my view, one 
of the best judges at Strasbourg, very independent, usually voting against Russia, and is 
now a member of the CoE’s authoritative Venice Commission.5 
3 In English on the website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (2003) Ruling of the plenary 
session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 5, October 10. Available at: http://www.supcourt.
ru/catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=6801. 
4 In English on the website of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (2013) Ruling of the plenary 
session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation no. 21, June 27. Available at:http://www.supcourt.ru/
catalog.php?c1=English&c2=Documents&c3=&id=9155. 
5 The European Commission for Democracy through Law - better known as the Venice Commission as it meets 
in Venice - is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters, see Council of Europe. Venice 
Commission. Available at: http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN. 
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Since ratification of the ECHR in 1998, more than a thousand cases have been decided 
against Russia. In many of them the applicants have been assisted by the European 
Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC) which I founded in 2003 in partnership with 
the Russian non-governmental organization Memorial; I represented the applicants in 
the first six Chechen cases against Russia, and the first environmental case, in 2005. 
As at the start of 2016, 10,677 applications were pending against Russia, of which 5,644 
were pending before a Chamber of seven judges. To put these figures in perspective, in 
2015 the Court dealt with 6,713 applications concerning Russia, of which 6,553 were 
declared inadmissible or struck out. It delivered 116 judgements (concerning 160 appli-
cations), 109 of which found at least one violation of the ECHR. From 1998 to 2015 there 
were 1,612 judgements finding at least one violation by Russia. Per head of population, 
Russia is by no means the leader when it comes to successful complaints to Strasbourg: 
on the same measure, Italy, Poland, Romania and Turkey are ahead. Russia pays some  
€ 32 million this year to the CoE’s budget, and there are 62 highly qualified Russian 
lawyers in the Court’s 679 strong registry, reflecting the large number of cases against 
Russia (see Council of Europe 2016).
In almost every case Russia has paid the compensation (which is termed “just satisfac-
tion” in the ECHR) ordered by the Court. In 2016 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-
cil of Europe, assisted by the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex, published a 
report on the impact of the ECHR in various countries (PACE 2016). The Report identified 
a number of instances of positive impact.
I. As a result of a pilot judgement (Burdov v Russia) in 2009 over non-enforcement of a 
domestic court judgement in favour of the applicant, Russia enacted a Federal Compen-
sation Act, as well as a Federal Law to guarantee the effectiveness of the new remedy. 
II. In 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation followed up the CoM’s 2004 Dec-
laration and extended journalists’ freedom of expression to criticism of public officials: 
public officials must accept that they will be subject to public scrutiny and criticism. In 
2008 the Court closed a number of applications in view of this change.
III. Following Mikheyev v. Russia (2006) and other, similar, judgements, on account of torture 
or inhuman and degrading treatment inflicted on persons held in police custody, and a 
lack of effective investigations into such acts, special investigation units were created 
within the Investigative Committee, and tasked with investigating particularly complex 
crimes by police and other law enforcement bodies.
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IV. There has been progress in the implementation of the Court’s 2012 pilot judgement in 
Ananyev and Others v. Russia concerning inhuman and degrading conditions in Russian 
remand centres and the lack of an effective remedy. Russia presented and has been 
implementing an action plan as a result, monitored by the CoM.
V. A number of measures have been taken to remedy numerous violations of the right to lib-
erty, guaranteed by Article 5 of the Convention, owing to unlawful and lengthy unreasoned 
(or poorly reasoned) detention on remand. Legislative changes were made between 2008 
and 2011. Both the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court have emphasized that 
a suspect or accused may be detained only on the basis of a valid judicial decision. This 
was most recently monitored by the CoM in 2015.
I have observed over the years in my own practice at the Strasbourg Court that the Rus-
sian representation and its conduct of cases against it has become more professional and 
competent, and as a consequence the Russian government is winning more cases brought 
against it. It is in the interests of all concerned, including applicants and judges, that 
Russia continues to take the Court seriously. In two high-profile cases, Yukos v Russia 6 
(concerning the expropriation of the Yukos oil company) and Georgia v Russia No.2 7 
(concerning the 2008 ‘5 day war’), Russia was represented by a British Queens Counsel 
(senior barrister). The same British barrister has been representing Russia in August 
2016 in two weeks of fact finding hearings in Strasbourg on the latter case. These are all 
indications that nearly 20 years after ratification of the ECHR Russia is unlikely to leave.
I am an optimist for another reason. I have for the last eleven years served as one of the 
more than a hundred judges for the Russian round of the Jessup International Law Moot 
Court Competition, with teams of students from at least 45 Russian law schools, from 
Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. The Competition has just celebrated its 15th year in Russia. 
In 2014 the fictional case concerned annexation of territory, and it was wonderful to see 
the Russian students arguing both sides, using arguments for and against the legality 
of Russia’s actions in Crimea.
6 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2011) OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Ruling of 20 
September, 2011 (final judgement), application no. 14902/04. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/
conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-145730&filename=001-145730.pdf.
7 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2011) Georgia v. Russia, Grand chamber hearing on 22 September  
2011. Application no. 38263/08. Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=hear-
ings&w=3826308 _22092011&language=en&c=&py=2011.
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Judgements of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation frequently refer to and 
follow the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, and law textbooks and legal monographs 
are full of references. In my view the impact in Russian law of Russia’s engagement with 
the European system for the protection of human rights is irreversible, even if Russia 
were to leave the CoE. The United Kingdom is more likely to leave at the present moment.
Several steps backwards?
The Foreign Agents Law
A very serious development of recent years has been the ongoing persecution of Russian 
NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), which started in July 2012, when the governing 
United Russia party introduced a draft law which requires non-profit organizations that 
receive foreign donations and engage in ‘political activity’ to register as ‘foreign agents’. 
This is the Foreign Agents Law.8 In my view the reason for this legislation and ongoing 
persecution and prosecution of NGOs is the fear of the regime that mass protests such as 
those which took place in 2012 against election fraud, and in March 2015 following the 
murder of Boris Nemtsov, were stirred up by NGOs funded by the United States, European 
Union and other donors, with a view to bringing down the regime. The regime is also in-
creasingly angry at the success of foreign-funded NGOs in taking cases to Strasbourg (for 
example my own EHRAC cases mentioned above), and campaigning on issues of electoral 
fraud, corruption, and environmental destruction. The law was strongly criticized by the 
Venice Commission (Venice Commission 2014).
As a follow-up to this law, on May 23, 2015, President Putin signed the Undesirable Orga-
nizations Law.9 The law bans non-governmental organizations that it deems undesirable 
as a “threat to the constitutional order and defence capability, or the security of the 
Russian state”. NGOs that do not disband when given notice to do so are now subject to 
high fines and significant imprisonment. 
According to a July 2015 report by the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils 
Muižnieks (Commissioner for Human Rights 2015), by 29 June 2015 the list of ‘foreign 
agents’ included at least seventy NGOs. Of those, only five organizations voluntarily agreed 
to designate themselves ‘foreign agents’. At least twenty NGOs have ceased their activity 
either in full or in part, including through ‘self-liquidation’. The litigation NGO which I 
8 Rossiiskaya Gazeta (2012) Federal Law of July 20, 2012 N 121 –FZ, 23 July.  
Available at: https://rg.ru/2012/07/23/nko-dok.html. 
9 The state system of legal information (2012) Federal law from 5/23/2015 number 129 –FZ, 23 May.  
Available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201505230001.
founded in 2003, the EHRAC is now representing some sixteen campaigning NGOs in a 
complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.
The Commissioner registered particular concern as follows:
“The imposition of the label of ‘foreign agent’ on NCOs 10 and the enforcement of 
disproportionate sanctions are increasingly perceived by the affected organizations 
as a defamation campaign against those who express disagreement or criticism of 
the policies pursued by the authorities. The Commissioner’s growing concern is that 
human rights defenders, including his Office’s long-standing partners in the country, 
appear to be particular targets of these measures.” (Commissioner for Human Rights 
2015, para.70, p. 24)
The Commissioner carries out regular monitoring of human rights issues in Russia, and 
without the assistance of independent human rights NGOs, his work would be much more 
difficult.
Most recently, on 2 June 2015, President Putin signed a law on further amendments to 
the law on NGOs, defining ‘political activity’ for the purpose of designation as a ‘foreign 
agent’, so that practically any NGO activity will be classified as ‘political’.11
The Constitutional Court and ECHR judgements
Consternation has been expressed at the judgement of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation (CCRF) of 19 April 201612, that implementation of the 2013 Anchugov 
& Gladkov v. Russia 13 judgement of the ECHR (on prisoners’ voting rights), is “impossi-
ble”, because it is contrary to the 1993 Russian Constitution. Article 32(3) of the Consti-
tution prohibits “citizens detained in a detention facility pursuant to a sentence imposed 
by a court” to vote or to stand for election. The April 19 judgement was the CCRF’s first 
since Amendments to the Law on the CCRF, enacted in December 2015. The Amendments 
followed the 14 July 2015 judgement of the CCRF, No 21-P,14 which proposed a mechanism  
10 Meaning NGOs – this is the Russian description.
11 Rossiiskaya Gazeta (2016) Federal Law of June 2, 2016 N 179-FZ, 2 June. Available at: https://rg.ru/ 
2016/06/06/obiedinenia-dok.html.
12 Rossiiskaya Gazeta (2016) Decision of the Constitutional Court from April 19, 2016 N 12-P, 19 April.  
Available at: https://rg.ru/2016/05/05/sud-dok.html.
13 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2013) Anchugov and Gladkov v. Russia, Ruling of 4 July, 2013 (final 
judgement), application no. 11157/04 and 15162/05. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng# 
{"fulltext":["11157/04"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-122260"]}.
14 Rossiiskaya Gazeta (2015) Decision of the Constitutional Court on July 14, 2015 N 21-P of St. Petersburg, 14 
July. Available at: https://rg.ru/2015/07/27/ks-dok.html.
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for determining whether it is ‘impossible’ to implement a Strasbourg judgement. The  
word ‘impossible’ is not defined in the judgements or in the amended Law (see Nuzov 
2016).
There were amicus curiae briefs before the CCRF arguing that the problem could be re-
solved by interpreting the Constitution, rather than seeking to amend it, which the CCRF 
cannot do. The CCRF, with three powerful dissents, disagreed, and held that in 1998, 
when Russia ratified the ECHR, there was no case law under Article 3 of Protocol 1 (right 
to democratic elections) prohibiting a ‘blanket ban’ on prisoners’ voting. Otherwise rati-
fication would have contradicted the Constitution. However, the CCRF suggested that by 
an amendment to the criminal law persons detained in Russian ‘open prison’ correctional 
colonies could be re-classified so that they do not fall within Article 32(2) of the Consti-
tution. If this is done, Russia will in effect implement the ECHR’s judgement. The CCRF 
emphasized the priority of international law, especially the ECHR, over Russian domestic 
law, while insisting that it is the final judge in issues concerning the Constitution.
I agree with the CoE Secretary-General, Thorbjørn Jagland (Jagland 2016), that the “…
judgment of the Constitutional Court suggests that there is a way to resolve the issue 
through a change of legislation which would alleviate the existing restrictions on the 
right to vote”.
In this way Russia may, if it chooses, avoid repeating the collision between the CoE and 
the UK over prisoners’ voting rights after the 2005 judgement in Hirst v. United Kingdom 15 
which the UK has simply refused, for political reasons, to implement. Or that of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina after the 2009 judgement in Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 16  
(discrimination against Jews and Roma in presidential elections), implementation of 
which would mean undoing the Dayton Agreements. It is of course the case that it is 
unwise to make predictions as to future developments in Russia, and experts have time 
and again been proved wrong. But it is my own estimation that Russia will choose prag-
matism over petulance. Russia has benefited from its membership of the CoE, and its 
principles are now deeply embedded in the Russian legal system.
15 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2005) Hirst v. the United Kingdom, Ruling of 6 October, 2005  
(judgement), application no. 74025/01. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["74025/01"], 
"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-70442"]}.
16 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2009) Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rul-
ing of 22 December, 2009 (judgement), application no. 27996/06 and 34836/06. Available at: http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["27996/06"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAM-
BER"],"itemid":["001-96491"]}.
Conclusion
On 25 March 2013 the offices of Amnesty International in Moscow were raided by Russian 
prosecutors as part of a sweep of more than 41 NGOs. Amnesty said that these searches 
“reinforce the menacing atmosphere for civil society” (Elk 2013). Nevertheless, Amnesty 
International’s representative office in Moscow continues to campaign outspokenly, as do 
Memorial, Agora and many other civil society organizations. As already noted, the future 
of the Russian Federation is completely unpredictable. President Putin’s high popularity 
ratings in opinion polls almost certainly reflect the fears of the population as to what 
might come after him, including the possibility of further disintegration of the Federation. 
Russia has already been at war with one CoE member, Georgia, and is presently at war 
with another, Ukraine. NATO is preparing for possible Russian aggression against the 
Baltic States. Nevertheless, civil society has since 1991 put down deep roots in Russia, 
and membership of the CoE has transformed Russian law and legal education. On 21-22 
November 2015, I participated in the III All-Russian Civic Forum in Moscow, sponsored by 
the former Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin, at which more than 1,200 civil society activ-
ists and academics from all over Russia spent two days discussing Russia’s predicament 
and the future of human rights activism, including a workshop conducted by Agora on 
how best to work round and through the Foreign Agents Law.17 The task for supporters of 
Amnesty International will be to publicize and support in as many ways as possible the 
activities of the many courageous human rights defenders in Russia.
17 The program is at Civil Forum (2015) Program of All-Russian Civic Forum – 2015. Available at:  
https://civil-forum.ru/forums/2015/programm/. 
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Mikhail Suslov
Framing and foreign policy: 
Russian media control and human rights 
In this chapter we will see how official foreign policy discourses in Russia make sense 
and use of human rights issues in international relations. It will discuss the role and 
influence of propaganda and media control on Russia’s past, present and future foreign 
policy in relation to human rights. It also explains the gap between Russia’s adherence 
to human rights principles in legislation and its criticism of human rights in practical 
political discourses, identifying three narrative strategies. 
Introduction
It would be a gross oversimplification to say that the Russian political elite and legal 
system are inimical to the idea of human rights. The skeletal structure of Russia’s legis-
lative system formed in the 1990s is based on Article 2 of the Constitution (1993) saying 
that “Man, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value. The recognition, observance 
and protection of the rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be the obligation 
of the State.” Likewise, all Concepts of the Russian Foreign Policy (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000a, 2008 and 2013) stipulate that Russia adheres 
to “universal democratic values […] including human rights and freedoms” (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013). However, the discrepancy between the 
constitutional norms and Russia’s foreign policy discourses has always been gaping. 
After the Second World War the rhetoric of human rights was instrumentalized for the 
purposes of complying with the Soviet Union’s status as a key member of the United 
Nations and its Security Council. 
Nevertheless, the leaders of the country saw human rights as tools for achieving (geo)
political goals rather than as ends in themselves. Today’s Russian leadership is also far 
from the wholehearted adherence to the human rights agenda because, if Russia’s politi-
cal identity in the Soviet times was largely shaped by constructing the temporal opposition 
with the pre-revolutionary period, today’s Russia’s identity is being made in opposition 
to the (imaginary) West. The geopolitical logic of self-perception as an alternative to the 
West demands that Russia’s political elite inevitably tries to attack and revise the core of 
Western ‘soft power’ – the human rights doctrine. This is in spite of the obvious benefits 
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of embracing human rights for the Russians, wanting to enjoy the same standard of life, 
security, and respect for human dignity as their Western peers.
Propagandistic infrastructure
In the post-Soviet period, in spite of the law on the mass media of 1991 which granted 
freedom and pluralism of media outlets and the prohibition of an official state ideology in 
the Constitution of 1993, the formation of the “state-controlled media system in the com-
mercial media environment” (Zassoursky 2004: 21) has been gathering momentum since 
the early 2000s. By many accounts it reached an acme after the annexation of Crimea. 
One of the reasons is that the media landscape has changed considerably in the last 
25 years, featuring a significant drop in the print-runs of newspapers and magazines, 
whereas television remained the main and the most credible source of information for the 
vast majority of the Russians up to date.1 So the leadership focuses its propagandistic 
efforts on the nationwide TV channels. Vladimir Putin started his first presidential term 
with a decisive crackdown on the oppositional TV channel NTV. NTV’s coverage of the first 
Chechen War (1994-96) successfully raised the audience’s awareness of the atrocities of 
the military confrontation. An orientation on human rights was central for the channel’s 
take on the conflict. By the end of the 1990s, popular disappointment in democratic 
reforms coupled with the widespread sense of insecurity, heightened after a series of 
bombings of the multistory houses in the autumn 1999, produced a general demand for 
a ‘strong hand’.2 Against this background NTV’s commentators raising the human rights 
problems were no longer able to compete with populist, right-wing and war-mongering 
TV anchors on other channels. Soon NTV fell prey to the rivaling media moguls, backed 
by the Kremlin (Ostrovsky 2015; Pomerantsev 2015). Since this ‘NTV affair’, the rules of 
the game have changed: oppositional TV channels were no longer tolerated in Russia, 
whereas some dissenting print outlets with limited impact on the population were allowed 
to survive (e.g. Novaia Gazeta) as a smokescreen for the illiberal turn of the state (for 
more on the illiberal turn in Russian foreign policy see the chapter of Alicja Curanović).
The advent of the Internet was not a game-changer, although after the Arab Spring, and 
especially after the waves of protests in the winter and spring of 2011-12, the Kremlin 
woke up to the growing powers of the social media. This awareness prompted much of 
the recent legislation aiming to curb down the Internet by means of increasing control 
1 High-Tech mail (2014) Television is the main source of information for most Russians. Available at:  
https://hi-tech.mail.ru/news/levada-tv/.
2 A series of terrorist attacks killed 307 and wounded more than 1,700 people in Moscow and two other cities.  
These events made a strong impact on the popular opinion in Russia, comparable to the effects of 9/11 
attacks in the US. 
over its physical infrastructure, as well as by legislative measures such as laws on the 
‘propaganda of extremism’, which resulted in some two hundred criminal sentences for 
‘extremism’ on the Internet in 2015 (Iudina 2016). The access to some important oppo-
sitional news portals (e.g. ej.ru, kasparov.ru, grani.ru ) was banned (from Russia), and 
their newsrooms emigrated. The state in its turn is trying to effectively colonize the dig-
ital landscape. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has launched various online 
platforms such as a YouTube channel (since 2012). Likewise, diplomats are encouraged 
to maintain accounts on Facebook, Twitter and other social networks. Students of the 
Russian Diplomatic Academy can attend special courses on social networking (Smirnov 
& Kokhtiulina 2012: 35). Additionally, a number of state-sponsored ‘troll farms’ and out-
sourcing of propaganda to quasi-private social media accounts of popular figures3 with 
hundreds of thousands and millions of subscribers are effectively shaping the political 
agenda of the Internet users (Morozov 2011; Oates 2013).
Having secured its grip over the mass opinion domestically, the Kremlin is trying to proj-
ect its agenda internationally. The flagship state-controlled media for the global audience 
is RT (formerly Russia Today ), a TV company established in 2005 by order of the Russian 
government. RT has recently grown into a serious competitor to the BBC, Al Jazeera, or 
France 24, wielding generously allocated budgets of some $ 300 million, 2,500 employees 
worldwide, and round the clock broadcasting in Russian, English, Spanish and Arabic. RT 
has reported to have the record of 1.7 billion views on YouTube and a tangible audience 
in Europe and the United States, as well as a status of the free-to-air television channel 
in Argentina. Around 2009 RT adopted a more assertive stance in castigating the West’s 
double standards coupled with actual problems with human rights implementation (Her-
pen 2015). RT managed to contract leading TV presenters such as Larry King for the pro-
gramme ‘Crosstalk’, which aired experts and political figures of various persuasion, but 
clearly privileging anti-American values. In one of the programme’s airings, Larry King 
criticized the US’s policy of supplanting international human rights by its own political 
agenda.4 Although RT has a 9 per cent budget cut in 2016, its sister company, state-
owned news agency Rossiya Segodnya with its branch Sputnik News (radio broadcasting 
and online news portals) enjoyed a ten-times surge in finances.
Another way to influence the international audience is instrumentalization of the Rus-
sian-speaking diaspora, which came to the fore in the middle 2000s. Russia’s diasporal 
policy has been fleshed out in a number of websites and print media (e.g. Russkii vek 
3 E.g. Margarita Simonian, the head of RT, has 417.000 followers on twitter.com; Vladimir Solov’ev, the anchor  
on state-owned Rossiya-1 TV channel, has 1,45 million followers (as of 28 July 2016).
4 RT (2016) Universal Justice?, 20 May. Available at: https://www.rt.com/shows/crosstalk/343730-international- 
law-americanization-sovereignty/.
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
69
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
68
Russian media control and human rights
since 2007, Shire Krug since 2006, Baltiiskii mir since 2008, Edinstvo v Raznoobrazii 
since 2008). These journals address directly the Russian speakers abroad and are dis-
seminated for free. In practical politics, the concept of ‘Russian World’ [Russkii mir] was 
fine-tuned to wield Russia’s ‘soft power’, and in this capacity it entered into the Foreign 
Policy of the Russian Federation of 2008 as one of the state’s priorities in the international 
arena: to defend the Russian-speaking diaspora abroad (Kosachev 2004; 2012; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2008). 
The institutional ‘muscle’ behind these journals include Rossotrudnichestvo, the state 
agency for the relations with the compatriots abroad, relaunched in its contemporary de-
sign in 2008, and the non-governmental organization Russkii mir, created by the initiative 
and with the financial support of the state in 2007. In 2013 it had a budget of 30 million 
euro (cf. 15 million in 2010), which gave it sufficient resources to maintain 218 centers 
in 50 countries and even more ‘cabinets’ (smaller centers) worldwide. Rossotrudnichestvo 
had a budget of 60 million euro in 2013 (cf. 40 million in 2012). Still, one should not 
overestimate the capability of the state to manipulate its foreign diaspora; in fact, only 
between 3 and 5 per cent of the Russian speaking expats actively participate in cultural, 
political and media events, organized by these institutions (Zatulin 2011: 95), whereas 
the vast majority shuns from any attempts of social and political engagement and very 
often harbors deep distrust to any initiative originating in the Russian officialdom. 
Geopolitical instrumentalization
The rest of the paper will discuss three narrative strategies of dealing with human rights 
in the context of foreign policy. The first narrative is grounded on the popularity of geo-
politics, which provides a deterministic and a ‘science-like’ approach to understanding 
the past and predicting the future. The central explanatory narrative in the Russian-style 
realist geopolitics is the idea of an everlasting struggle between continental powers such 
as Russia and maritime powers, represented by NATO (Suslov 2013). In this narrative, 
human rights discourses are represented as nothing more than a weapon, hypocritically 
used by ‘the West’ for the purpose of gaining the upper hand over Russia, Iran, China and 
other ‘continental’ countries. This argumentation crystallized after the bombing of former 
Yugoslavia in 1999, which was almost unanimously seen in Russia as the manifesta-
tion of the West’s double standard approach. A series of articles published by Natalia 
Airapetova in Nezavisimaia Gazeta in 1999 (controlled by tycoon Boris Berezovskii, who 
then supported Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign) mounted a powerful indictment 
against the human rights movement worldwide as a mercenary activity whose benefactor 
in the end of the day would always be ‘the West’ (Morozov 2002a).
Russian media control and human rights
In response to this perception of human rights as the instrument in geopolitical strug-
gle, the Russian leadership and loyal intellectuals have developed a counter-strategy 
of reciprocal monitoring of the human rights situation in Western countries, allowing 
them to accuse the Western countries of neglecting violations of human rights on their 
own territories. In 2007 the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation was established in 
Paris, with a branch in New York, financed by the Foundation of Historical Perspective. 
The Institute has attracted scholars and political figures to discuss political issues on 
its platforms, and the institute’s actions are occasionally covered on France 24, RT and 
other media outlets. The New York branch of the institute has published several reports 
(hosted on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), criticizing various violations of 
human rights in the US (Institute of Democracy and Cooperation 2013). 
However, the focal point of this strategy is the Russian-speaking diaspora in the Baltic 
states. The situation with the Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia pro-
vided ample opportunities to use the human rights argument as Russia’s leverage over 
these countries (Kivirähk et al. 2010). For example, in 1999 when the Latvian Parliament 
(Saeima) adopted a law on the national language, the Russian State Duma issued a 
statement in which this law was condemned as a ‘recurrence of racial discrimination’ of 
the Russian speakers. In this vein, the aforementioned journal Baltiiskii mir continuously 
covers the issue of ethnic discrimination and violation of democratic principles in relation 
to the Russian-speaking diaspora. For example, Maxim Reva, a columnist of Baltiiskii mir, 
observed that Russian compatriots were exposed to “actual cultural and legal genocide” 
(Reva 2009). Pointing at the large groups of non-citizens of Russian origin in Estonia and 
Latvia, experts of this foundation claim that these countries have committed uncountable 
human rights violations but thanks to their membership in the EU and their anti-Russian 
stance, they are exempted from well-deserved criticism (Demurin & Simindei 2009). 
As the extreme development of the utilization of human rights in the diasporal issues, the 
pro-Kremlin intellectuals and officials adopted a kind of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) 
doctrine in relation to its ‘compatriots’. Thus, the war with Georgia in 2008 was covered 
in Baltiiskii mir as a clear sign that “Russia […] will defend us, her compatriots” (Lo-
banov 2010). Likewise, Valerii Zor’kin, the head of the Constitutional Court, vindicated 
the annexation of Crimea by the appeals to the principles of R2P, arguing that Russia 
was impelled to intervene in order to prevent blatant violations of rights of the Russian 
speakers living there (Zor’kin 2015). (See the essay of Derek Averre and Lance Davies in 
this volume for more on Russia’s position on R2P.) 
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‘Sovereign democracy’ concept
Geopolitical instrumentalization of the human rights doctrine remains an important part 
of Russia’s strategic narrative up to date. It has, however, an inherent limitation: the 
illiberal turn in Russian politics (see the essay of Alicja Curanović), the suppression of 
the opposition, and the tightening of state control over the media have all made it in-
creasingly difficult to maintain Russia’s image as one of the world’s liberal democracies, 
being under geopolitical attack of its Western enemies. The pro-Kremlin intellectuals have 
thus come up with a different perspective on human rights – the concept of ‘sovereign 
democracy’, which was coined and put into wide circulation in 2005. 
The name associated with this concept is that of Vladislav Surkov, one of the main ar-
chitects of the Putin-era illiberal turn in Russian politics. Drawing on the ideas of Carl 
Schmitt, Surkov theorized sovereignty as the central political value of absolute impor-
tance. The ‘sovereign democracy’ concept acknowledges human rights and democratic 
values but vigorously resists the assumption that some external force could impose them 
(Surkov 2006). The immediate trigger of this new conceptualization was the so-called 
‘Orange revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004-2005. For the Kremlin this was the watershed 
moment when the fears reigned that the West would use civic activism and human rights 
concerns to foment a mass uprising and to prepare a coup (Zygar 2015). 
The concept of sovereign democracy has been tailored to counteract the principle of 
humanitarian intervention. In 2012 mildly liberal Moskovskie Novosti (owned by the Rus-
sian information agency RIA Novosti) published Vladimir Putin’s article ‘Russia and the 
Changing World’, in which he backed the principle of state sovereignty, ‘sanctified by 
ages’. Today, he argued, sovereignty was being undermined by military conflicts, falsely 
justified by humanitarian goals, thereby creating a ‘moral and legal vacuum’. Further on, 
Putin resorts to the first strategy, claiming that the human rights movement has been 
politicized and squatted by ‘the U.S. and other Western countries’; in order to counter this, 
Russia has to identify and criticize violations of human rights in the West.5
Already in 2000, the principle of humanitarian intervention was repudiated in the Foreign 
Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Feder-
ation 2000a). The Concept maintains that Russia is not akin to post-war Germany or Ja-
pan, and therefore institutions of democracy should grow organically; Russia should pace 
itself, not succumbing to the ‘colour revolutions’, sponsored from abroad. Sergei Lavrov, 
the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, explicated his position in an article published in 
5 MN (2012) Vladimir Putin's article in the “Moscow News”. Available at: http://www.mn.ru/politics/78738.
Kommersant (owned by once the richest Russian Alisher Usmanov, loyal to the Kremlin). 
This paper presented democratic principles, human rights and liberties as universal and 
as basic values for the whole of humanity, but at the same time Lavrov (2014a) insisted 
on the right of nations to “remain different, to preserve their cultural identity”.
The second strategy, built upon the ideology of ‘sovereign democracy’, presents interna-
tional legal obligations as more important than moral reasoning about justice. Valerii 
Zor’kin, the head of the Constitutional Court and one of the doyens of the Putin-era 
illiberal turn, professed that for centuries, Russian statehood and society had been kept 
congruous with traditional values and Christian morals. However, in today’s post-indus-
trial world, the force and relevance of these bonds have weakened, so the role of legal 
means of cohesion must increase. That is why those who put the ‘spirit’ of democracy and 
human rights above the ‘letter’ of the law, open a Pandora’s box of lawlessness, where the 
mighty rule over the weak. What Zor’kin described was the West’s encroachments on the 
legal order all over the world, under the pretext that the ‘spirit’ of democracy and human 
rights is above the ‘letter’ of national sovereignty (Zor’kin 2015). 
This approach was legally supported by the decision of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation of 14 July 2015, which revisited Article 15, paragraph 4 of the Con-
stitution, proclaiming the priority of the international treaties and agreements, signed by 
Russia, over the national legislation. According to the new interpretation, the Constitution 
is the basis of the political subjectivity of the Russian nation and hence it has the high-
est juridical force. So, if international legislation, such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ratified by Russia in 1996, contradicts the norms of the Constitution, the 
latter should apply. In practice this means that decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights related to Russia could be called in question and deemed invalid.6 
Multiple civilizations approach 
The concept of sovereign democracy remained a powerful narrative strategy, but its con-
clusions are indecisive. It admits to the universality of human rights but reserves the 
sovereign right to interpret and implement them without external oversight. However, it 
does not offer any alternative to human rights doctrine. Besides, the emphasis on legality 
at the expense of morality is somewhat incongruous with the Russian ethical worldview, 
notoriously defined by priviliging the truth (pravda) over the law (pravo). So inevitably, 
the sovereign democracy concept has morphed into another strategic narrative, which  
6 Constitutional Court of Russia (2015) Decision, 14 July. Available at: http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRF  
Decision201896.pdf. 
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
73
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
72
Russian media control and human rights Russian media control and human rights
assumes fundamental cultural differences between Russia and the rest of the world and 
rejects the idea of universality of human rights concepts. The civilizational approach to 
history replaced the Marxist formation approach in the 1990s and has become the main 
intellectual source of this narrative (Scherrer 2003). 
The assumption of the lack of any universal grid of values and morals prompted conser-
vative intellectuals to revisit the human rights doctrine and (partially) cast it away as 
merely a Euro-centric hegemonic discourse of the global West. In Russia, they argued, the 
highest value would never be individualistic human rights (Tsygankov 2016). Instead, a 
communitarian approach of sorts is promoted according to which a human is seen as a 
part and parcel of her social context, e.g. a community, a tradition, a religious faith and 
so on. The communitarian logic infers from this that individual rights are secondary to 
more fundamental rights of a community. To put it roughly, the civilization approach to  
human rights returns Russia to the Soviet-era skepticism about human rights principles 
as a cover for bourgeois hegemony, but this time it substitutes class values and interests 
by those of a culturally defined civilization. 
The multiple civilizations approach to human rights stages an anti-Western criticism, 
different from the ‘sovereign democracy’ approach. The latter emphasizes the procedural 
aspect of the defence of human rights as a pretext to violate national sovereignties, not 
questioning the pertinence of the human rights concept in general. The former stresses 
that the very idea of the predominance of human rights is detrimental to the ‘Russian 
civilization’, because it supplants authentic values by ones imported from abroad. In this 
context, the term ‘spiritual sovereignty’ was coined by patriarch Kirill and picked up by the 
whole gamut of nationalistic NGOs and public figures, most notably by the Izborskii Club 
organization, headed by controversial writer Aleksandr Prokhanov, and by the Eurasian 
movement, spearheaded by Aleksandr Dugin. For them, ‘spiritual sovereignty’ implies that 
Russia would shun from the Western values simply because they are Western, ‘not ours’. 
The multiple civilizations paradigm, however, has a weak spot: it prioritizes particularism 
over universalism (Mälksoo 2014; Morozova 2015). In a way, this model’s only universal 
principle is that there could be no universal principles in everyday life and politics be-
cause we all belong to different civilizations. 
Conclusions: towards ‘Inter-Traditional’?
The Kremlin’s grip over the major media outlets is as firm as it has ever been since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, and the victory of the ‘TV set over the fridge’ is quite solid. If no 
dramatic lowering of the living standards happens in the foreseeable future, the Kremlin’s 
control over the media will probably remain steadfast. Moreover, today we can observe 
some attempts to work out a new universalism grounded on the rejection of human rights 
as an unsuitable doctrine for the whole of humanity. This universalism draws on the lega-
cies of pre-revolutionary religious Messianism and Soviet communism. We can tentatively 
call it the ‘Inter-Traditional’ model, built upon the traditionalist values of religious morality 
(Stoeckl 2014). As a case in point we can consider the recent article by Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov, ‘Russia’s foreign policy in a historical perspective’ (Lavrov 2016). 
In this paper Lavrov calls for the partnership of civilizations, which would be based on 
common morality of humans and their adherence to traditional values such as family val-
ues and religion. Patriarch Kirill sounded the same note in his sermon of 21 March 2016, 
in which he attacked the “global heresy of human-worshipping”, which had ”put human 
rights higher than the word of God”.7 
The ‘Inter-Traditional’ strategy can effectively capitalize on the fears and anxieties gener-
ated by globalization. But at the same time, ‘Inter-Traditional’ is ideologically very ‘thin’ 
and negatively defined. It hardly has anything to offer ideologically apart from a funda-
mentalist backlash. All in all, ‘Inter-Traditional’ is not a serious rival to the universalism 
of the human rights principles, and it could not be sustained for a long period in a stable 
political, economic and media environment. The reverse is also true: the state-generated 
situation of permanent emergency and the unfree press nurture Messianic and illiberal 
public opinions. What is perhaps more important is the vision of human rights as in-
struments in the geopolitical struggle as well as their cynical and half-hearted adoption 
whenever it suits Russia’s political goals. This approach to human rights undermines 
popular trust in moral values (Pomerantsev 2015) in a paradoxic contradistinction with 
Russia’s self-portrait as a bastion of traditional morality.
It has been argued above that the human rights discourses should be contextualized 
within the bigger picture of Russia’s relations with the ‘West’. In Russia human rights, 
like many other things, are more than just that – they are also the markers of national and 
political identity. The external pressure, such as the decision of the ECHR on the Yukos  
affair8 or the international sanctions against Russia during the Ukrainian crisis, have 
7 Russian Orthodox Church (2016) Address of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill to the Triumph of Orthodoxy feast 
after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, 21 March. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/
text/4410951.html.
8 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (2011) OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Ruling of 20 
September, 2011 (final judgement), application no. 14902/04. Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/
conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-145730&filename=001-145730.pdf. ‘Yukos Oil Company’ was owned 
by Mikhail Khodorkovskii, an oligarch with political ambitions. Since Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power, the 
company was harassed with the tax claims and declared bankrupt in 2006, while Khodorkovskii was arrested 
and sentenced to prison. Yukos shareholders filed a number of complaints to international institutions;  
in 2014 the ECHR decided to charge Russia €1.86 billion in compensation for the lack of fair trial and 
protection of property.
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Russian media control and human rights
Hanna Smith
Domestic politics and the role of identities 
in Russia’s foreign policy 
on international human rights 
This article examines the role of identities in Russian foreign policy through an examina-
tion of three different foreign policy schools of thought – Westernizers, Civilizationists, 
and Statists. Each of these has a distinct ideological basis, leading to different impli-
cations for international human rights policies. Although Statists have mostly been pre-
dominant for the past twenty years, more recently the Civilizationist approach has been 
gaining ascendancy. This has implications for the rights of both Russians in Russia and 
migrant workers, and consequently for the work of human rights advocates. 
Introduction
There seems little doubt that in the case of Russia the link between domestic factors and 
foreign policy is strong; as Bobo Lo has written: “One of the most noteworthy aspects of 
Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era has been the extent to which it has been 
shaped by domestic factors” (Lo 2002: 26). Robert Putnam (1988: 432) states that po-
litical leaders can be viewed as trying to achieve their goals in the domestic and inter-
national arenas simultaneously. He discusses the two faces of a policy arising from the 
same social base and argues: “A more adequate account of the domestic determinants 
of foreign policy and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, 
interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators and even public opinion 
and elections, not simply executive officials and institutional arrangements.” Therefore 
the role of identities defined in the domestic political arena are worthy of closer exam-
ination when it comes to the formation of foreign policy and a country’s interactions with 
other countries.
However, this task is not easy. Identity as one of the driving forces in public opinion and 
in the activities of civil society in Western countries can be expressed through democratic 
institutions, especially elections, and through human rights, particularly with freedom 
of speech and with the help of institutions based on the rule of law. In this respect the 
role of political parties, NGOs and civic activism is central, a pluralistic media landscape 
is essential, and respect for norms and the rule of law are vital. In the case of Russia 
been framed by the state-controlled media as Western attacks on Russia, and successful-
ly recycled for rallying mass support behind President Putin. The popular demand for the 
human rights agenda should emerge domestically, whereas to date, the Russian middle 
class has been unable to create this demand. First, it traded participation in politics for 
comfortable consumption in the 2000s when the oil prices were high, then the crackdown 
on opposition in 2011-2012 muffled the most radical voices of dissent, and finally the 
middle class was lured by the nationalistic and great-power rhetoric, rampant in the 
media after 2014. So there is no easy or win-win solution for human rights advocates who 
will observe either of the two possible scenarios: 1) the spiraling economic and political 
crisis can create some opportune moments for the democratic change, but it is more likely 
that it will consolidate the framing of human rights as the enemy’s information warfare 
against Russia; 2) stabilization could free the hands of the regime for international ad-
venturism, but in the long run it would weaken the self-image of Russia as a besieged 
fortress, and foment the popular demand for human rights.
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evaluating the possibility for civil society, here understood in its broader sense of civic 
values, to influence foreign policy presents more of a challenge; political parties, NGOs 
and civic activism in Russia have a very different societal framework, nature and position 
from those in Western countries; the media are almost entirely controlled by the state (see 
the essay by Mikhail Suslov in this volume), and respect for the rule of law is expressed 
in unpredictable ways.
Therefore tracing the influence of Russian civic values expressed by civil society needs 
to be done by looking at Russian ideas and beliefs that find support among sections of 
both the people (civil society) and the political elite (state). The complex issue of Russian 
foreign policy has often been explained by breaking down the inner groups involved in 
Russian foreign policy-making, each of which has its own self-image of Russia. This has 
provided a way of looking at different views on Russia’s place in the world, Russian iden-
tity and national interests, the nature of the Russian state system and economic models. 
Traditionally the common way of breaking down Russian political society into groups is 
to define three categories in Russian foreign policy thinking (Light 1996; Lukin 1992; 
Pushkov 1995; Jackson 2003; Zevelev 2012). In this article the three groups are identified 
as Westernizers, Statists and Civilizationists, following Andrei Tsygankov’s line (2010: 4). 
These represent the main foreign policy schools and are the basis for any sub-groups of 
foreign policy thinking. In addition, they reflect different views of Russian identity among 
the broader public, subject to the influence of different interests and ideas. Therefore by 
proxy they represent the various views of a broader civil society, in the absence of the 
more obvious institutions of civil society which can be examined in Western countries. The 
different foreign policy schools each represent, more or less, the place occupied in more 
open systems by a political party battling for influence and popularity, not only in the eyes 
of the political elite but also of ordinary Russians. In the next section of this article the 
three groups are introduced, with particular emphasis on their views on human rights 
and Russians abroad. 
Westernizers – together with the Western democracies?
The Russian liberal school – the Westernizers (zapadniki) – have also been called Atlanti-
cists, liberals, democrats and even “international institutionalists”. They come closest to 
the ideas of institutionalism and liberalism in the Western context. Even if for this group 
the West is the referent for Russia’s evolving state identity, it should not be identified with 
the Western concept of liberalism as such. In common with other groups, Russian West-
ernizers consider Russia as a Great Power and therefore see a special place for Russia 
in international affairs (Smith 2016). Supporters of this group are often associated with 
Domestic politics and the role of identities 
business elites, NGO workers, cultural elites, the educated middle class (reckoned to be 
15 per cent of the population) and some journalists.
Russian discourses of modernization have roots in this thinking. They insist that Russia 
needs to become a modern state in the Western style. Westernizers emphasize the Rus-
sian similarity with the West and view the Western civilization as the most viable and 
progressive in the world. For Westernizers the ideas of multilateralism and international 
cooperation are essential elements of international politics. Therefore they see the main 
task of Russian foreign policy as one of joining Western economic, political and military 
institutions (Sergunin 2007: 46). This policy was at first shared with a different group, 
the Statists (introduced below), but since the mid 1990s it has been modified. The Stat-
ists lost faith in the international institutions led by Western countries failing to accept 
Russia’s Great Power status.
The Westernizers do see the collapse of the Soviet Union as a positive thing, making it 
possible to finally build a Russian civic state inside the borders of the Russian Federation. 
This group feels strongly that they are the winners of the Cold War and that they are the 
ones who actually defeated communism. Their economic policies are based on general 
free market economy principles and the insistence that economic relations with the newly 
independent states of the former Soviet Union should be based on free economic zones. 
With the West the relationship is very much based on the ideas of the market economy 
where cooperation and competition vary (Clunan 2009: 63). The Westernizers call for 
strategic partnerships and equality with Western countries. Partnership and equality are 
possible based on common understandings of human rights and the democratic state 
system. This, however, was one of the factors that opponents of the Westernizers attacked 
strongly in the 1990s. The Westernizers’ policies towards the West were seen as based on 
‘ideological desires’ rather than ‘firm foundations’ (Lo 2002: 46). Other factors that made 
such views unpopular were the fact that the Westernizers showed little interest in the area 
of the former Soviet Union, and the fact that they argued that Russia was a normal state 
with no overarching global mission, like the ones it had in tsarist times (orthodoxy) and 
in the Soviet Union (communism) (Jackson 2003: 34). 
For Westernizers the internal problems in Russian politics arose from the perception that 
they were ready to sell their country to the West, undermining Russian Great Power iden-
tity, Russian values and its sovereignty. Interestingly this argument had less to do with 
economic factors than with the human rights regime and democratic institutions. The 
argument was that those advocating human rights and any Western model of rule of law 
were after Western money (referring especially to NGO activists), and were self-centered 
individuals neglecting their own people (Morozov 2002b: 417). In the early 2000s this 
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critique was still marginal and had not yet become part of mainstream politics. However 
today in Russia those NGOs and activists that speak for human rights and the rule of law 
according to European conventions or the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights are 
seen more as a ‘fifth column’ inside Russian society (Lipman 2015).
Regarding the question of Russians outside of the borders of the Russian Federation, 
Westernizers agree with the Civilizationist and Statist position that there was a real 
threat to Russian-speaking minorities in the area of the former Soviet Union (Light 1996: 
60). Already in 1992, then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev argued: “If minority rights are 
not maintained, Europe may face a stream of military conflicts and refugees that will not 
only disrupt the Helsinki process, so important to the cause of peace and stability, but 
will also drown human rights its wake” (Kozyrev 1992: 292). 
For Westernizers the threat towards Russians abroad, especially in the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) area, was more economic in nature. They were afraid of 
‘a mass exodus’ of Russian speakers (Light 1996: 60). However, they argued that this 
concern should be dealt with in the general context of human and minority rights. This 
policy of involving others (the West) in matters concerning Russians in the so-called 
‘near abroad’ and sovereign decision-making (using international institutions) of the 
state worked against the Westernizers in domestic politics. It differed from the approach 
of Statists and Civilizationists who see Russia as having sole and exclusive responsi-
bility for Russians living abroad. As Igor Zevelev (2014) has pointed out, this difference 
became more important with the annexation of Crimea. 
In Russian politics today, in the economic sphere the Westernizers are still part of the 
political elite but in civil society and in foreign policy, they are very much marginalized 
and discredited. The best ‘weapon’ against the Westernizers in Russian domestic politics 
has been the argument that the Westernizers, by arguing for human rights and the rule 
of law according to Western models, have betrayed Russian uniqueness, become puppets 
of the West, and undermined real Russian values.
Civilizationists – conservatism with a national twist
The Civilizationists are also known as Slavophiles (slavyanofily ) or nationalists (Neumann 
1996). This group derives their arguments from what they call Russian inheritance and 
values. The Slavophile movement was born in the 19th century. According to Anisimov 
and Gulyaikhin, the Slavophiles saw the autocratic monarchy as the ideal form of govern-
ment; they put emphasis on the uniqueness of the Russian people, its history and future, 
criticizing political and legal forms and the relationship between state and society in the 
West. The conclusion of this was that the Western model of government, state-society 
relations and the legal system was not suitable for Russia (Anisimov & Gulyaikhin 2014: 
24). The Civilizationists can be found across Russian society. They are most often asso-
ciated with the more religious part of the population, as well as with some cultural elites, 
former communists and the conservative side of the power structures like the FSB, the 
main Russian security agency.
The Civilizationists see the international environment as hostile. The collapse of the  
Soviet Union is seen by them as a very negative thing and they see most of the bad 
things in Russia as due to Western interference. The Civilizationist framework sees Russia 
mainly as surrounded and threatened by enemies. These threats include democracy and 
liberal ideas (Jackson 2003: 35). For them the West is a threat to Russian values and the 
vast land mass is essential for Russian greatness. This has expressed itself very strongly 
in the question of human rights, which has been labeled as a Western policy of double 
standards (Morozov 2002b: 416). 
The Russian Constitution of 1993 was strongly criticized by Slavophile groups as lacking 
consideration for the memory of ancestors and traditions of the people; the Constitution 
“as expected again reflected pro-European utilitarian principles” (Anisimov & Gulyaikhin 
2014: 29). One of the Slavophile philosophers from the 19th century, K. Leontiev, saw the 
Tsar as being above the law, argued that natural rights and freedom of the individual do 
not exist, and held that “Russian people would not be inspired by the English love for the 
law” (Anisimov & Gulyaikhin 2014: 27). These ideas and views have had a fundamental 
effect on Russian politics too. They suggest that there are no natural rights but rights 
granted by a superior force. This naturally puts the question of human rights on a very 
different basis from that in Western societies.
Slavophile foreign policy discourse uses mythologized narratives of Russian civilizational 
uniqueness and ‘mission’. For Civilizationists the idea of the ‘Russian Empire’ has been 
at the core of thinking. The Civilizationists object to both Western and Asian influence 
in Russia, seeking Slavic unity. Therefore the Civilizationists define Russia on a strong 
ethnic basis, which is a key difference between Statists and Civilizationists. Ethnic and 
assimilated Russians enjoy ‘first class’ citizenship in this framework. For Slavophiles, 
Great Russia includes Ukraine, called ‘Little Russia’ among Civilizationists, and Belarus, 
called ‘White Russia’, as well as sometimes Latvia and northern parts of Kazakhstan 
with their large Russian-speaking populations (Clunan 2009: 71). Also the Slavophiles, 
like the Statists, do not rule out the use of military force for the protection of the ethnic 
Russian population (Sergunin 2007: 55). Igor Zevelev (2008) observed in 2008 that this 
policy of emphasizing ethnicity, redefining Russia in more specific ethnic terms, was to 
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become the most dangerous undertaking in the entire history of Russia: “Implementation 
of this project may bring about a revision of state borders and undermine the country’s 
internal integrity.” In addition to the centrality of ethnicity for Civilizationists, there is an 
emphasis on the Russian Orthodox Church, which brings the essence of spirituality into 
Russian society (see for more on this the essay of Alicja Curanović). 
Up until Putin’s third term as President, the Civilizationist group was the weakest in the 
power hierarchy behind the Statists and the Westernizers. But they have now bypassed the 
Westernizers and came close to overtaking the Statists after the annexation of Crimea and 
the war in Ukraine, requiring the Russian official position to take a strong Civilizationist 
turn (Tsygankov 2006b; see also the essay of Curanović in this volume).
Statists – the powerful middle way
Russian Statists come closest to Western realist thinking, and are also known in some 
writings as Eurasianists, liberal nationalists, or great-power balancers (derzhavniki). 
They can be found among the technocrats and civil servants as well as having a strong 
representation within the power structures. They also find support in the regions and 
among less educated parts of the population. Even if the business elite is more often 
associated with the Westernizers, several big business leaders with connections to the 
state belong to the Statist group. The group gained influence when President Putin first 
came to power in 2000 but its process of power consolidation had started already during 
the 1990s. Inside of this group there is a more liberal wing which sometimes cooperates 
with the Westernizers, especially in economic matters, and a more conservative side 
which finds friends among the Civilizationist group. This group, as its name indicates, 
argues for a stronger role for the state and the revival of Russia’s Great Power status. 
The Statists wanted to unite the most popular ideas coming from the Westernizers and 
Civilizationists. Statists believe that foreign policy should be guided by national interests 
defined realistically with regard to the Russian geopolitical security situation, domestic 
economic objectives and available resources. During Vladimir Putin’s first two presi-
dencies this line was also called pragmatist. Pragmatism meant that Russia would be 
ready to cooperate with anyone who saw Russia as a Great Power in the international 
system (Tsygankov 2006b: 93). This was a factor that differentiated the Statists from 
the Civilizationists.
The Statists see the state as a central actor governing and preserving the social and 
political order as well as conducting economic policy. The Statist economic policy is 
very much connected to state control of economic policies, and so it does not reject 
altogether the Soviet experience. By emphasizing the role of the state, Statists, without 
being explicit, demote the role of civil society. Sergei Markov, political analyst and former 
member of Russian state Dume, in an interview for The New York Times provided a good 
illustration of the Statist way of conducting policies: “The authorities will attempt to 
conduct themselves with society as a parent would a child who is crying and demanding 
some kind of toy. It is not correct to go out and buy the child a toy, but rather distract him 
with something else” (Herszenhorn & Barry 2011). 
Concerning the questions of norms, values and identity, it has frequently been claimed 
that Russia has a different set of values from the Western world. However this claim 
has been rejected by Statists in Russia. The Russian argument goes that Russia has 
its own type of democracy but that its values have the same base as those in the West. 
When listing differences in the Russian approach to statehood and values, Putin on the 
one hand stated that pan-human values that are also understood and used in Russia 
are: freedom of expression, the right to leave the country and other political rights and 
personal liberties, the right to own property, and the right to create a fortune for yourself. 
On the other hand, the specifically Russian values mentioned by Putin are patriotism, 
derzhavnost (‘great-powerness’) and gosudarstvennichestvo (state-centeredness) (Kolstø 
2004: 2). Out of these three, great-powerness and state-centeredness are at the core of 
Statism and are also among the factors that make a difference in Russia’s relationship 
to the West.
Furthermore, as part of Statism’s great-powerness, Russian identity is connected to lan-
guage and it has been emphasized how important it is for Russia to defend Russian 
speakers outside Russia’s borders. For Statists, territory is a very important element of 
strength. A. Vladislavlev, influential and long term politician in Russia, and S. Karaganov, 
today Dean of the school of World Economics and International Relations at the Higher 
School of Economics in Moscow, wrote already early in the 1990s that “Russia must bear 
its cross and fulfil its duty by playing an enlightened post-imperial role throughout the 
ex-Soviet Union” (Sergunin 2007: 57). The Statists view the area of the former Soviet 
Union as Russia’s sphere of interest. This emphasis on territory and defending Russians 
and Russian speakers beyond Russia’s borders was present in foreign policy argumen-
tation as early as June 1992, when then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, often labeled a 
‘Westernizer’, wrote: “The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation has held for the first 
time hearings on international human rights and we will show persistent and keen in-
terest in the strict, legal observance of the rights of our compatriots, including Russians 
and other nationalities. We cannot allow the consolidation of nations within the CIS (or 
those that did not become members of the Commonwealth) to be accompanied by any 
infringement of minority rights” (Kozyrev 1992: 291). This policy has been present in both 
Russian domestic and foreign policy argumentation ever since the fall of the Soviet Union 
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but intensified during Putin’s two first presidential terms. It survived the Medvedev pres-
idency 2008-2012 and returned to the core of policies with the return of Putin in 2012.
Today the Statists have become the dominant group within the Russian political elite. 
They have carefully constructed a working dualism in their views relating to human rights; 
a Great Power defends its compatriots beyond Russia’s borders and at the same time it 
can demand that there is no interference in its own domestic affairs through arguing for 
strong sovereignty. The Statists find their support more in the peripheries than in the big 
cities and the Orthodox Church is their ally in many policy matters. 
Conclusion
The three different schools of foreign policy thinking described in this article are associ-
ated with real people, embedded in real institutions and subject to the influence of their 
own interests but also to broader societal pressures. The ascendancy of one school or 
another under Vladimir Putin is often the result of responses to popular opinion, or else 
of the regime’s will to push public opinion in one direction or another. The three main 
schools of Westernizers, Civilizationists and Statists are associated with broader ideas 
of liberalism, religious conservatism, and state interest, and are linked to those currents 
in the broader population. 
There has been a clear shift since the early 1990s in Russian foreign policy away from 
liberal and towards more conservative ideas in foreign policy. The current trend is for the 
Civilizationists to gain more influence over foreign policy, and assuming this continues, 
it implies a further distancing from notions of individual human rights which are asso-
ciated with Western values. This will also have foreign policy consequences in relation 
to both Western countries and to Russia’s neighbours in the post-Soviet space. Russia 
is isolating itself with its human rights rhetoric, even if many authoritarian states in the 
post-Soviet space struggle to protect individual human rights.
At the same time, the Civilizationist discourse will create strong tensions inside Russia. 
Even if Statists, who put the state before the individual, are the strongest group, the 
Westernizers’ discourse of Russia as part of the West lives on among many people. With-
out the West Russia struggles to be a Great Power. The atmosphere of ‘you are either with 
us or against us’ reduces the human rights framework for all Russians and brings a halt 
to the development of the rule of law. The position of non-Slav migrants living in Russia 
will also become more difficult. 
The Civilizationist message poses a unique dilemma for international human rights ad-
vocates: the involvement of foreign organizations in Russia is viewed with more and 
more suspicion, so that receiving support from international human rights organizations 
immediately makes individuals more suspect and possibly open to more reprisals. 
Discourses over human rights and democratization have been too closely linked only with 
the Westernizers’ approach in foreign policy. This should be extended to other frameworks 
too; by encouraging bringing up human rights in dialogues between churches/religions, 
and by raising human rights issues in the context of ongoing police and military coop-
eration. Attention can also be paid to human rights in the framework of already existing 
agreements where Russia is a participant, in business ethics, and in academic circles 
a more in-depth analysis of Slavophil and Statist understandings of human rights can 
be carried out etc. Even if human rights are universal and should apply to all people, a 
country-sensitive approach as well as a more comprehensive and systematic approach 
including adding the principles of human rights in existing cooperation areas, would 
bring the dialogue to a more ‘universal’ level without encouraging, inside the human 
rights dialogue, a division between ‘us’ and ‘them’.
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Civil society in Russia’s foreign policy: 
excluded ‘foreign agents’ and 
pro-Kremlin policy implementers
The role and involvement of Russian NGOs in the country’s foreign policy and relations 
with other countries has profoundly changed over the recent years. Domestic and interna-
tional political developments have shaped two main formats and models of such involve-
ment relevant for two groups of NGOs: 1) the group of Russian NGOs, some of which are 
often labelled ‘foreign agents’, and Russian NGO members of global civil society forums, 
and 2) GONGOs, recognized and sometimes established by the Russian state as foreign 
policy implementers. They act in different forms and models, but both are present in the 
definition and implementation of Russian foreign policy and Russia’s broader role in the 
international relations.
Introduction
The foreign policy of Russia and its relations with other countries have radically changed 
in the last fifteen years. The conventional wisdom is that in the aftermath of the collapse 
of the USSR, Russia’s foreign policy has travelled from close collaboration and coopera-
tion with the West, including the European Union and the United States, to a breakdown of 
these relations and a more assertive position as a state catering to its national interests 
and promoting its own agenda. At the present day, relations between Russia and the 
West can be explicitly characterized as an open confrontation. At the same time, Russia 
increasingly seeks to establish itself within such groupings as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian 
Economic Union and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.
This reorientation in foreign policy has noticeably affected the Russian civil society actors 
and their role in and influence on the country’s foreign policy, including the policy in the 
sphere of human rights. In particular, one can see that as a result of both domestic and 
international political developments there have been several important moves. First, there 
has been an open split of perspectives between the Russian state and a segment of Rus-
sian civil society, on Russian foreign policy and its role in the international community. 
Nowadays, the relations between both are characterized as an almost open confrontation. 
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Second, there has been a rise of a new category of Russian civil society actors who are 
actually involved in implementation of some aspects of the Russian foreign policy. As 
a result, two specific models of involvement of Russian civil society in foreign policy 
relevant for two groups of NGOs have emerged: 1) exclusion from foreign policy-making 
and implementation for NGOs labelled as ‘foreign agents’ and other Russian members of 
global civil society forums, and 2) involvement in foreign policy-making and implemen-
tation for a range of Government-Sponsored Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs). 
This essay discusses how these shifts have come about and evaluates future prospects 
for the Russian civil society in the realm of foreign policy and international relations.
The foreign policy of Russia and civil society over time
Since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian foreign policy has gone through two distinct 
phases of development. The role of civil society actors, predominantly NGOs, has also 
evolved throughout these two periods. This section briefly describes this evolution.
The 1990s: pro-western orientation of russian foreign policy
The foreign policy of a new state – the Russian Federation – in the 1990s was charac-
terized by an intensive rapprochement and cooperation with the West. Internally Russia 
was in a situation of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. The West or, in other 
words, the European countries and the US, were seen as the democratic role models to 
catch up with. This orientation strongly influenced Russian foreign policy: there were 
clear intentions to learn from the West and embrace the Western models, norms and 
principles, and there was visible support for or at least a lack of open criticism of, the 
new allies’ foreign policies. Development of civil society was one of such orientations, 
and the 1990s saw proliferation of civil society organizations supported by American and 
European donors.
It is practically impossible to trace any direct influence of the emerging Russian civil 
society on the new foreign policy, as both phenomena were developing simultaneously. 
However, in that period, both the Western financial assistance and an overall democratic 
and civil society-friendly orientation of the Russian state created favourable conditions 
for the Russian NGOs to become involved in cooperation between Russia and Western 
countries. Importantly, the Russian state viewed NGOs as its assistants in the process 
of becoming a ‘normal’ power through inner democratization, importing and diffusion 
of the Western practices and models of governance, human rights protection and social 
problem-solving. The latter, for instance, was especially intensive in the regions bordering 
European countries and later the EU members where NGOs were involved in cross-border 
cooperation (Belokurova 2010; Demidov & Laine 2013). Cross-border cooperation was of-
ficially considered an important instrument and even a unique format of the EU-Russian 
cooperation (Liikanen & Scott 2010).
In a sense, the period from the 1990s until Putin’s second presidency was a period of con-
sensus between the Russian state and civil society, who both seemed to share common 
intentions to democratize Russia as well as integrate it into the international community. 
In this period, civil society actors were implementers of the official foreign policy of inte-
gration and cooperation.
The 2000s: the ‘national interests’ turn and a fallout between the state and civil society
The turn away from friendly and cooperative relations with the West did not occur at the 
very start of Putin’s presidency. Quite the contrary, in the beginning of the 2000s there 
were still several attempts to rewind and renew these relations that were crumbling 
down after such events as the Chechen wars, the bombing of Yugoslavia or the Kosovo 
War in 1999 when Russia blamed the West for betrayal and sidelining. The Russian state 
was still faithful to its intentions to de-ideologize its relations with the rest of the world 
despite recurring normative clashes with the Western allies over the NATO expansion or 
the war in Iraq in 2003 (Romanova 2016).
However, as a result of this confrontation with the West, Russia started identifying itself 
less and less with the prevailing international order and started opposing what it saw as 
exclusion through unequal treatment by the West. In 2007, Putin gave his famous Munich 
speech that signified a turn towards an independent foreign policy with a distinct role 
for Russia.1 This role was defined as participation in the stabilization of the international 
system through reaffirmation of the principles of international law and ensuring multi-
polarity (Romanova 2016; Kurowska 2014). Moreover, an orientation towards its own na-
tional interests was announced as the main principle of Russian foreign policy (Pavlova 
& Romanova 2014). At the same time, Western, and especially European politicians began 
to seriously criticize Russia for its refusal to follow the path of democratization. This led to 
a more and more sceptical position of Russia towards the West (Sergunin 2000, and his 
essay in this volume). Already in 2003-2005 Russia, for instance, refused to join the new-
ly-introduced European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiated by the EU. It did not want to 
be just a ‘junior partner’ of the EU, as was the case with other ENP countries, and insisted 
on equal financial participation in the ENP implementation (Browning & Joenniemi 2008).
1 Putin, V. (2007) ‘Speech and the following discussion at the Munich conference on Security Policy’, President 
of Russia, 10 February. Available at: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
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In practical terms, this turn manifested itself in an increasing desire of Russia to in-
fluence international politics. Russian opposition to the West has been progressively 
escalating and transpiring both through demonstrable ‘turns’ to alternative formats of 
international cooperation, such as with the BRICS countries, the Shangai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union or players such as China, and through 
perpetual contestation of the Western attempts to invoke the norm of Responsibility to 
Protect or install the anti-nuclear shield in Eastern Europe (see also the essay by Averre 
& Davies in this volume). Since the second Putin’s presidency, the Russian opposition 
to the West moved to a level of contesting the doctrine of universal human rights that 
was labelled as a threat to Russian traditional values and as a concept introduced by 
the West to put pressure on Russia and other weaker states. In such a situation, human 
rights organizations are seen as enemies of the Russian state.
Russian civil society and foreign policy: formats of (non)participation
What is the role of the Russian civil society in this remarkably different context? How did 
these radical turns affect the roles and position of Russian NGOs? This section maps out 
the multi-faceted reality of the Russian civil society that, on the one hand, came about 
as a result of the above-mentioned U-turns in Russian foreign policy and, on the other, 
resulted from inner developments within Russian civil society. The section depicts two 
main models of (non)involvement of Russian NGOs in foreign policy.
Excluded from the official foreign policy and international cooperation: ‘foreign agents’  
and members of global civil society forums
The first group of Russian NGOs, excluded from, more broadly, any international relations 
or, more narrowly, any official foreign policy pursued by the Russian state, yet deeply 
involved in international cooperation, is represented by two sub-groups: 1) those directly 
affected by the repressive state policy and often labelled ‘foreign agents’, and 2) those 
who continue to act as Russian members of global civil society forums yet not as official 
Russian representatives.
Due to the active international cooperation of Russian NGOs, these actors became closely 
involved in the global civil society, which is represented by transnational NGOs, interna-
tional NGO networks and global civil society forums. The Russian branches of Greenpeace, 
the World Wildlife Fund, Transparency International and other transnational NGOs became 
visible both within Russia and on the global scene. Russian national and local NGOs, 
especially the ones in such fields as human rights, the environment, gender, and social 
policy (social inclusion, anti-poverty etc.) became important actors of global civil society. 
By acting in the international arena, they, however, do not represent the Russian state, 
but work on their own missions, in the interests of their constituents and for the common 
good as defined by those missions. They are active within global civil society forums and 
during international negotiations on such global issues as climate change, world heritage 
protection, gender equality etc.
Sometimes, these NGOs were involved in the formation and even implementation of the 
official Russian foreign policy, although, paradoxically, that involvement was never ini-
tiated by the Russian authorities. One example is participation of the Russian human 
rights NGOs in the EU-Russia Human Rights Dialogue, a gathering that would always 
take place one day before the official EU-Russia meetings. For a long time, this practice 
exemplified a transition period for Russian NGOs, from recognition to full exclusion from 
foreign policy-making.
The exclusion of independent NGOs from both foreign and internal policy was connected 
with the general trend that Russian national policy towards NGOs became less favour-
able, especially after 2004 (more on the change of discourses and policies towards NGOs 
in Belokurova 2010). Among other things, this shift was connected with the Orange Rev-
olution in the Ukraine, after which NGOs primarily funded by Western foundations and 
criticizing national policies were demonized as potential threats and organizers of the 
so-called ‘colour revolutions’ against the national interests of Russia. As a result, in 2006 
new legislation was adopted, which strengthened the government’s control over NGOs, 
especially for those having foreign funding (HRW 2008: 414). This policy was especially 
strong in 2006-2007, before the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 and 
2008 respectively.
But, after the re-election of Putin in 2012, as well as after the citizens’ mass protest 
movement ‘For Fair Elections’, the restrictive policy towards critical NGOs supported by 
foreign foundations was strengthened. Its new ‘faces’ are the 2012 legislation on ‘foreign 
agents’ that targets domestic NGOs which acquire foreign financial support and carry out 
so-called ‘political activities’, and the 2015 legislation on ‘undesirable organizations’ 
that targets foreign NGOs and foundations. 
To sum up, since 2012, the Russian government’s policy towards NGOs involved in inter-
national relations and getting support from Western and international organizations and 
foundations, has changed to a very restrictive one. Although some restrictive measures 
were introduced firstly in 2006 and 2007, they became severe between 2012 and 2015. As 
a result of these measures, a whole cluster of Russian NGOs has been officially excluded 
from any involvement in foreign policy, as described in the previous section. In broad 
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terms, the space for involvement in various forms of international cooperation for these 
NGOs has significantly shrunk.
However, Russia’s membership in various intergovernmental forums and organizations 
– the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe – still provides a channel for continuing some 
kind of involvement in international cooperation. The logic of involvement is, thus, similar 
to the one practiced by many NGOs from countries famous for violations of human rights 
and is described in literature as the “boomerang pattern”, meaning that “domestic NGOs 
bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring pressure on 
their states from outside” (Keck & Sikkink 1998). The primary purpose of such top-down 
international advocacy is consolidation of effort in order to target domestic governments. 
Examples of such advocacy include, but are not limited to, the support of Russian citizens 
in their claims to the European Court of Human Rights, preparation of shadow reports 
about the Russian situation in different fields to the United Nations institutions, etc.
Another form of international activity of such Russian NGOs is connected with an active 
participation in the creation and development of international NGO networks, often acting 
as parallel structures to the official organizations or negotiations. Here, such examples 
can be named as the Civic Solidarity Platform connected with the OSCE and created in 
2011, World Heritage Watch connected with the UNESCO World Heritage Committee etc. 
Although not connected with the official EU-Russia negotiations, the EU-Russia Civil 
Society Forum established in 2011 also became visible both in the EU and Russia.
To sum up, although many Russian NGOs active in the global civil society were already 
labelled as ‘foreign agents’ and excluded form Russian foreign policy, this did not happen 
to all of them. Thus, many NGOs involved in cooperation for social and environmental 
problem-solving are not seen as a threat or as ‘foreign agents’. This can be explained 
both by bureaucratic reasons of inconsistent and selective implementation of legislation, 
and by low political salience of these issues and, consequently, NGOs. In general, it 
means that even in spite of the repressive measures of the Russian state towards NGOs, 
a lot of them are representing Russia in the global civil society without articulating the 
official Russian foreign policy goals. In such a situation, they enjoy different relations 
with the Russian government: they can be either controversial or cooperative, they can be 
closely related or very distant from each other. What is important to bear in mind is that 
NGOs in this group pursue their own goals and act in accordance with their own missions, 
more and more often dissimilar to the official positions of the Russian state.
GONGOs: application of ‘soft power’ through cultural foreign policy and production  
of alternative discourses
Civil society was first mentioned as an actor of Russian foreign policy in the Concept of 
the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation). The Concept discusses the potential of civil society in the context 
of the improved use of ‘soft power’. The latter is broadly interpreted by the Kremlin as a 
complex of measures aimed at improving the image of Russia and enhancing its attrac-
tiveness as a political, economic and social model, and essentially includes several types 
of actions (Sinikukka 2014; Tsygankov 2006a; Sergunin & Karabeshkin 2015). The Kremlin 
equates invocation of ‘soft power’ with, first of all, the spread of Russia’s ideals, values 
(the ‘traditional’ version of values), language and culture. It also includes promotion of 
alternative unique Russian discourses and ‘clarification of the Russian position’ on highly 
contested international norms such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law in 
order to avoid imposition of any single point of view. Civil society actors are involved in 
both types of activities associated with application of the Russian version of ‘soft power’.
This group of actors is comprised of a wide array of organizations and associations. In 
legal terms, the majority of them are registered as NGOs, and, due to that fact, are often 
referred to in the literature as GONGOs. The population of these actors is very diverse and 
can provisionally be divided into several sub-groups. These include 1) the state-spon-
sored foundations and NGOs involved in the implementation of the Russian version of 
development assistance, 2) a network of think tanks, platforms and discussion clubs 
involved in intellectual production of alternative visions and discourses on world politics 
(such as Eurasianism etc.), the place of Russia in the world, and human rights, 3) a small 
number of state-sanctioned and sponsored human rights NGOs, 4) state-supported youth 
groups, 5) a number of religious groups endorsed by the Russian Orthodox Church. Some 
analysts suggest including various semi- or paramilitary groups and associations such 
as Cossacks or the Russian Imperial Movements into a separate category of NGOs. They 
can be seen as also involved in implementing Russian foreign policy through infiltrating 
in neighbouring territories such as Donbas; legally they are also ‘NGOs’.
Each of these groups of NGOs are involved in the Russian foreign policy to a different 
extent and through different means. The primary format for the NGOs from the first group 
is implementation of Russia’s development assistance. Interestingly, the composition 
of this group of NGOs is closely linked to what constitutes the Russian version of devel-
opment assistance. In the literature, Russia is approached as a re-emerging donor and 
largely a donor-in-the-making whose priorities and development aid instruments are in 
the process of consolidation as the country is defining its place and role in this sphere. 
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Nevertheless, Russia’s development policy and practice already exhibits certain peculiari-
ties: a specific geographical focus (Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, 
members of the Eurasian Economic Union as well as SCO and BRICS) and association 
of the so-called public diplomacy, the Russian operationalization of ‘soft power’, with 
development assistance and its implementation by state development agencies such as 
Rossotrudnichestvo.
Several big NGOs such as the ‘Russkiy Mir’ (the Russian World) Foundation, the Gorchan-
kov Fund, Foundation for Support of Compatriots, Moscow House of Compatriots etc. (Lut-
sevych 2016) act as recipients of state aid for implementation of various projects world-
wide, mainly in the CIS countries and the Balkans. There is a lack of data on what projects 
get funded through these NGOs, due to a lack of transparency about the fund-channeling 
practices of these organizations. However, an analysis of the websites of these NGOs 
shows that various educational activities, such as the organization of conferences, train-
ings, seminars and summer schools for discussion of the so-called alternative visions of 
the world order and international relations as well as promotion of the Russian language 
and culture, constitute the lion’s share of all the actions.2 Some experts claim that the 
network of these NGOs actively support pro-Russian separatist groupings in the ‘near 
abroad’, Ukraine and Georgia (Lutsevych 2016). Yet, the extent of this activity still needs 
to be empirically established.
The organizations that belong to the second group can often be considered NGOs only in 
legal terms. Perhaps the term ‘think tank’ better depicts the type of actions that these 
associations perform. Production and spread of alternative discourses and narratives on 
Russia, its values and traditions, its role in the world, world history as well as on a wide 
range of norms and ideas such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law represent 
the main sphere of activities of these foundations, discussion clubs and intellectual plat-
forms. Interestingly, these clubs and think tanks played an important role in creating and 
spreading the discourse of ‘soft power’. Alternative readings of history and, since recently, 
intellectual awareness-raising about allegedly distorted meanings of such phenomena 
as Nazism and fascism also became important fields of action for these organizations. 
The latter, as claimed by scholars, also represents one of the central aspects of the 
Russian normative agenda in foreign policy that became especially prominent during the 
Ukrainian crisis (Pavlova & Romanova 2014).
2 These activities are oftentimes referred to as ‘foreign cultural policy’. The Russian government prepared the 
Concept ‘Foreign cultural policy of Russia – year 2000’. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 
introduces a different term: ‘cultural humanitarian cooperation with foreign countries’. 
This group is represented by more or less strictly institutionalized and organized associa-
tions, clubs and institutes such as the Foundation for Historical Perspective, the Institute 
for Democracy and Cooperation, World without Nazism, the International Antifascist Front, 
the Historical Memory Foundation, Essence of Time, the Russian Institute for Strategic 
Studies, the Valdai Club, the Izborsky Club, and the Institute for Civic Projects (literally 
‘Institute of Societal Engineering’3). These NGOs act parallel to a wide network of the 
so-called ‘Eurasianists’ clubs, associations working on promotion of an alternative ‘in-
tegration project’ on the post-Soviet space based on specific common Eurasian values, 
and actively cooperating with similar groupings across the post-Soviet space through 
establishing their offices in those countries (Lutsevych 2016).
The third group of NGOs consists of organizations which can, from some perspective, be 
defined as advocacy NGOs working on issues of human rights and democracy. However, 
their reliance on the Kremlin funding as well as the reputation of being affiliated with 
the state governmental bodies such as Rossotrudnichestvo does not allow seeing them 
as fully independent. What is more interesting about these actors is their involvement in 
production of the narrative on human rights, alternative to the Western ones, in close co-
operation with state bodies. Having access to the presidential grants programme, which 
was extended to human rights NGOs three years ago, these NGOs are actively involved in 
general monitoring of human rights violations abroad, mainly in the Baltic states and CIS 
countries, or electoral monitoring parallel to official practices of such organizations as the 
OSCE. Moreover, they actively participate in publishing reports on human rights violations 
in the neighbouring countries, thus adding to the activities of the Special Representative 
for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 
2011 (Romanova 2016).
Human rights monitoring conducted by such NGOs as Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, 
the Russian Institute of Electoral law, the Eurasian Observatory for Democracy and Elec-
tions or CIS-EMO is not limited to registering the violations of the rights of the Rus-
sian-speaking minorities, which certainly occupy the central position, or scrutiny over 
electoral processes. The published reports cover a wide range of human rights issues 
such as the situation of Roma minorities, migrants and asylum-seekers, highlighting is-
sues of racism and xenophobia, child abuse, discrimination of the mentally-disabled and 
prisoners, human trafficking and social rights. It still needs to be established whether 
the Russian state increasingly relies on these NGOs as providers of such information on 
human rights violations. If so, this would indicate the emergence of a model of state-
NGO relations well known and widely practiced in the West. So far, the scholars notice 
3 See also its website. Available at: http://www.inop.ru/.
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
95
Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy  |  Russia
94
Civil society in Russia’s foreign policy Civil society in Russia’s foreign policy
that this link does not function as it should, and the Kremlin, for its reports, relies on the 
data acquired by the Western NGOs. Yet it can be expected that the relations between the 
Kremlin and these NGOs might change and move to the practice of information provision.
The participation of youth groups and NGOs in international exchange programmes got 
more support from the Russian government in the last years’. Thus, although in the 1990s 
and the beginning of the 2000s these exchanges were mostly developed on the initiative 
and due to the funding from Western countries, in recent years the Russian state also 
started to support these exchanges. As an example, the creation and support of the 
German-Russian Youth Exchange Foundation can be mentioned as well as some other 
state-funded youth exchange programmes.
As for the Russian religious organizations connected with the Russian Orthodox Church, 
they were always very active in other countries, but became more active in the last years 
due to the additional support of their international activities by the Russian state.
Although not directly related to the Russian NGOs, the Russian government endorsement, 
both rhetorical and material, of the European conservative far right movements and NGOs 
needs to be mentioned. It is believed to represent one of the very visible examples of 
dissemination and strengthening of the Russian soft power in the EU countries, which 
is also implemented through cooperation of the Russian government with both Russian 
and EU NGOs, political movements and political parties (Political Capital Institute 2014).
To sum up, during the last years we see very significant activation of the Russian soft 
power policies, which are implemented both through the governmental agencies and 
GONGOs created for these purposes.
Conclusion
A look at the involvement of Russian NGOs and civil society actors in the country’s foreign 
policy reveals a diverse and mosaic picture. As was described, the Russian civil society 
can be seen as divided into two big groups of actors, one of which is fully excluded from 
any official participation in foreign policy yet developing these activities through their 
independent channels, whereas the other one is increasingly becoming an official im-
plementer of the government’s policies. Most interestingly, actors from the second group 
become progressively involved in activities performed by the ones from the first one. The 
latter is especially relevant and worrying for the so-called independent human rights 
organizations and advocates, labelled as ‘foreign agents’ and systematically pressur-
ized by the Kremlin. These actors now have to compete, both in terms of resources and 
symbolic power, with the ones created and endorsed by the Kremlin, which sees these 
as advocates of the alternative understanding of human rights and other norms and 
instruments of its soft power. The excluded ‘foreign agents’ are finding new niches in the 
gradually shrinking space for their activities, especially in light of decreasing foreign 
funding (development of philanthropy, use of crowd-funding technologies, closer work 
with volunteers etc.). Their involvement in the country’s international cooperation and 
relations is far from over. 
International human rights advocates face a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, they 
could opt for strengthening their support to the excluded ‘foreign agents’ and the Russian 
members of global civil society forums. However, it is questionable whether this strategy 
could yield tangible outcomes in the long run, as their return to involvement in the official 
foreign policy is hard to imagine. Although these actors resent the idea of quitting any 
attempts to establish a constructive dialogue with the Kremlin, it is too early to see the 
outcomes of these attempts. In any case, international human rights advocates should 
closely look at emerging practices to understand their mechanisms and inner logic. Oth-
erwise, a blind continuation of any kind of support of these actors, especially financial, 
may trigger the Kremlin to harshen its stance towards them and may, as a result, harm 
these actors even more. 
On the other hand, foreign actors may attempt to build some sort of relationship with 
representatives of the second group, especially with the ones involved in promoting the 
Russian narratives on human rights and international norms. These attempts will inevi-
tably lead to an increase in contention between these actors and, most likely, a normative 
contestation with the Russian state. However, given that the major claim of the actors 
from the second group is the one about the lack of willingness of the Western counterparts 
to allow for any contestation and dialogue, let alone participate in it, this strategy does 
not sound as a hopeless exercise and may yield some positive results of dialogue and 
deliberation.
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Religion and human rights in 
Russia’s foreign policy 
Since 1991 Russia’s foreign policy evolved from idealism through pragmatism to moral-
izing conservatism. This so-called conservative turn is reflected by the shift in Russia’s 
relations with the West that is increasingly ‘othered’. The Russian Orthodox Church is the 
driving force behind Russian attempts to present its own interpretation of human rights 
as an alternative to that of the West. Human rights have become one of the strategic 
platforms of Russian church-state cooperation in the international arena, including the 
UN Human Rights Council. The conservative turn in Russian foreign policy resulted in a 
significantly less favourable situation for human rights organizations operating in the 
Russian Federation.
Introduction
Since the fall of the Soviet Union the elites of the Russian Federation were occupied with 
the quest for a new identity. In terms of geopolitics, post-Soviet Russia had to decide 
whether it wanted to be a ‘normal’ country, a regional power, a major global player or 
perhaps an empire. There was also a civilizational dimension of this identity dilemma: is 
the new post-Soviet Russia a European, Asian or Eurasian country? After 25 years since 
the fall of the USSR, this very dilemma has still not been definitively solved. Yet one could 
identify a common denominator for the majority of the narratives about the new Russian 
identity, i.e., Russia is a distinct civilization with its own tradition and culture.
The continuous search for identity made culture (and religion) of strategic importance 
for Russian politics, since culture and religion are considered by the Russian elites nec-
essary elements for the construction of Russia’s new self. Today the Russian Federation 
perceives the West not as a role model but rather as a negative point of reference.1 This 
situation is due to the combination of external (e.g. disappointment with the West’s 
1 During the Cold War one of the most important embodiments of the West in the Soviets’ eyes was the NATO 
and later on the so-called ‘old’ members of the European integration initiatives. Today when Russians refer to 
the West, they still think of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway etc. However, with 
the gradual enlargement of the NATO and the EU, even the former allies of the Warsaw Pact, e.g. Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, are more and more often considered a part of the West as well. For the purpose 
of this essay, the West means roughly the US, Canada (NATO non-European members) and the EU countries.
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policies) and internal factors (e.g. rapprochement of church and state) which are beyond 
the scope of this essay. However, it should be noted that religion and tradition as defined 
by the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter: ROC) have been playing a crucial role in 
‘othering’ the West. This, in turn, has had serious consequences for Russia’s interpreta-
tion of human rights.
There is thus a connection between Russia’s self-identification process (and the inherent 
dilemma of whether to be alike or the opposite of the West) and Russia’s approach to 
human rights. The more Russia determines itself through opposition to the West, the more 
likely it is to see human rights as an ideological project aimed at legitimating Western 
dominance. As Russia started to signal its ambition to regain a major power status, hu-
man rights became one of the crucial elements of struggle for an ideological hegemony. 
In presenting a civilizational alternative to the West, the Russian state is supported by the 
ROC. Collaboration of the Russian diplomacy and the church in the field of human rights 
is one of the best examples of the ongoing church-state rapprochement. Religion is thus 
a factor to be considered when it comes to understanding the dynamics of human rights 
discourse in Russia and its policy stance on human rights in the international arena.
This essay continues with an introduction of the characteristic features and tendencies 
of Russia’s self-identification process. It is followed by a presentation of the evolution 
of values and religion in Russia’s foreign policy from idealism through pragmatism to 
conservatism. It is emphasized how this change influenced Russia’s attitude towards 
human rights. Russia’s attempts to promote its own understanding of human rights are 
presented in the context of the tight cooperation of the ROC and the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.
Identity debate: what should Russia be in 21st century?
It is important to note that the status of a (separate) civilization is considered in the 
Russian public discourse to be an attribute of a major power. The status of a civilization 
is of strategic importance also because, as one can read in the Foreign Policy Concept 
of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013), 
civilizations are the main contenders in the global rivalry in 21st century. Acknowledging 
that cultural dominance is won by the capacity to promote and impose one’s own values, 
the Russian authorities stress the significance of cultural and civilizational sovereignty. 
In this regard sovereignty also means protecting national culture from foreign influences. 
Losing Russian cultural distinctiveness would undermine Russian identity, which in turn 
would endanger the state’s existence. 
Thus ‘foreign’ (values, norms etc.) is perceived as a challenge (to say the least) not only 
to national culture but also to national security. Also the multipolar vision of the world (as 
opposed to the Pax Americana) supported by the Kremlin has a civilizational dimension. 
According to Moscow, the post-Cold War global order should be based on the balance of 
power between the Western civilization and the joint effort of civilizations committed to 
traditional values – Russia, India and China. It is important to note that both China and 
India share Russia’s ambition to shape a new multipolar world order. Furthermore, they 
also identify themselves as distinct civilizations. Finally, both New Delhi and Beijing lean 
towards a pluralistic, non-universal concept of human rights and stress the collective 
nature of these rights.
Russia legitimizes its claim to a civilizational distinctiveness by presenting its own val-
ues which differ from both the European and the Asian ones. The visible rise of the com-
mitment of the Kremlin to traditional Russian values is referred to as the conservative 
turn and dates back roughly to the third presidential term of Vladimir Putin (since 2012). 
With taking on this new conservative identity, the Russian authorities frame their actions 
as based on moral grounds with acknowledgment of the legacy of traditional religions.
As a distinct civilization true to its religious heritage, Russia positions itself in opposition 
to the West which is presented as a domain of aggressive secularism. Moscow shows am-
bition to undermine the West’s cultural hegemony inter alia by questioning its monopoly 
on the interpretation of human rights. In Western hands, Russia argues, human rights 
are an instrument for bashing states which do not act in line with the West’s policies. In 
the Kremlin’s opinion, the West’s approach to human rights is an example of double stan-
dards. Therefore, following the reasoning of the ideological framework of the conservative 
turn, the Kremlin emphasizes the necessity to defend the right of each country to its own 
interpretation of human rights in accordance with its own traditional values. 
Russia’s foreign policy: from pragmatism to conservatism
The search for the new Russian identity has been reflected in Russia’s foreign policy. The 
latter was also determined by the general dilemma: to act in line with or in opposition 
to the West. The choice between these two options is related to values. In the first two 
years after the fall of the USSR, the Kremlin not only sought rapprochement with the West 
but was ready to acknowledge the Western model of socio-economical development (de-
mocracy, a human rights agenda, capitalism) as universal. Russian political scientists 
Sergei and Andrei Kortunov (1994) referred to this period of Russia’s foreign policy as 
‘ideological moralism’ to underline Russia’s unconditional dedication to Western moral 
standards regarding socio-political solutions.
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The failure of the democratic reforms of the 1990s casts a shadow over the image of the 
West in Russian eyes and ended the period of this initial idealism. The noticeable change 
came after 1993, when a constitutional crisis and the war in former Yugoslavia paved the 
way to the course of political pragmatism.2 The successor of Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin 
emphasized his commitment to turning Russia into a ‘normal’ country, i.e. a pragmatic 
state with no ideological vision facilitating its actions in the international arena. 
Also Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2004, confirmed on many oc-
casions that the Russian diplomacy intentionally lacked an ideological underpinning. 
This can be seen in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation issued in 2000 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2000a). Values are mentioned only 
in the context of democracy, which is considered inseparable from human rights and 
freedoms. In this document the Russian authorities confirm their strong commitment to 
developing an international cooperation in the area of the human rights, expanding Rus-
sia’s participation in relevant international conventions and bringing Russia’s legislation 
into conformity with its international obligations. Judging from the present situation, it is 
striking that there is no mention of religion, Russian traditional values, or morality. This 
can be explained by the fact that at the time, human rights were not so much a subject 
of ideological rivalry between Russia and the West. The occasional tensions were mostly 
of geopolitical and not ideological nature. Russian authorities did not question the con-
sensus on the interpretation of the universal character of human rights. Even the ROC, 
occupied with restoring its own position within Russia and the post-Soviet territory, did 
not pay more attention to this particular issue until later.
The comparison of this document (2000) to the concepts approved consequently in 2008 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation) and 2013 reveals the significant 
change which Russia’s foreign policy has undergone since the second presidential term of 
Vladimir Putin. It moved from declared pragmatism to moralizing conservatism. Although 
in the concept issued in 2008 there is still no explicit mentioning of traditional values, 
there are already important references to religion. According to the authors of the docu-
ment, “a religious factor in shaping the system of contemporary international relations 
is growing, inter alia, as regards its moral foundation. This problem cannot be resolved 
without a common denominator that has always existed in major world religions.” It is 
noteworthy that the Russian Orthodox Church is mentioned as one of the main partners 
of the Russian state in dealing with this issue.
2 Disputes in the beginning of the 1990s around the shape of the new constitution resulted in a political  
stand-off between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and the Russian parliament. The crisis was resolved by the 
use of military force ordered by Yeltsin in 1993.
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There are also significant changes in the interpretation of human rights. In the document 
of 2008 Russia reaffirms its respect for human rights and freedoms on the basis of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but at the same time calls for “preventing double 
standards, respecting national and historic peculiarities of each state in the process of 
democratic transformations without imposing borrowed value systems on anyone”. This 
is a clear reference to the policy of the United States and other Western countries which, 
in the Kremlin’s opinion, are instrumentalizing human rights for the sake of their own 
particular interests. 
Demanding respect for national historic differences is in line with the discourse on civ-
ilizational pluralism and particularism. Russia argues that the human rights concept 
should acknowledge local traditions which are foremost embodied in religion. The docu-
ment states that Russia finds it important to connect human rights “to the responsibility 
of persons for their actions, first of all in terms of preventing contempt for the feelings 
of believers and promoting tolerance, and to strengthen moral foundations in the human 
rights dialogue”.
The latest foreign policy concept (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
2013) puts a strong emphasis on civilizational identity. It is stated in the document that 
“for the first time in modern history, global competition takes place on a civilizational 
level, whereby various values and models of development based on the universal princi-
ples of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other”. 
According to this narrative, values have become one of the main axes of global rivalry, 
and civilizational sovereignty is – more than ever – of strategic importance. Moreover, 
Russia explicitly expresses its concerns that “imposing one’s own hierarchy of values 
can only provoke a rise in xenophobia, intolerance and tensions in international relations 
leading eventually to chaos in world affairs”.
Although Russia keeps confirming its commitment to human rights, it also increasingly 
emphasizes its conviction that the concept is used “to exert political pressure on sover-
eign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manip-
ulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights 
projects abroad”.
Russia’s foreign policy has evolved from pragmatism to a policy with a moral underpin-
ning. This shift is due to the general disappointment of Russians with both the failure of 
the transformation at home and the triumphal foreign policy of the West in the interna-
tional area. Examples are the expansion of NATO to the East (1999, 2004), the bombard-
ment of Serbia (1999), the American intervention in Iraq (2003) and last but not least 
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the ‘colour’ revolutions in the former Soviet republics, which were perceived by Moscow 
as acts aimed at humiliating Russia.3 
In 2008 Sergei Lavrov, previously a personification of Russian pragmatism, stated that 
foreign policy should be moral and thus deeply rooted in traditional values of world reli-
gions.4 While the EuroMaidan was unfolding in Kiev in December 2013, Minister Lavrov 
explained Moscow’s engagement in Ukrainian affairs with its Christian obligation to help 
a neighbour.5 Then in 2014, in the midst of the crisis, Lavrov argued that the deterioration 
of the relations with the West was due to the fact that the latter could not accept Russia’s 
return to its true traditional values.6 
This change in the tone of rhetoric of the Russian diplomats is correlated with the iden-
tity debate and the conservative turn. Russia – a distinct civilization with its own val-
ues – does not accept the Western ideological monopoly. The Russian Federation has the 
ambition to become the advocate of other civilizations which are, in Russia’s opinion, 
pressured by the West to follow its footsteps when it comes to interpretation of human 
rights. By standing up to the West’s aggressive secularism, Russia appeals not only to 
non-Europeans states but also to conservative circles in Europe and the US. The Krem-
lin tries to present itself as the last hope of the conservatives to reverse the course of 
secularism. 
What is important, traditional values are frequently interpreted in Russia as those em-
bedded in the tradition of Russian Christian Orthodoxy. ‘Traditional’ is thus commonly 
equated with ‘religious’. As a result, in the new Russia the ROC has become one of the few 
public institutions entitled to determine the canon of the Russian tradition and morality. 
The ROC thus plays an important role in legitimating the conservative turn in the Russian 
politics. This is also a reason why the Russian diplomacy has intensified its cooperation 
with the church.
3 The colour revolutions refer to the situation in former Soviet republics (the best known are Georgia and 
Ukraine), when opposition parties supported by a part of society managed to overthrow the government and 
install new political parties in power.
4 Interfax (2008) Lavrov calls for strengthening moral foundations of foreign, 23 October. Available at:  
http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=27046.
5 Interfax (2013) Helping Ukraine is an imperative of Christian Truth, 19 December 2013. Available at:  
http://www.interfax-religion.ru/orthodoxy/?act=news&div=53862.
6 Interfax (2014) The West is growing apart from Russia due to Russia’s return to Christian Orthodoxy, claims 
Lavrov, 5 June 2014. Available at: http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=55525.
The cooperation between the church and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The cooperation of the ROC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a part of a rapproche-
ment of the church and state which happened in Russia after the fall of the USSR (Knox 
2005). Although the cooperation between the orthodox hierarchs and the Russian dip-
lomats already took place in the 1990s, the institutional base was set in 2003 after 
patriarch Alexy II’s visit to the ministry. Then an expert working group of the ROC and the 
ministry was established, which still holds regular sessions. The group is the initiator 
of joint ventures, organizes conferences, issues publications and so on. In 2015 another 
body was created – the Committee for International Cooperation within the Council for 
Cooperation with Religious Institutions at the President’s office. Its mandate is to give 
state diplomacy recommendations regarding international activity, social morality and 
traditional values.7
The cooperation of the church and the ministry has solid foundations for it is driven by 
common interests. Both parties agree that the post-Soviet area should remain a sphere 
of dominant Russian influence. They also share the negative view on the impact of the 
Pax Americana and favour civilizational multipolarity. In the so-called near abroad8 the 
ROC supports the Russian diplomacy by fostering relations of the Russian diaspora with 
the homeland. Outside the post-Soviet area, e.g. in the Middle East or Latin America, the 
church helps to promote Russian culture and language and to improve Russia’s image. 
The Kremlin shows its support to the ROC abroad in several ways. Starting with practical 
issues, such as allowing mass services in the diplomatic headquarters, exchange of 
information, getting involved in regaining church’s real estate lost after 1917 or giving 
subventions for new places of worship.
Moreover, both parties can rely on each other’s support when it comes to diplomatic 
initiatives. For instance, the Russian President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and even 
members of parliament (including the Communist Party) have expressed their concerns 
about prosecutions of Christian minorities in the Middle East, especially in Syria and 
Iraq. In 2015 Russia together with the Vatican and Lebanon prepared a draft resolution 
on the protection of Christians at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva. The Kremlin 
7 A ‘personal’ factor also played an important role in the development of the cooperation – Minister Sergei 
Lavrov is known for looking kindly upon the intensification of contacts between his department and the ROC. 
To the strength of the bilateral contacts testify new ‘rituals’, such as a common celebration of Easter holiday 
by hierarchs and diplomats at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the patriarch’s blessing on the occasion of 
the national day of diplomats. Symbolically, in 2015 as a proof of mutual respect Sergei Lavrov was awarded 
with the order of Sergius of Radonezh, while patriarch Kirill received a honorary doctorate by the Russian 
Diplomatic Academy.
8 The notion refers to the former Soviet republics with the exception of the three Baltic states.
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has presented itself as the main protagonist of this cause in the international arena. In 
this way, it supports the church which considers improving the situation of Christians in 
this region to be one of its priorities. In return, for example, patriarch Kirill appealed to 
the US President Barack Obama in 2013 not to bomb Syria, and thus supported Vladimir 
Putin’s diplomatic initiative. The ROC also backed the Kremlin’s decision to launch air 
strikes in Syria in September 2015. Patriarch Kirill referred to them as a ‘peace-enforcing 
operation’.9
Human rights are also an important area of church-state cooperation. This topic has 
turned into another ideological battlefield with the West, and the ROC seems to be the 
driving force behind it. It should be emphasized that this is an unusual situation for 
church-state relations in Russia, where the Kremlin usually has the upper hand. 10 
Human rights in the agenda of the ROC and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The conservative turn has made the ROC an indispensable part of the Kremlin’s foreign 
policy. The ROC is in a position to define what traditional values are. It is not a coinci-
dence that the most important attempt so far to define these values is the document The 
Basic Values: the Fundaments of National Unity issued by the World Russian People’s 
Council (an organization established and closely linked to the ROC) (Russian Orthodox 
Church 2011). It was prepared by the Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church 
and Society, and, if we can believe the then head of this department, Vsevolod Chaplin, 
the text was the result of discussion with political parties and different social groups.
9 Patriarch Kirill’s preaching, 19 March 2016, see Official Website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2016) 
Address of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill on Saturday of the first week of Lent, after the Liturgy in St. Daniel 
Monastery Stauropegial, 19 March. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4407803.html. Archpriest 
Vsevolold Chaplin even called Russia’s military involvement in Syria a ‘holy war’. However, this comparison 
triggered harsh criticism from the representatives of Syrian Christian communities and eventually cost  
Chaplin his post as the head of the Department for Church-Society Cooperation. ‘Russia’s fight against ter-
rorists of ISIS was called by the ROC’s representative a ‘holy war’, see Ria Novosti (2015) Russian Opposition 
IG terrorists named in the ROC ‘holy struggle’, 30 September. Available at: http://ria.ru/religion/20150930/ 
1293510538.html.
10 The ROC might promote some ideas or projects but it is up to the Kremlin which one of them will be included 
in the state agenda and thus privileged in the Russian public sphere. The asymmetrical character of the  
relation between church and state is well seen in case of the church’s status. For many years the ROC has 
tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the Russian authorities to sign a separate agreement (a sort of a concor-
dat) which would strengthen the ROC’s position. Similarly, the Kremlin has so far ignored the church’s calls 
for delegalization of abortion. The recent sidelining of Vsevolod Chaplin, the head of the Synodal Department 
for the Cooperation of Church and Society, is also seen by commentators as a result of the Kremlin’s pressure 
on the Moscow Patriarchate, see Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2016) An Outspoken Priest Falls From 
Grace, 28 March. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-chaplin-interview-putin-kirill-orthodox- 
church-conservatism/27639946.html.
In order to specify traditional values, which previously had been used in general terms, 
the document provides a catalogue of seventeen values: faith; justice (meaning “the 
rightful place of a nation in the international community”, i.e. status); peace; freedom 
(limited by moral obligations); unity (of different ethnic groups, social classes, political 
groups); morality; dignity; honesty; patriotism (defined as love for homeland, nation, cul-
ture, respect for history and readiness for self-sacrifice); solidarity; mercy; family; culture 
and national tradition (characterized as respect for one’s own culture and the tradition 
of others); prosperity (material and spiritual); diligence; self-limitation (resignation from 
consumption); and devotion (to the homeland and nation). What is striking in this ‘canon’ 
is its prevailing patriotic character. An individual is foremost a member of a community 
which he/she owes love, respect, devotion, and, if necessary his/her life.
The debate on the approach to human rights has been going on within the ROC since 
1999 (Stoeckl 2012: 214)11 but was introduced to the Russian public in 2006 when the 
World Russian People’s Council12 issued the ‘Declaration on Human Rights and Dignity’.13 
Since then the ROC has been actively promoting its point of view in the international 
arena, e.g. patriarch Kirill delivered speeches to the UNESCO (2007) and to the UN Human 
Rights Council (2008). Finally, the Bishops’ Council of the ROC adopted “The Russian 
Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights” in 2008. Gen-
erally, the ROC’s stand on human rights is constructed in opposition to liberalism and 
secularism. Moreover, individual human rights are juxtaposed with rights of community, 
nation and family (Stoeckl 2014). As the church underlines, freedoms involve duties, e.g. 
vis-à-vis community, society etc. Last but not least human rights are interpreted by the 
ROC in an inseparable relation with traditional values. 
11 The interest in human rights was picked up and elaborated on in the Department for External Church Rela-
tions led back then by the metropolitan Kirill (Gundyayev), the present patriarch.
12 The World Russian People’s Council was established in 1993 at the initiative of patriarch Alexy II. It is an 
international organization closely linked to the ROC that seeks to mobilize people who are concerned about 
Russia’s faith. Council sessions are attended by governmental representatives, leaders of public associ-
ations, clergy, science and culture figures, and delegates of Russian communities from the near and far 
abroad.
13 The declaration was not strictly a Church document but it was generally perceived as the ROC’s attempt to 
probe the reactions to such initiatives.
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A closer look at the church’s inner debate reveals the evolution in the position of the ROC: 
from simple opposition to human rights as a foreign concept promoted by the West to a 
narrative in which the West, driven by aggressive secularism, has forgotten the true (i.e. 
moral) origins of human rights. In the controversial sermon on the occasion of the Feast of 
Orthodoxy (20 March 2016), patriarch Kirill called elevating human rights above (outside) 
God’s Law a “global heresy of idolatry of an individual”.14 
According to the ROC, in order to understand human rights properly one should acknowl-
edge article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its connection 
to the requirements of “morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society”. Thus ‘traditional morality’, i.e. morality preached by traditional religions, is 
the main reference for the correct interpretation of human rights, according to the ROC.
In this light, the secular West, plagued – argues the ROC – by Christianophobia, is 
violating human rights of the believers. Interestingly, the West is often compared by the 
Russian hierarchs to the ancient Rome, where Christians were persecuted. Needless to 
say that the Roman Empire is presented as a country whose moral decay (e.g. the popular 
acceptance of homosexuality) costs it its very existence. Following this historic compari-
son, one should – according to the ROC – conclude that the days of the secular West are 
numbered. However, there is still hope for Europe. As patriarch Kirill argues, it is not Euro-
peans but European elites which are imposing a policy of de-Christianisation of Europe.15 
Such a distinction (demoralized elites versus healthy masses) fits the discourse of the 
conservative turn produced by the Kremlin. In March 2015 in Geneva, Sergei Lavrov ex-
pressed his concerns about the rise of the aggressive secularism in Europe and the 
growing problems which European Christians face while manifesting their religiosity.16 
The church and the Kremlin thus speak in one voice and post-Soviet Russia presents 
itself as the last hope of true Europeans to keep their tradition, identity and faith. With 
the conservative turn the Kremlin makes it clear that Russia is not a part of the secular 
West. However, this does not mean that Russia is not a part of Europe. Russia could find 
common ground with Europe, if only Europe would find its traditional (read: Christian) 
values again.
14 The Sermon by patriarch Kirill from the official website of the Russian Orthodox (2016) Address of His  
Holiness Patriarch Kirill to the Triumph of Orthodoxy feast after the Liturgy at the Cathedral of Christ the 
Savior Church,  
21 March. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/print/4410951.html.
15 Official website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2014) Christmas interview with his holiness patriarch Kirill 
on TV channel “Russia 1”, 7 January. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3498045.html.
16 ‘Interfax (2015) Christians in the West, more difficult to assert their rights – Lavrov, 3 March. Available at:  
http://www.interfax-religion.ru/?act=news&div=58031.
Russian diplomats and the ROC at the UN Human Rights Council
The Russian state’s involvement in the debate on human rights is well reflected in the 
common actions undertaken by the church and the Russian diplomats at the UN Human 
Rights Council. In 2009 a draft of the resolution Promoting human rights and funda-
mental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind 
was prepared.17 Next, in 2010, a seminar on The widening of the human rights concept 
through a better understanding of traditional values, held in Geneva, was attended by 
the representatives of the ROC. In 2011 the abovementioned resolution was issued by the 
Human Rights Council.18 According to the ROC, by adopting this resolution the Council 
confirmed that “freedom, dignity and responsibility are traditional values shared by all 
humankind”. Furthermore, the ROC expressed its satisfaction with the fact that the Coun-
cil finally acknowledged that “better understanding of traditional values helps widening 
and a better protection of human rights and freedoms”.19 
At the 67th session of the UN General Assembly, in September 2012, Russia confirmed its 
commitment to the moral interpretation of human rights and again called for establishing 
a consultative body with representatives of world religions at the UN.20 In recent years 
Russian diplomats on many occasions voiced the necessity of creating such fora within 
international institutions. This is another example of a common agenda of Russian state 
and church. The ROC, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has proposed 
numerous initiatives to establish consultative bodies with representatives of religions at 
the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe or the EU. Eventually, the ROC presented as its diplo-
matic success the establishment in 2010 of the High Panel on Peace and Dialogue among 
Cultures at the UNESCO, which also included religious leaders. The aim of this diplomatic 
effort is to influence the debate on human rights at the international institutions.
17 The resolution was presented by the Russian representative and adopted with no votes of support from 
Western countries (26 for, 15 against, 6 abstained). France, the UK, Italy, the US, Norway and Japan were 
among states against, while China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and South Africa voted in favor of 
the resolution.  
See United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2010) ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its twelfth 
session’, UN DOC: A/HRC/12/50, 25 February. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G10/118/28/PDF/G1011828.pdf?OpenElement.
18 Human Right Council (HCR) (2011) ‘Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better  
understanding of traditional values of humankind’, UN doc: A/HRC/16/L.6, 18 March. Available at: https:// 
documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G11/119/35/PDF/G1111935.pdf?OpenElement.
19 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2011) ‘Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through 
a better understanding of traditional values of humankind’, UN DOC: A/HRC/RES/16/3, 8 April. Available at:  
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/124/92/PDF/G1112492.pdf?OpenElement.
20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2015) Russia’s position on the 67th session of the UN 
General Assembly, 25 March. Available at: http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/general_assembly/-/asset_publish-
er/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/1309624.
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As Kristina Stoeckl (2012: 277), an Austrian political scientist, rightly notices, the coor-
dinated efforts of the church and the Russian diplomats at the UN proves that the ROC is 
the driving force in Russia’s foreign policy when it comes to the debate on human rights.
Conclusion 
Russia’s approach to human rights is related to the future of the conservative turn in 
Russian foreign policy. Experts on Russia differ in their opinion on the conservative turn. 
Some say it is merely an instrument of the very pragmatic authorities who will forget 
about it in a flash, if they should seek rapprochement with the West or in any other sit-
uation when this ideology stops serving their interests. Others, however, argue that the 
conservative turn does reflect a genuine change in the mindset of the Russian elite. It 
is probably impossible to determine unambiguously the true nature of the new Russian 
conservative wave. However, regardless of this, one should keep in mind the numerous 
political benefits for the Russian state elite which make the conservative turn something 
more that an ideological project for a single use. It is enough to notice that Russia’s 
claim to the status of a distinct civilization-protector of traditional values resonates with 
domestic as well as international audiences. The conservative turn is thus playing an 
important role as an additional source of legitimacy and an attractive framework for the 
new Russia’s identity.
The Kremlin’s involvement in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria provides a fertile ground 
for further fostering of the conservative narrative. The Russian Orthodox Church, whose 
presence in the public sphere in growing, is also interested in strengthening this ideolog-
ical course of Russian politics. And the church is the key institution engaged in re-inter-
preting the human rights concept not only in the Russian public discourse but also in the 
global debate. Even a possible future rapprochement with the West does not necessarily 
have to mean the end of the conservative turn, which is a bad prognostic for human rights 
activists working in Russia.
The Russian Orthodox Church, the driving force behind the ‘Russian’ human rights doc-
trine, is rather unsusceptible to the influence of human rights organizations, domestic 
as well as international, since both can be dismissed by the ROC as foreign agents. 
The church might show some consideration to three actors: other Orthodox churches, 
a majority of Russian society and the Russian authorities. If the majority of Orthodox 
churches questioned the ROC’s interpretation of human rights, the Moscow Patriarchate 
could reconsider its stand not to put at risk its position within the world Christian Ortho-
dox community. However, this scenario is highly unlikely. The ROC could tone down the 
idea of ‘Orthodox’ human rights, should a majority of the Russian society be outspokenly 
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against it. Such a situation would undermine the church’s authority but as long as the 
ROC has the state’s support, it can afford ignoring critics from civil society. This makes 
the Russian authorities the crucial actor. The ROC’s ‘Orthodox’ human rights campaign 
would not have won renown, had it not been included in the state agenda by the Kremlin.
For the Russian authorities the debate on human rights is a part of major powers’ rivalry. 
In order to discourage the Kremlin from embracing the idea of human rights as a non-uni-
versal category (but one which is intricately connected to religious tradition) one should 
deprive this idea of the appeal it has for non-Western countries. China, for example, is 
playing an important part in Russia’s vision of multipolarity coming true. And although 
China is a secular, formally communistic state, it seems to be eager to play together 
with Russia the ‘tune’ of traditional values, despite the fact that this ‘tune’, as sung by 
the Kremlin, has religious reverberations. Just like Russia, China is interested in weak-
ening the West’s ideological hegemony, inter alia in the area of human rights. Beijing’s 
positive approach to Moscow’s conservative agenda could be observed during patriarch 
Kirill’s first official visit to China in May 2013. The head of the Moscow Patriarchate was 
welcomed with the honours reserved only for heads of state and met with President Xi 
Jinping.21 While visiting Beijing, Harbin and Shanghai, Kirill kept underlining the common 
‘spiritual foundation’ of Russian-Chinese relations, i.e. traditional values.22 Talking to the 
head of the Chinese State Administration for Religious Affairs the patriarch expressed 
hope that the common spiritual foundation of Russian and Chinese civilizations would 
provide fertile ground for a bilateral cooperation in the international arena.23 What is im-
portant, during his visit to Moscow on 8 May 2015 the Chinese President was received by 
the patriarch, and on this occasion he also referred to traditional values.24 This narrative 
is thus shared by both the Russian and Chinese authorities. Under these circumstances, 
lowering the appeal of a non-universal human rights concept seems an almost impos-
sible task, especially given the West’s relative loss of standing in the world normative 
order and the rise of non-Western powers. Due to all this, the prospects of human rights 
organizations working in Russia are rather bleak.
21  Official Website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2013) Patriarch Kirill: the Church has a role to play in 
strengthening friendship among nations, 10 May. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2961750.
html.
22  Official Website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2013) The head of the Russian Orthodox Church celebrated 
Mass in Harbin, 15 May. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2970296.html.
23  Official Website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2013) The head of the ROC met with the religious leaders 
of China, 13 May. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2967776.html.
24  Official Website of the Russian Orthodox Church (2015) Patriarch Kirill met with the president of China Xi 
Jinping, 8 May. Available at: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4073045.html.
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Russia: digital rights in the foreign policy agenda
Russia joined the global Internet governance discourse emphasizing a strong role of 
states in it, as guarantors of their citizens’ rights. Principles of state sovereignty, polit-
ical independence and non-interference into the sovereign information space are at the 
core of Russia’s stance in global Internet and ICT-related policy debates, even though 
human rights concerns are often verbally supported. Russia’s foreign policy stance on 
digital rights is much driven by national security and political stability agendas and this 
security-driven narrative is often at odds with the protection of individual liberties online 
and offline in the country.
Human rights online: reassessing policy priorities
Those who stood at the origins of the Internet and ICTs often remind us that the digital 
boom never stemmed from, or intended to consider, human rights or security consid-
erations. But improving our daily life through state-of-the-art functionality ICTs also 
increasingly represent previously un thought of security threats at the same time opening 
up new dimensions for human rights infringement as people’s lives increasingly shift 
online. 
Having been long in the focus of civil society groups’ attention, digital rights consider-
ations are now entering the agendas of less conventional platforms for human rights 
advocates. Technical community organizations which previously excluded human rights 
from the realm of their policy-making as relevant to online content development strate-
gies, now have to face a new take on human rights. Protocols and algorithms ultimately 
represent the choice of values made by their authors as influenced by the normative and 
legal environment they are intended for. As Laura DeNardis (2009), a scholar of Internet 
architecture and governance, writes in her book Protocol Politics: “Protocols are political. 
They perform some technical function but can shape online civil liberties in unexpect-
ed ways. It is well understood how decisions about encryption protocols must strike a  
1 This essay is written in the personal capacity of the author. Views expressed do not necessarily reflect those 
of her employer. 
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balance between providing individual privacy online and responding to law enforcement 
and national security needs.”2 Now the Human Rights Protocol Considerations Group3 has 
been formed at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) “to research whether standards 
and protocols can enable, strengthen or threaten human rights, as defined in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), specifically, but not limited to the right to freedom of expression 
and the right to freedom of assembly”. 
The growing multi-layer human rights implications still build on the existing corpora of 
international human rights law and its application in digital space. The development of 
new dimensions of human rights considerations will further test the current legal frame-
work and the states’ standing on it.
In July 2016 the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) passed an important, although non- 
binding and not unanimous, resolution on “the promotion, protection and enjoyment of 
human rights on the Internet”4, which in itself is a reiteration of the core issues at stake 
when we talk about human rights protection in the digital space. This joint initiative of 
Brazil, Nigeria, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United States reaffirms the fundamental 
principle at the basis of two previous UNHRC resolutions, that “the same rights that 
people have offline must also be protected online”.5 The resolution in particular recom-
mends that states “address security concerns on the Internet in accordance with their 
obligations to protect freedom of expression, privacy and other human rights online”, 
refrain from “measures to intentionally prevent or disrupt access to or dissemination of 
information online”, and adopt a ‘human rights based approach’ to provide and expand 
access to the Internet. The resolution also takes note of the recent report of the Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of expression, David Kaye, to the Human Rights Council (UNGA 
2016), which highlights that “unnecessary and disproportionate surveillance may under-
mine security online and access to information and ideas”.
2 In the book she goes on to study the way the new IPv6 protocol (the latest version of the IP protocol essential 
to perform the addressing function of the global Internet) was designed by the IETF engineers to address  
the problem of IPv4 exhaustion and the institutional choices made in its favour. See: Mashable (2011)  
IPv4 & IPv6: A Short Guide. Available at: http://mashable.com/2011/02/03/ipv4-ipv6-guide/#pXxi5A7AEkqJ.
3 IETF (2015) Human Rights Protocol Considerations (hrpc). Available at: https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/hrpc/ 
charter/. 
4 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2016) ‘The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on 
the Internet’, UN doc: A/HRC/RES/32/13, 18 July. Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/G16/156/90/PDF/G1615690.pdf?OpenElement. 
5 See UNGA resolution in footnote 1 and United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2012) ‘The promotion,  
protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet’, UN doc: A/HRC/RES/20/8, 16 July. Available at:  
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G12/153/25/PDF/G1215325.pdf?OpenElement.
Russia and China have been reported as opposing, in particular, the adoption of a ‘human 
rights based approach’ for providing and expanding access to the Internet, as potentially 
conflicting with domestically adopted policies. They also reportedly oppose the wording 
taken from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the right to free-
dom of expression “regardless of frontiers” and “through any media of one’s choice”, 
according to Article 19’s reporting.6 Not mentioned in this account, the Russian dele-
gation’s comments7 to the draft resolution also stress its concerns about child abuse 
in content dissemination online as well as the importance of giving equal attention to 
various human rights online, in particular, not overlooking the protection of user privacy 
on the Internet. This could be a starting point for understanding Russia’s human rights 
foreign policy priorities: Russia has consistently stated its sovereign right to develop 
domestic policies on online content regulation. At the same time, it has also flagged 
user privacy concerns on a number of platforms since Snowden’s revelations about mas-
sive surveillance by NSA and other states’ intelligence services, which also stem from 
considerations regarding state independence that emerged in the wake of the resulting 
diplomatic stand-off.
Framing the human rights discourse in foreign policy
Human rights concerns are often voiced in the international agreements and documents 
Russia adopts and supports. But they are as often set forth in the context of presumably 
overriding principles of states’ sovereignty and equality, integrity and political indepen-
dence. For example, this is the way respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
is framed in the BRICS Summit 2015 Ufa Declaration8 (see Clause 33-34), and in the 
latest BRICS Summit 2016 Goa Declaration (2016) with special emphasis on the right 
to privacy (see Clause 65 in Clauses 64-67).9 In the tripartite meeting with India and 
China earlier in 2016 it was stated that “adherence to universally recognized principles of 
international law in the use of ICTs, in particular, the principles of political independence, 
territorial integrity and sovereign equality of states, respect for state sovereignty, non-in-
tervention into the internal affairs of other states, as well as respect for human rights 
6 Article 19 (2016) UNHRC: Reject attempts to weaken resolution on Human Rights and the Internet.  
Available at: https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38428/en/unhrc:-reject-attempts-to-weaken-
resolution-on-human-rights-and-the-internet.
7 UN Web TV (2016) A/HRC/32/L.20 Vote Item:3 - 43rd Meeting 32nd Regular Session of Human Rights Council. 
Available at: http://webtv.un.org/watch/ahrc32l.20-vote-item3-43rd-meeting-32nd-regular-session-of- 
human-rights-council/5009164474001#full-text. 
8 University of Toronto BRICS Information Centre (2015) VII BRICS Summit Ufa Declaration. Available at:  
http://www.brics.utoronto.ca/docs/150709-ufa-declaration_en.pdf.
9 Embassy of India (2016) Goa Declaration at 8th BRICS Summit. Available at: http://indianembassy.ru/index.
php/en/media-news/press-releases/1744-goa-declaration-at-8th-brics-summit.
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and fundamental freedoms, is of paramount importance” (Mitra 2016)10. In the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) draft Code of Conduct for international information 
security, which Russia has been lobbying in the UN since 2011, Clause 2(1) states that 
each state voluntarily subscribing to it pledges to “comply with the Charter of the United 
Nations and universally recognized norms governing international relations that enshrine, 
inter alia, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all 
States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect for the diversity 
of history, culture and social systems of all countries”.11 
Human rights language is also present in the latest report on international information 
security of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on developments in the field of informa-
tion and telecommunications in the context of international security to the UN Secretary 
General, with recommendations that “States, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should 
respect Human Rights Council resolutions 20/8 and 26/13 on the promotion, protection 
and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet, as well as General Assembly resolutions 
68/167 and 69/166 on the right to privacy in the digital age, to guarantee full respect for 
human rights, including the right to freedom of expression” (Clause 13(c)). It also states 
commitments to international law including “respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States” (Clause 26).12 
The Russian delegation did not endorse the final Statement of the NETMundial Internet 
Governance Meeting held in April 201413 in Brazil in the wake of Edward Snowden’s revela-
tions about state sponsored surveillance programmes, together with other states and civil 
society groups dissatisfied with its outcomes (Ermert 2014). Arguing inter alia that the 
role of the UN and ITU in the global Internet governance was disregarded in the outcome 
document, the official position also noted that “the human rights for the protection of  
 
10 See for more on India’s position in global debates on Internet governance and digital rights: Kovacs & Datta 
(2015).
11 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2015) ‘Letter dated 9 January 2015 from the Permanent Represen-
tatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’, UN doc: A/69/723, 13 January. Available at: https://ccdcoe.org/
sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf.
12 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2015) ‘Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field 
of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security’, UN doc: A/70/174, 22 July. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/174&referer=http://www.un.org/disar-
mament/topics/informationsecurity/&Lang=E.
13 NETmundial (2014) NETmundial multistakeholder statement. Available at: http://netmundial.br/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf 
privacy against surveillance of telephone conversations and electronic espionage carried 
out by the intelligence agencies of a number of countries have been ignored in the out-
come documents of the meeting”.14 
In December 2015 Russia joined the adoption of the WSIS 10+ Outcome Document of the 
high-level meeting of the General Assembly on the 10-year review of the implementation 
of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society15 previous rounds in 
Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005).16 Looking at the results of the decade-long efforts by 
the international community to foster the global information society in the digital age, the 
document contains a whole section on human rights protection in the information society 
as an integral part of policy-making to achieve sustainable development goals for the 
following decades. At the same time, as can be seen from the written submission of the 
Russian Federation, it places much emphasis on strengthening the role of governments 
as guarantors of their citizens’ rights, and of multilateral UN bodies (rather than mul-
tistakeholder initiatives) in further Internet governance ecosystem development and the 
use of ICTs. Much space in the submission is given to the cybersecurity of ICTs and the 
resulting risks run by the users.17 
Russia’s domestic roots of its international policy stance on digital rights 
Russia’s stance on digital rights in international fora is much driven by the domestic 
agenda. The sovereigntist line, based on the paramount role of political independence 
and state integrity priority, is implemented at home through control over information 
flows, boosted by the geo-political tensions with the West and the increasing global 
terrorist threats. In such a context, domestic approach to Internet regulation becomes 
factored into the national security policies and global security discussions.
14 Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations (2014) Position of the Russian Federation 
on the outcome of the NETmundial Internet Governance Meeting. Available at: http://russiaun.ru/en/news/
rus_nigm.
15 See for more on the role of other emerging powers in the WSIS: Esterhuysen et al. 2016.
16 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2016) ‘Outcome document of the high-level meeting of the General 
Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information 
Society’, UN doc: A/RES/70/125, 1 February. Available at: http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Docu-
ments/UNPAN96078.pdf.
17 United Nations Public Administration Network (2015) Written submission of the Russian Federation to the 
draft outcome document of the UNGA High-level Meeting on the overall review of the Implementation of WSIS 
Outcomes. Available at: http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/internet/Documents/UNPAN95313.pdf. 
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For example, Russia’s content blocking or take-down policies are based on domestic 
legislation on child pornography18, suicide and drugs propaganda, extremism and terror-
ism, and mobilization for unlawful manifestations.19 However, unsubstantiated bans, as 
RosComSvoboda, a digital rights civil society group estimates, reach 95 per cent of all 
blocked resources. 20 This is due to the lack of precise guidelines of defining illegal content 
under these and other categories, as well as to often technically indiscriminate blocking 
resulting in a number of web resources being not accessible.
The most recent source of concern is the latest counterterrorism legislation – the so-
called ‘Yarovaya laws’, labelled ‘Big Brother’ laws in the media (signed into law in July 
2016, to come into force in 2018) as potentially an unprecedented infringement on user 
privacy rights to offer more leverage to anti-extremist intelligence powers.21 Part of it 
requires “organizers of information distribution” to store communications content for six 
months and metadata of these communications for three years, all of it to be available for 
analysis by law enforcement agencies. Besides, the law contains a requirement for com-
panies to facilitate decryption of encrypted communications. Civil rights groups around 
the world have already voiced their concerns about the consequences for Russians’ con-
stitutional rights and universal civil liberties that would result from the implementa-
tion of the law, while its efficiency in reaching declared antiterrorism goals leaves many 
doubts.22 If successful in implementation, the law not only would presumably infringe on 
the privacy rights of innocent Russian and foreign citizens, as pointed out by UN Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of expression David Kaye,23 it would also weaken the cryptographic 
protection vital for some online services, thus undermining user trust in ICT products and 
services and opening doors to cybercriminals exploiting vulnerabilities. The encryption 
debate is seen as particularly sensitive given the previous calls in the UK to weaken 
end-to-end encryption and the Apple vs FBI case in the US (Griffin 2015 / Yadron 2016). 
18 Rossiyskaya Gazeta (2012) Federal release №5845 (172) Federal Law of July 28. Available at:  
https://rg.ru/2012/07/30/zakon-dok.html.
19 Rossiyskaya Gazeta (2013) Federal Law of December 28, 2013 N 398-FZ. Available at:  
https://rg.ru/2013/12/30/extrem-site-dok.html
20 See Rublacklist.net. Available at: http://reestr.rublacklist.net/.
21 Meduza (2016) The Duma’s new ‘Big-Brother’ legislation kills Russia’s Internet companies and hurts ordinary  
Web users. Here’s how. Available at: https://meduza.io/en/feature/2016/06/27/the-duma-s-new-big-brother- 
legislation-kills-russia-s-internet-companies-and-hurts-ordinary-web-users-here-s-how.
22 Campaign against surveillance. Available at: http://1984.live/. 
23 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2016) ‘Mandates of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the Special 
Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Special Rapporteur on freedom 
of religion or belief’, 28 July. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/
RUS_7_2016.pdf. 
The reasoning behind another resonant law requiring Russian citizens’ personal data 
collection, retention, processing and storage by Internet operators to be restricted to 
the territory of the Russian Federation, was ostensibly based on Snowden’s revelations 
about foreign state-run surveillance programmes presumably affecting Russian citizens 
and the necessity to protect the privacy of Russians’ personal data by localizing their 
storage.24 While centralized data storage hardly increases their security, the law stirred 
a public debate on the resulting increase for SORM (System of Operative-Investigative 
Measures) user data access capabilities. 
A quick glimpse at recent domestic practices suggests that the Russian approach to 
human rights protection online might justify itself in light of broader security and political 
stability strategies, but civil liberties seem to be its inevitable victim. In the foreign policy 
in the meantime, human rights considerations are supported while at the same time 
offset with statements on the supremacy of the principle of sovereignty in digital policies 
thus offering leeway for their interpretation. 
Defining Russia’s position: geopolitical security interests
While the Internet is often conceptualized by the Russian authorities as a hazardous phe-
nomenon, the shaping of the human rights discourse around it has been seemingly much 
supported, as mentioned above, by Snowden’s revelations about other state-sponsored 
online surveillance programmes and perceived implications for Russian citizens who need 
to be protected by the state. This is also seen as a strong counterargument in debates 
about infringement on the Russians’ liberties in cyberspace as well as about cyber strate-
gies of other states. This framing helps construe and solidify the security-driven narrative 
both domestically and in Russia’s foreign policies. The current hard economic situation 
in the country is largely blamed on standoffs with the West over the right for sovereign 
policies driven by national security concerns. This is traditionally accepted by the majority 
of the population as a legitimate reason to put up with the deteriorating internal situation 
and endorse the current governmental policies. 
According to a survey conducted by the Center for Global Communication Studies at 
the University of Pennsylvania and the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) 
(Center for Global Communication Studies 2015), 49 per cent of all Russians believe that 
information on the Internet needs to be censored and 42 per cent that foreign countries 
are using the Internet against Russia and its interests. The public perception of their own 
rights online looks shaped by a securitist outlook, as are their expectations from the state 
24 Rossiyskaya Gazeta (2014) Federal Law of July 21, 2014 N 242-FZ. Available at:  
http://www.rg.ru/2014/07/23/persdannye-dok.html. 
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authorities in protecting these rights. As long as these expectations are met, this provides 
for a stable social-political system desired both by the people and their leadership, and 
demands for more liberties come as a minority voice. 
Sustainable so far, this somewhat asymmetrical trust agreement also justifies many 
restrictive measures adopted in the recent years as described above.25 Maintaining the 
overall control over the national ‘information space’ thus underlies both domestic and 
foreign policy. The resulting so-called ‘information warfare’ in the ICT-enhanced public 
sphere is a tough entrenched battle, and its success is reliant on the trust credit that the 
leadership has. In Russia’s case it is impressively strong but not limitless, and therefore 
efforts are taken to sustain and foster the current level of control (Trenin 2016). According 
to Russian Investigative Committee Chair Alexander Bastrykin, it is time to go as far as to 
establish an information shield against disinformation and opinion manipulation from.26 
At the technological level this is intended to be achieved inter alia with the so-called ‘IT 
sovereignty’, seen as an important political but also long-term economic and societal 
goal.27 
The same principles of state sovereignty and non-interference into the national informa-
tion space from outside are at the core of Russia’s negotiating stance in the context of 
international information/cyber security discussions and formats, like the above-men-
tioned SCO, BRICS, as well as in the UN Group of Governmental Experts on norms of state 
behaviour in cyberspace, and in the OSCE on confidence-building measures to avoid 
conflict in cyberspace (Kulikova 2016/2015). They underlie the discussions on human 
rights protection online or offline on international platforms, as online space reflects the 
primary role of state sovereignty offline. Therefore, attempts from abroad to share best 
human rights protection practices and work with the local civil society and academia on 
the promotion of the human rights approach to policy–making, are likely to be taken as 
attempts to interfere with internal affairs and to influence the social-political status quo. 
At the same time, human rights considerations will continue to be endorsed as long as 
they strengthen Russia’s stance. 
25 In August 2016, Russians’ real income shrunk by 8,6 per cent on average, a minimum since 2008,  
See RBC. The rate of decline in real incomes of Russians peaked seven years. Available at: http://www.rbc.ru/
society/19/09/2016/57dfeb1b9a79471bdb6db29f. 
26 Kommersant (2016) ‘It is time to put an effective barrier to information war.’ Available at:  
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2961578.
27 The Yarovaya laws look hard to implement in the absence of the necessary IT equipment domestically.  
See Vedemosti (2016) Putin instructed to organize in Russia equipment for the implementation of the  
Yarovaya Law. Available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2016/07/15/649300-vladimir- 
putin-poruchil-organizovat-proizvodstvo-oborudovaniya-dlya-ispolneniya-zakona-yarovoi. 
Conclusion
Looking ahead, it seems safe to suggest that the national security-driven discourse will 
continue to shape Russia’s foreign policies regarding human rights in the digital age. 
Internally, human rights such as the right to privacy, freedom of expression and assem-
bly will continue to be traded in when needed for the purposes of ensuring security and 
stability within the country and the region. Internationally, the Russian approach has 
been consistent in stating the importance of protecting human rights in the context of 
developing national and supranational cybersecurity strategies. At the same time, Russia 
places much emphasis on strengthening the role of governments as guarantors of their 
citizens’ rights, and therefore of multilateral bodies in Internet governance and the use 
of ICTs. Its sovereigntist line, based on the paramount role of political independence and 
predominance of state integrity, often trumps individual human rights considerations. In 
the meantime, the areas with best potential for engaging with Russia on human rights 
online policy appear to be in the field of concerted international efforts to prevent child 
abuse online; to work on joint cybercrime and antiterrorist measures while striking the 
balance to preserve user privacy, freedom of speech and access to content; and to de-
velop guidelines both for states and the private sector on promoting responsible policies 
in ICT’s supply chain. International human rights advocates must thereby reckon with a 
strong narrative which frames attempts from abroad to promote human rights online as 
attempts to interfere with Russian affairs, undermining Russia’s legitimate role as the 
sovereign ruler over its cyberspace and protector of the people’s interests. 
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Russia, the R2P and human rights: 
ensuring responsible protection
Russia’s position on R2P is aimed at strengthening its international and regional influ-
ence and affirming its legitimacy in a global order underpinned by the principle of sover-
eign equality. However, it has been increasingly accompanied by values-based narratives 
– including on human rights – which challenge Western liberalism and may inhibit a 
more constructive approach to responsible protection.
Introduction
Recent events have generated a colossal amount of scholarly and policy commentary 
on the concept and practice of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) – how the interna-
tional community protects populations from atrocity crimes responsibly and safeguards 
humanitarian conditions effectively (as outlined in the following section). Russia’s ap-
proach, particularly in the Syria conflict, has been controversial. Moscow has been widely 
perceived as obstructing the protection of the Syrian population by vetoing UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolutions designed to curb the efforts of the Bashar al-Assad regime to 
crush the opposition – and indeed of contributing to the killing of civilians and disregard 
for basic human rights through its military support for Assad since autumn 2015. 
What is often overlooked is that Russia’s position on R2P is largely similar to that of other 
emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil. While most (though not all) Western 
scholars and experts agree that R2P has become an established norm (see Gallagher 
& Ralph 2015: 3), Russia and many non-Western states are suspicious about the po-
tential for its abuse by some of the established liberal democracies, as highlighted by 
the NATO-led intervention in Libya in 2011. Several factors are at play here. Historical 
identities and domestic politics incline the emerging powers to accentuate cultural and 
civilizational specificities when assessing intra-state conflicts and human rights policies. 
The exigencies of regional security dynamics, particularly where issues of sovereignty 
and self-determination collide, may influence their views. Finally, global power shifts 
prompt them to reassess norms and try to negotiate an international order that reflects 
1 This paper is an abridged and adapted version of Averre & Davies (2015). 
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their enhanced status. As Justin Morris (2013: 1278) argues, “the boldness of the stance 
adopted by R2P-sceptics such as Russia and China may ultimately come to owe as much 
to the dynamics of global power distribution as to specific normative bearings”. 
R2P as a global norm
The atrocities perpetrated in the Balkans and African conflicts in the 1990s, and debates 
over the legality of NATO’s intervention – which took place without a UNSC resolution – in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) to protect the Kosovar population, led to the 
keynote 2001 report by the Canadian International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS). The report asserted that states have internal responsibility towards 
their own peoples and external responsibility to react as members of the international  
community in cases of serious human rights abuses (ICISS 2001, VII-VIII; see also  
Evans & Sahnoun 2002). The ICISS sought to close the gap between the established and 
emerging states by shifting the emphasis away from the liberal discourse of intervention, 
which tended to pit the human rights of individuals against the sovereign rights of states 
(Chandler 2012: 219), and elaborating key principles for responsible protection on which 
the major powers could find consensus. The principles were just cause, where intervention 
may be warranted if large scale loss of life results from deliberate state action or neglect; 
the precautionary principles of right intention, last resort, proportional means and rea-
sonable prospects; and right authority, namely the UNSC. States in favour of intervention 
should formally request the UNSC’s authorization and the permanent five (P5) members 
should agree not to apply their veto power if their vital state interests are not involved or 
obstruct resolutions authorizing intervention with majority support (Breau 2006: 433-5).
The 2005 World Summit Outcome (WSO) document adopted a narrower reading than the 
ICISS by affirming the responsibility to protect civilians from four ‘crimes’: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (sections 138, 139).2 The 2009 UN 
report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UNGA 2009) subsequently reaffirmed 
the emphasis on states’ responsibility to protect populations rather than the right of hu-
manitarian intervention as such. The report recognized three ‘pillars’: first, the enduring 
responsibility of the State to protect its populations from the four ‘crimes’ referred to in 
the WSO document; second, the international community’s responsibility to support states 
to meet the demands of the first pillar; and third, the responsibility of member states to 
respond collectively when a state is failing to provide protection, which may include coer-
cive measures under chapter VII. R2P was thus made distinct from coercive intervention: 
2 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2005) ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, UNGA document A/Res/60/1,  
24 October. Available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.
pdf?OpenElement
it is aimed at strengthening rather than undermining sovereignty and preventing serious 
human rights abuses through diplomatic and non-military measures (Evans 2012). The 
UNSC retains its primacy as the sole body authorized to sanction military action. A ma-
jority of member states also rejected the ICISS recommendation to include criteria for 
decision-making about the use of coercive intervention unless mandated by the UNSC 
under a chapter VII response (Breau 2006: 438; Murray & Hehir 2012: 391-2). 
R2P thus constitutes an important norm – that a state’s sovereignty is contingent on 
observing a responsibility to protect its population – with important practical implica-
tions for the international community’s approach to dealing with the most serious abuses 
of populations. However, it does not create any legal obligations for states to intervene 
and leaves open the question of the particularistic interests of states acting within the 
UN-centred international system and their perception of what constitutes fundamental 
human rights.
Russian views on R2P, intervention and human rights
Russia’s attitude towards R2P has been shaped by a series of Western-led interventions, 
starting with NATO’s intervention in the FYR and closely followed by the US invasion of 
Iraq, which caused deep divisions in the international community. In Russia’s eyes, the 
NATO-led campaign in Libya – initially aimed at pre-empting attacks by Gaddafi forces 
on sections of the population – went beyond the protection of civilians, distorting the 
mandate obtained under UNSC resolution 1973 (on which Russia abstained but did not 
veto) to secure a no-fly zone.3 Moscow had in fact voiced support for protecting the Libyan 
population (Churkin 2011), accepting that Gaddafi had lost legitimacy and that the Libyan 
National Transitional Council could take over. However, after Gaddafi’s overthrow the NATO 
operation was interpreted as an elaborate cover for regime change, perceived by Moscow 
as illegitimate (Zhukova 2011; see also Evans 2012). The consensus reached with other 
UN member states over responsible protection was thus outweighed by Russia’s concerns 
about whether and when it should serve to prompt military intervention. Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov declared that Libya was the culmination of consistent attempts by 
some Western states to undermine the fundamental principles of contemporary interna-
tional law (Lavrov 2013a).
The Libya intervention has in turn had a direct impact on Russia’s approach to the Syria  
conflict. Russia has supported the Assad regime and repeatedly vetoed draft UNSC reso-
lutions which would impose sanctions and potentially lead to external interference on the 
3 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (2011) ‘Resolution 1973’, UN document S/RES/1973, 17 March. 
Available at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110927_110311-UNSCR-1973.pdf
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Libya model, in favour of a negotiated transition sponsored by the UN and the League of 
Arab States. Moscow has repudiated Western claims that the Syrian opposition groups 
constitute a coherent force capable of taking over from Assad and argued that the “legal 
authorities of Syria are still supported by a significant part of society who not without 
foundation fear anarchy, collapse of law and ethnic cleansing” (Pankin 2013). It has also 
warned that regime change would bring about the disintegration of Syria as a sovereign, 
independent, multi-confessional and multi-ethnic state (Lavrov 2013c) and rejected West-
ern representations of the Arab spring as a struggle for democracy against dictatorship, 
arguing that this oversimplifies the political, ethnic and confessional complexity of the 
region. 
While supporting the concept of R2P, Moscow calls for strict adherence to the 2005 WSO 
document reading: it is the state’s own responsibility to protect their populations from the 
‘four crimes’ with international support (ICRtoP 2014). Russian arguments focus on pillar 
1) emphasizing that the principle of sovereignty as responsibility strengthens rather than 
weakens the state by ensuring the stability of legitimate government, thereby facilitating 
humanitarian conditions – and pillar 2) whereby international efforts should be directed 
towards a prevention strategy aimed at eradicating root causes of conflicts. However, 
prevention should not, in Russian eyes, entail the promotion of democracy but rather 
should facilitate grass-roots peacebuilding measures conducive to local needs and re-
alities.4 Russian statements in the UN General Assembly debates have made clear that 
“the key to success of any international assistance is greater consideration of national 
ownership” (ICRtoP 2014). 
The third pillar has caused most disagreement and heightened tensions between the 
established and emerging powers. Russia’s approach reflects a particular understanding 
of the relationship between statist and humanitarian norms, with a powerful narrative 
registering concerns over the humanitarian casualties that may stem from the violent 
overthrow of the incumbent regime: it is the legality of the means, rather than the hu-
manitarian principle itself, over which Moscow has raised grave reservations. Lavrov 
has repeatedly warned against the politicized nature of selective unilateral intervention 
and harked back to the rejection by UN member states of calls for R2P to include explicit 
criteria to guide decision-making on when to intervene (Lavrov 2013b). President Putin 
himself has stated that using force only within existing legal norms “represents the abso-
lute value” (Putin 2013), one widely accepted as a basic principle in interstate relations. 
4 See Zhukova (2011). This idea is reflected in UN documents. Paragraph 13 of Implementing the Responsibil-
ity to Protect (2009) recommends that UN member states “move from identity-based politics to the effective 
management, even encouragement, of diversity through the principle of non-discrimination and the equal 
enjoyment of rights” (emphasis added). The World Summit Outcome document (2005, section 135) states 
that “while democracies share common features, there is no single model of democracy… [we] reaffirm the 
necessity of the respect for sovereignty and the right of self-determination” (emphasis added).
Russian experts interpret customary law, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, as “containing only moral-political commitments” of UN member states, while 
“attempts to interpret these political norms as equivalent to international legal norms, 
or even having priority over them, are not justified from a legal point of view and do 
not meet Russia’s interests” (Khlestov 2003). Legitimacy thus derives less from ethical 
considerations than from the legal rules-based constitutional order enshrined in the UN. 
The original purpose of creating the UN – “to prevent another major war among great 
powers – not to create a humanitarian utopia”5 – remains paramount for the Russian 
political establishment. As one authority on R2P, Aidan Hehir, has argued, the “‘legalised 
hegemony’” enshrined in the veto powers of the P5 remains central to the UN, which 
functions only if it “‘work[s] with, rather than in opposition to, the realities of power’” 
(Hehir 2013: 151-2). 
Russia’s normative challenge to Western liberalism
Russia’s position over R2P has been described as typical of “self-interested spoiling by 
illiberal governments who reflect neither the wishes of their own citizens or world opinion” 
(Murray & Hehir 2012: 401). However, Moscow’s policy in the past has not been uniformly 
obstructive. In the 1990s it supported interventions with a humanitarian remit through 
peacekeeping, the delivery of aid and protection of citizens; even after the Kosovo crisis, it 
was willing to engage with the post-conflict peace effort on the ground and contribute to 
the development of an agreed legal interpretation of humanitarian crises. It has support-
ed UN missions in some African states where humanitarian abuses have occurred (though 
it has opposed others; see Allison 2013: 61 & ff). Russia did not question whether it was 
legitimate for the UN Security Council to become involved in Syria in spite of the fact that 
the conflict there was a largely domestic affair (Bellamy 2015: 168).
However, Russia’s defence of sovereignty increasingly reflects concerns about the chal-
lenge posed by the ‘transformative agenda’ of liberalism to the legitimacy of states with-
in Russia’s own neighbourhood (see Allison 2013: 14, 16, 110). This is evident in the 
current Ukraine conflict, which started as a popular revolt against Viktor Yanukovich’s 
corrupt and nontransparent regime and culminated in his overthrow and the installation 
of a liberal, pro-Western government. This challenge impacts on Russia’s approach to 
R2P. The onus on the state to protect responsibly is interpreted by Russia as privileging 
‘regime stability’, as shown by its support for governments in the largely authoritarian 
Eurasian space. The systemic change that Western intervention threatens to bring about 
has led Russia to believe that its regional interests are being undermined. Legitimate  
5 Plesch cited in Murray & Hehir (2012: 393). In a recent UNSC debate Lavrov (2015) cited Dag Hammarskjöld:  
“The United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell”.
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Russian arguments – and those of other emerging powers – about the danger of R2P 
escalating into coercive intervention have thus become linked with ‘realist’ geopolitical 
narratives. 
This increasingly normative challenge to the human rights-based intervention inspired 
by Western liberalism comes at a time when the perceived decline in the power of liberal 
states is impacting on the political sustainability of the humanitarian movement (see 
Ralph 2015: 4). A recent Russian official statement is explicit:
“In contrast with Western states, who position [the UN Council of Human Rights] as 
a kind of “rescue team” to react effectively to violations of human rights in conflict 
conditions and crisis situation, we see its role as assisting the development of con-
structive and maximally depoliticised inter-state dialogue on key thematic issues 
of the human rights agenda… Forcing a unilateral interpretation of human rights 
norms, dishonest use of human rights for political aims, and attempts to undermine 
the basic principles of international law on the pretext of guaranteeing human rights 
are unacceptable. We continue to proceed from the assumption that the state bears 
fundamental responsibility for the observance of human rights on its territory… the 
use of arguments about human rights violations as a motive for interference in inter-
nal affairs or for applying the concept of “responsibility to protect” is unacceptable 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2016).”
The liberal notion that the main threat to individual human rights comes from the irre-
sponsible actions of states is thus contested by Russia’s political elite. In a speech at the 
UN Council for Human Rights Lavrov (2014b) has argued that:
“For joint efforts to promote and defend human rights to be effective, they should be 
implemented in strict compliance with generally recognised norms and principles 
of international law… no country or group of countries have exclusive authority to 
unilaterally create a new “code of conduct” which is not based on a universal frame-
work. The imposing of personal interpretations of human rights standards can only 
aggravate intercultural and intersectarian disagreements, risk provoking a conflict 
between civilisations and disrupt the efforts to create a sustainable system of global 
development.”
For Russia, legitimacy rests on traditional moral and spiritual values safeguarded by the 
state, which are under threat from liberal ideology. Replacing international law with a 
hierarchical system of morality based in Western interpretations of human rights would 
only heighten conflict over inequalities in the international order and deepen divisions  
over the rules of international society.6 As a leading R2P advocate has argued in relation 
to Asian approaches, “the norm of non-intervention remains a moral imperative, not 
simply a legal inconvenience to be discarded at the whim and will of the West” (Thakur 
2001: 34). Put simply, differences with the West are due not simply to obstructionism by 
the emerging powers – which do engage in various ways with the R2P norm – but to the 
disregard of their legitimate concerns by the liberal democracies.
Libya and Syria have highlighted these diverging understandings of responsible protec-
tion as Russia, China, India, Brazil and other emerging powers pursue their global order 
preferences. Although these states differ in terms of foreign policy, domestic political 
order and attitude to human rights, their positions on R2P reflect some fundamental 
similarities. Like Russia, they maintain a very cautious approach to coercive intervention, 
which should be used a last resort, and emphasise prevention and the need to strengthen 
the sovereignty of the state, as well as the exclusive authority of the UN in decision-mak-
ing within a multilateral order based on sovereign equality. Brazil has engaged robustly 
with R2P since the WSO 2005 document but is still driven by traditional arguments over 
strengthening the UNSC and sovereign equality. Chinese officials and experts, while voic-
ing differing opinions over R2P and the extent to which human rights abuses can be seen 
as a threat to international peace and security, also support the primary authority of the 
UNSC to authorize the protection of citizens and the notion that the use of force should be 
a last resort. India has seen a lively domestic debate but – particularly since the Libya 
episode – has been sceptical and cautious about R2P and has retreated towards the 
sovereignty norm.7 
Sovereign equality – but also sovereign responsibility
The trend towards global human rights, though constrained by the pluralist interna-
tional political order, does influence the practices of the emerging powers, however. In 
demonstrating their influence in shaping global norms, they must be seen to be fulfilling 
their special responsibilities and engage with evolving universal norms such as R2P 
to promote global public goods (see Gallagher & Ralph 2015; Foot 2014). Indeed, their  
6 Hurrell (2003: 29-30) notes that, while there is greater support for the idea that international society should 
promote justice and human rights, “peoples, nations, and communities have an identity and seek the 
protective and expressive power of the state to further that identity. If state sovereignty provides the basic 
institutional framework, it is self-determination – most commonly national but often shading into cultural 
and religious – that has come ever more to provide the political power and the moral meaning to the idea of 
living in a world of states and an international society”.
7 It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the approaches of the emerging powers, but see 
Bellamy 2015; Foot 2014; Bloomfield 2015; Arantes 2014; Virk 2015; Stuenkel & Tourinho 2014; Liu & Zhang 
2014; Jaganathan & Kurtz 2014.
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contribution to developing instruments at the disposal of the international community in 
terms of prevention and post-conflict peace-building, and the mechanisms of account-
ability for authorising coercive intervention in cases of gross violations of human rights 
– as raised in the Responsibility while Protecting concept put forward by Brazil8 and that 
of Responsible Protection articulated by the Chinese scholar Ruan Zongze (see Bellamy 
2015: 180) – will be crucial. 
The principle of sovereign equality within a pluralist world order is a constant theme in 
Russian foreign policy narratives. Russia’s Ambassador to the UN has cautioned against 
breaching the “democratic functioning principle [of the UN] – the sovereign equality of all 
states without dividing them into leaders and led” (Churkin 2015). The 2013 verison  of 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept warns that “it is inadmissible that, under the pretext of 
realizing the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’, military interventions and other forms 
of external interference are carried out which undermine the foundations of international 
law based on the principle of sovereign equality of states” (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation 2013).9 
The tension between the universal human rights imperative of ending mass atrocities and 
the realities of historically-rooted national attitudes to intervention is one that Russia 
struggles to come to terms with. Despite its rhetorical engagement with R2P, Moscow 
is often perceived in the West as blocking constructive ideas and effective diplomatic 
mediation to mitigate humanitarian abuses. It has refused to rein in its veto power in 
the UNSC over Syria and has not put sufficient pressure on the Assad regime to exercise 
responsible protection, allowing Assad to exacerbate the crisis and resist the establish-
ment of legitimate inclusive governance. As discussed above, it tries to separate human 
rights from the debate over R2P, including at the UN. Russia’s readiness to contribute 
to the future of human rights protection is likely to be contingent on improvements in 
political relations with the Western liberal democracies – which at the time of writing 
appear a distant prospect.
8 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (2011) ‘Annex to the letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Perma-
nent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General Responsibility while 
protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept’, UN document A/66/551-S/2011/701, 
11 November. Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/551
9 A leading R2P scholar argues that the principle of sovereign equality has liberal roots; the notion that states 
are entitled to equal rights and self-government regardless of internal social and political arrangements “is 
firmly embedded in the United Nations Charter and in much of contemporary international law” (Welsh 2010: 
427).
Conclusion
Russia’s position over R2P, rooted in the WSO document and situated within an inter-
national legal framework that privileges the sovereign equality of states, accords with 
the consensus among the emerging powers. Responsible protection must be achieved by 
states themselves, albeit with international assistance; international involvement should 
be in tune with local conditions (see Bellamy 2015: 181). The second pillar of prevention 
should constitute the basis for action, rather than recourse to coercive intervention under 
the third pillar, which must be implemented solely through the UNSC, exercise proportion-
ality and be used a last resort. Russia’s approach does not exclude humanitarian consid-
erations but rests on the inviolability of national sovereignty as the fundamental basis of 
international order; human rights norms, as understood in and promoted by the West, do 
not constitute a central element of its foreign policy. In dealing with Russia – and indeed 
with the other emerging powers (see Bloomfield 2015: 51) – advocacy groups will have to 
consider national approaches to human rights as well as to the political calculus which 
underpins specific R2P cases. Human rights advocates would do well to engage more 
closely with country and regional experts when devising strategies for states like Russia.
Russia’s involvement in Syria, together with its use of force in Ukraine – widely perceived 
as illegitimate, despite Moscow’s reference to the need to protect citizens – prompts 
three conclusions. First, the Libya and Syria conflicts appear to have raised the threshold 
for the implementation of effective protection against atrocity crimes. Second, Russia’s 
normative vision of a pluralist global order challenges some of the fundamental ideas 
of the Western liberal community; a ‘clash of values’ narrative has reinforced norma-
tive divides and complicated relations with the West even further (Averre 2016). Third, 
Moscow is prepared to rely on power politics to respond to the neglect of its national 
interests by a declining West (see Thakur 2013: 62). This does not mean that Russia will 
refuse to engage in international debates on the relationship between human rights and 
sovereignty, and on the legitimacy and legality of R2P and the mechanisms to enforce 
it. However, interpreting the context of Russian decision-making and the international 
and domestic factors that shape its professed values is crucial. A “more constructive 
and self-critical dialogue on global peace and security governance” (Benner et al. 2015: 
3) between Western countries and Russia is needed to enable effective and responsible 
protection in the future.
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How to counter a counter-narrative? 
Civilizational diversity and traditional values are key concepts in sophisticated attacks 
on human rights by the Russian government. Russia’s international counterparts ap-
pear to be at a loss when faced with its growing influence, arrogance, and impudence. 
Nonetheless, old style large-scale repression is hardly possible in Russia’s ‘imitational 
democracy’ and the country is not seeking international isolation. This offers opportuni-
ties to support and strengthen internal voices critical of Russia’s human rights record 
at home and abroad.
“Who would grasp Russia with the mind?
For her no yardstick was created:
Her soul is of a special kind,
By faith alone appreciated.”
These words, written in 1866 by Russian poet and career diplomat Fyodor Tyutchev, have 
remained relevant through centuries. Russians themselves often use this mantra to jus-
tify the country’s – and their own – uniqueness and it’s exclusive status compared to 
other nations. And Russia’s international counterparts at times cite it to demonstrate 
how impossible it is to understand Russia and the Russians, and to build a constructive, 
mutually respectful relationship. 
Today, as this collection of essays clearly demonstrates, Russia again uses its claim for 
uniqueness to backtrack from its international obligations, counterpoise itself to the 
broadly defined West and challenge the whole body of principles of international human 
rights. 
Twenty-five years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the hopes that Russia would 
become a reliable, law-respecting international counterpart, have been shattered. The 
return to repressive domestic policies and an aggressive, cynical foreign policy is more 
evident each year, and the international community at various levels appears to be at a 
loss, not knowing what to expect and how to address this. 
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As various authors note in this volume, in recent years Russia has more and more boldly 
presented the agenda of civilizational diversity and traditional values as a key count-
er-narrative to the concept of universality of human rights. 
Russian authorities have gone even further than their Soviet predecessors, painting an 
apocalyptical picture of intercultural, civilizational conflict resulting from ‘unilateral’ 
interpretation of human rights norms and their use for ‘political purposes’. 
Russia has also become much more sophisticated in its attacks on human rights both 
at home and abroad. These attacks include using unprecedented levels of propaganda, 
aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences (see Suslov’s essay in particular), and 
furthermore a number of indirect methods such as creating alternative organizations and 
treaties (see Cooley and Schaaf’s essay), and eroding and substituting the internationally 
recognized human rights principles – rather than rejecting them altogether (as, among 
others, Fawn describes in his contribution to this volume).
Amnesty International has been working on Russia for decades, supporting political pris-
oners and documenting a wide range of human rights violations inside the country as well 
as, increasingly, in the context of Russia’s role in the international arena. 
There is no doubt that over the last years the situation has again been deteriorating rap-
idly. Domestically, freedoms of association, assembly, and expression are under constant 
attack. 
The notorious registry of NGOs considered to be ‘foreign agents’ by now contains dozens 
of entries, requiring the NGOs concerned to put this stigmatizing label on all their publi-
cations and observe onerous reporting requirements, defiance of which entails hefty fines 
and criminal liability. More and more foreign organizations are labelled ‘undesirable’ on 
the grounds of posing a “threat to the country’s constitutional order, defence or state 
security”, with the immediate effect of rendering their presence, and any activity on their 
behalf, unlawful. 
Public protests are infrequent, since permission to hold them are rarely granted, and 
those who defied the ban or the rules are penalized through fines and detention.
State-run or state-controlled media channels, including the ones produced for foreign 
audiences, like Russia Today, produce unthinkable amounts of pure propagandistic ma-
terials and twist facts mercilessly, while a few remaining independent outlets and jour-
nalists face attacks and harassment. The control over mass media has by now extended 
over the Internet (as also Kulikova describes in her essay on Russia’s position on Internet 
governance and digital rights), with thousands of websites blocked by order of the state 
media regulator, and individuals facing criminal prosecution for online postings. 
Internationally, Russia is pursuing a dual policy of aggressive and shamelessly hypocrit-
ical actions aimed at intimidating opponents and restoring its super-power status with 
much more nuanced and sophisticated tactics of strategic alliances with non-Western 
partners. It maintains its positions and influence in the key international and regional 
institutions while it simultaneously defies international mechanisms that are not deemed 
suitable. And increasingly Russia interferes – through financial investments, espionage, 
and hacking – in political processes in the West. 
Examples of the former include the annexation of Crimea and continued support to sep-
aratists in eastern Ukraine, as well as the political and military support of president 
Bashar Al-Assad’s forces in Syria, which has resulted in thousands of casualties, in-
discriminate destruction of civilian property, and massive displacement, as well as in 
ongoing impunity for perpetrators due to Russia’s blocking of UN Security Council’s action 
referring Syria to the International Criminal Court. 
Russia’s double-faced, hypocritical foreign policy can be illustrated by Russia’s growing 
engagement with BRICS grouping (and the creation of its own financial body, the New 
Development Bank) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, its refusal to honour its 
obligations before international bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights, and 
recent revelations about Russia’s alleged interference in elections in the United States 
and some European countries. 
As indicated in earlier volumes of this Shifting Power and Human Rights Diplomacy se-
ries, and in the introduction to this volume, analysis of the voting behaviour of emerging 
powers in the UN Security Council on human rights issues shows that Russia, together 
with China, is leading an international coalition that is increasingly reluctant to use 
the UN to criticize the human rights records of other states (see also Ferdinand 2014). 
Elsewhere this group of UN member states has been dubbed the Axis of Sovereignty and 
it has been argued that “the Russian and Chinese vetoes are a permanent impediment to 
progress on human rights issues” and that “if the Russian (and Chinese) influence over 
the UN on human rights subjects at the UN remains unabated” the UN risks becoming 
even more paralysed (Gowan & Brantner 2008).
Simultaneously, Russia invested heavily in building its international image and aggres-
sively promoting its own understanding of human rights and democracy. It has done this 
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through bilateral relations and new regional institutions, resulting in a spill-over effect 
with other states in the region – and in Europe – accepting Russia’s version of democracy 
and even adopting similar repressive laws. 
Notably, and somewhat surprisingly, Russia’s key international counterparts appear to 
be at a loss when faced with Russia’s growing influence, arrogance, and impudence. 
For years, they simply chose to look the other way and pretend that Russia’s abusive 
war in Chechnya, arms supplies to rogue governments, aggressive anti-Western rhetoric 
and domestic crackdown were just minor bumps on the country’s otherwise steady path 
towards democracy and rule of law. 
It was not until the war with Georgia, the Magnitsky case (a Russian lawyer who died in 
prison after exposing high-level corruption), and annexation of Crimea that the interna-
tional community started to wake up. Yet, the condemnation and even sanctions which 
finally followed, seemed to be too little and too late to influence Russia’s behaviour at 
home or abroad. If anything, Western sanctions and criticism have been strategically 
played by the Russian leadership domestically to boost the patriotic, anti-Western moods. 
Under these circumstances, devising a strategy aimed at improving the human rights 
situation in Russia and at minimizing its destructive influence internationally is a chal-
lenging task. 
Such a strategy should be based on a twofold approach. First, it must rely on an under-
standing of the nature of Russia’s current political and socio-economic realities, and 
use this understanding to develop efficient, and perhaps non-conventional, ways of en-
gagement with the Russian public, civil society groups, and, to the extent possible, its 
leadership. This could involve, as many authors argue above, engaging with non-tradi-
tional actors such as the Russian Orthodox Church. And second, it must recognize that 
any Russia-focused human rights strategy cannot exist and be successful in isolation 
and needs to be developed as part of a more global, multinational, and multi-institutional 
human rights strategy. 
To be relevant and effective in our work in and on Russia, human rights organizations need 
to acknowledge that what we see there is a fairly new political phenomenon. Russia is not, 
as some are trying to claim, on the way to becoming a neo-fascist, totalitarian dictator-
ship, nor is it on the way back to its Soviet empire days. Instead, nowadays, Russia is a 
classic example of what political scientists have labelled a hybrid regime, a ‘non-liberal’, 
‘imitational democracy’, or an ‘electoral authoritarianism’. 
In such regimes, democratic institutions are decorative, rather than real. Elections are 
held, but their outcome is irrelevant since the same people remain in power. There are 
various mass media channels, but most of them report the same, state-generated or 
controlled message. Civil society organizations are allowed to exist, but unable to operate 
due to severe administrative restrictions (or, as Demidov and Belokurova illustrate in their 
essay, government-run NGOs are being set up as soft power tools of the government). And 
political opposition is not banned, but is too weak and passive to play a prominent role.
Such regimes are very different from totalitarian dictatorships because they rely on a pas-
sive rather than an active position of the population (as famous Russian political scientist 
Ekaterina Shulman shows in one of her recent articles1). While the authorities enjoy over-
whelming support, confirmed through elections and opinion polls, this support is passive. 
This has several implications. Firstly, large-scale repressions, typical for totalitarian re-
gimes, are hardly possible since they require active participation of a significant part of 
the population. Secondly, authorities are particularly concerned about the active minority 
(which includes independent journalists, human rights activists, bloggers, and other civil 
society actors) which it sees as a threat – this explains dozens of repressive laws which 
in theory a government with such overwhelming popular support should not need. Thirdly, 
and most importantly, it also means that opportunities exist to support this active minority 
and to find ways to sway at least some of the passive majority into a more active position. 
Amnesty International’s Russia strategy is heavily focused on helping Russian NGOs to 
develop, strengthen and disseminate positive messages, and on promoting an under-
standing of the value and contribution of these organizations and human rights defend-
ers for the well-being of Russian citizens, Russian society and the state. And, at the same 
time, on convincing the authorities that maintaining space for civil society and human 
rights defenders is crucial for Russia’s international image and its inclusion as an equal 
counterpart in international fora. As Demidov and Belokurova argue, such engagement 
should not be limited to traditional, long-standing partners, but should involve starting 
a dialogue with other civil society groups, including the government-controlled ones. 
The strategy also involves developing a narrative and focusing on issues that would 
resonate with the majority of Russians – such as the right to health, or abuses in the 
judicial system. It involves, in other words, demonstrating in practical terms that interna-
tional human rights norms that Russia has signed up to are there to protect the citizens 
themselves rather than to undermine Russia’s credibility in the international arena. As 
1 Shulman, E. (2014) ‘Kingdom of Political Imitation’, Vedomosti, August 15. Available at:  
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2014/08/15/carstvo-imitacii.
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part of this trend, it is crucial to demonstrate to the Russian society the objectivity, in-
dependence and value of international organizations – including by wide dissemination 
of materials and information documenting human right violations in other countries.
In terms of Russia’s foreign policy, it would be naïve to expect dramatic changes that 
would turn Russia into a protector and promoter of human rights overnight. It is important 
to continue to expose Russia’s unlawful military actions, destructive interventions in var-
ious international bodies, and support of abusive regimes. It is important to use existing 
mechanisms that Russia is part of – such as the Council of Europe, the Human Rights 
Council, and many others – to call Russia to account. And, as Cooley and Schaaf suggest, 
to engage with new institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) which could become potential new advocacy 
forums to halt the erosion of human rights standards by balancing the counter norms 
that Russia and China try to spread through these institutions.
It is equally important to pressure Russia’s international partners to keep Russia’s do-
mestic and international human rights record high on the agenda in their bilateral and 
multilateral interactions. As some of the authors argued, Russia is not ready for, and is 
not seeking, international isolation. On the opposite, despite its arrogant policies, it is 
still constantly seeking opportunities for engagement and recognition – including with 
the West (e.g. see both Sergunin’s and Bowring’s essays on Russia’s relations with Europe 
and its institutions). Finally, without trying to be overly optimistic, it is not inconceivable 
to find areas where Russia would be able and willing to render its support for human 
rights values internationally or in a particular country situation (abolition of death penalty 
or support for humanitarian aid delivery could be such examples), and such opportunities 
should not be overlooked. 
There is no question that the situation inside Russia and its international stance, in-
cluding its strategic partnerships with non-Western, illiberal regimes in the region and 
globally present a major, growing challenge for the human rights movement. And given 
the developments in Europe, the United States, and more globally, this situation is not 
likely to improve imminently. Nonetheless, one should remember that the seemingly inde-
structible totalitarian system empowered by the Soviet Union and dominating significant 
parts of the world for many decades, eventually crumbled and crashed, and on its ruins 
many states have developed into functional democracies and active, positive interna-
tional players. For someone like me, who had lived through this transition, it is a stark 
reminder that change is possible, and that as human rights activists we have an ultimate 
responsibility to continue supporting Russia’s struggling civil society, whose survival is 
crucial for this change to happen.
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